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“(Dis)Placing the American Revolution: The British Province of Quebec in the Greater Colonial 
Struggle, 1759-1783” is a transregional history of the American Revolution. It examines the 
efforts of colonial subjects, revolutionary agents, and British imperial administrators in North 
America to negotiate a place for Quebec within the Revolutionary struggles of the period. 
Drawing from material from both Canadian and American archives, this study investigates the 
attempts of historical actors located in and outside of Quebec, who took seriously the possibility 
that the province would join the United Colonies. In doing so, they helped negotiate the meaning 
of independence along the political and territorial boundaries of that very colony. This study 
argues that this process of geopolitical imagining only ceased when the American Revolutionary 
War ended in 1783.  
 
By reintegrating Quebec into the study of Revolutionary America, “(Dis)Placing the American 
Revolution” doubles as a spatial history of the revolution more broadly. It dislodges the colonial 
struggle from the constricting boundaries of the thirteen colonies that have so regularly framed 
studies of the period. It, thereby, provides analytical space from which to formulate questions 
and understandings of the revolution that reflect the geographic realities of the time. The very 
  
language with which congressional delegates articulated independence allowed for Quebec’s 
potential entry into the union. Although that never came to pass, recognizing the fluidity of the 
revolution’s geographic dimensions—as they were negotiated—is necessary to better understand 
the multifaceted motivations that undergirded the revolutionary action of the period. In this way, 
while this study is seemingly limited to Quebec, its historiographical significance is broader, 
reframing scholarly understandings of the revolution in Britain’s twenty-six American colonies.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
On Places and Placings 
 
“In reality of course, people make their own geography as well 
as their own history.” - Raymond Craib1  
 
In mid-January 1776, the paths of two military officers crossed in Hartford, Connecticut. 
While passing through the city, General Charles Lee of the Continental Army encountered the 
imprisoned British Major Christopher French. Over the course of an evening, they exchanged 
competing assessments about the ongoing military struggles of the period. Eventually, they 
decided to place money on their predictions, settling on a bet of “ten guineas” over the 
Continental Army’s prospects in Canada. Strictly referring to the army’s Canadian Campaign of 
1775-1776—the first major military offensive of the Revolutionary War—French foresaw a 
British victory whereas Lee believed the odds favored the Continental forces.2  
Despite the specificity of their wager, however, Lee and French’s predictions pertained to 
more than just a particular military engagement; they also concerned the colony of Quebec, or 
Canada, as it was better known.3 The campaign in question was, after all, primarily waged in an 
effort to overthrow Canada’s British colonial government and integrate the newly “liberated” 
colony into the nascent union of the United Colonies.4 In the words of the historian J.H. Smith, 
                                                
1 Raymond Craib, Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 3-4. 
2 Christopher French Journal, 1776, American Revolution Collection, MS Amrev1776 (Box 6A, Q). Connecticut 
Historical Society, Hartford, Connecticut. See January 14 and May 10, 1776 entries. 
3 For purposes of clarity, I have chosen to refer to the province of Quebec as “Canada” and the city of Quebec as 
“Quebec.” 
4 For more on the Canadian Campaign, see Mark R. Anderson, The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: America’s 
War of Liberation in Canada, 1774-1776 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2013); Thomas A. Desjardin, 
Through a Howling Wilderness: Benedict Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006); 
Gustave Lanctôt, Le Canada et la Révolution Américaine (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1965); J.H. Smith, Our Struggle 
for the Fourteenth Colony: Canada, and the American Revolution (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1907), v.1-2; 
Hospice Anthelme Baptiste Verreau, Invasion du Canada: Collection de Mémoires Recueillis et Annotés par M. 
l'abbé Verreau, Ptre (Montréal: Eusèbe Senécal, 1873). 
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the campaign was Congress’s “Struggle for the fourteenth colony.”5 Simply by speculating on 
the campaign’s eventual outcome, therefore, both Lee and French had also offered their own 
prognoses on Canada’s future role in the Revolutionary struggles of the period. Even though they 
held conflicting opinions of what was to come, both officers knew that Canada’s future was an 
unsettled matter—something that could clearly lie at the very center of a bet.   
 
 
A Place: Canada 
 
The history of Canada and its role in the struggle for American independence is by no 
means a familiar tale. Although scholars of Early America have focused on certain aspects of the 
American Revolution that either directly or indirectly involved Canada, they have often done so 
in ways that reinforce perceived assumptions about the colony and its irrelevance to the colonial 
unrest of the period. Most literature on the Canadian Campaign, for instance, can largely be 
described as the careful, detailed overview of a military expedition that appears tangential to the 
Revolutionary War more broadly. The colony itself has fared even worse. More than tangential, 
Canada has continuously appeared wholly out of place in studies of the struggle, as though it was 
somehow located outside of the geographic boundaries of revolution.  
But as the actions of Charles Lee and Christopher French help demonstrate, between the 
years 1774 and 1783, Canada’s relation to its colonial neighbors remained an open question. 
Although under British control for the duration of that period, the colony’s inhabitants were 
often invited to join the nascent union of the United Colonies. As early as the fall of 1774, 
delegates from the First Continental Congress penned a nine-page address to their “Friends and 
fellow-subjects” in Canada, encouraging them to both elect and send their own delegates to the 
                                                
5 Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony. 
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Second Continental Congress, scheduled to meet in Philadelphia that following spring.6 That 
would prove to be the first of many similar solicitations, all of which represented only one 
strategy for formally incorporating the northern colony into the union.7 In addition to explicit 
invitations to join their association, Congress sanctioned military action such as its Canadian 
Campaign, oversaw the creation of bureaucratic channels specifically designed to facilitate the 
Canada’s future inclusion in its confederation of states, and made clear—when formalizing its 
alliance with France—that the colony would fall under its control even if conquered by French 
forces.8 For congressional delegates, the possibility that Canada could one day join their union 
warranted such serious consideration that they took meticulous care to ensure they could control 
what form that incorporation would take.   
Of all of Congress’s attempts to secure Canada’s formal incorporation, however, the 
Continental Army’s Canadian Campaign proved to be its most robust. In the end, it would also 
be the closest the governing body ever got to realizing the highly sought out association. Within 
just two months of their arrival in Canada, the Continental forces would proudly claim control of 
most of the colony, including the city of Montreal, where the army established its Canadian 
headquarters. By mid-November 1776, the only British stronghold left standing was Quebec 
City, the fortified colonial capital of Canada. It was over the fate of this particular city that Lee 
                                                
6 Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1904-1937) (hereafter JCC), 1: 105-113. For a French translation of the address, see Marcel Trudel, 
ed. La Tentation Américaine, 1774-1783: La Révolution Américaine et le Canada: Textes Commentés (Québec: 
Septentrion, 2006); Simon Sanguinet, "Le témoin oculaire de la guerre des Bastonnois en Canada dans les années 
1775 et 1776: Journal de M. Sanguinet" in Verreau, Invasion du Canada, 4-18.  
7 For a selection of similar invitations, see Trudel, ed. La Tentation Américaine.  
8 In Article XI of the Articles of Confederation, Congress stipulated that if Canada’s inhabitants acceded “to this 
Confederation, and [joined] in the measures of the United States,” it “shall be admitted into and entitled to all of the 
advantages of the Union.” See JCC 9:879-880. When determining what their alliance with France would mean for 
Canada, should it fall to Continental or French forces, Congress had determined that the colony would naturally fall 
under their purview, see JCC, 12: 1044. 
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and French would disagree.  
In hindsight, it is difficult to fathom the degree of contingency that profoundly informed 
Lee and French’s wager. Despite the early successes the Continental forces enjoyed in Canada, 
the eventual failure of the campaign is regularly taken for granted. Scholars of the offensive have 
frequently described it as an ill-conceived venture destined to fail.9 Too often, the military 
offensive is found guilty by its association to Canada, a colony that hindsight teaches us 
remained outside of the limits of independence. Only thirteen colonies secured their 
independence from the British Empire in 1783, and Canada was not among them.  
 
 
Placings: The Other Thirteen Colonies 
 
Over the last several decades, historians of Early America have increasingly embraced 
continental, Atlantic, and transregional perspectives in their work, shedding greater light on 
previously overlooked historical regions and actors.10 In the process, Early America has become 
less and less synonymous with British America. Yet, as the historian Kathleen DuVal recently 
argued, “scholarship on the Revolution in particular has been slower to move beyond the thirteen 
                                                
9 For a recent attempt to call into question “the general verdict of historians… to label the invasion a failure,” see 
Kevin Phillips, 1775: A Good Year for Revolution (New York: Viking, 2012), 461-76. 
10 This trend has been widespread, impacting literature focused on different regions and time periods. For some 
examples of this shift, see Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas 
Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians 
and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Brett Rushforth, 
Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2012); Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York: Penguin Books, 2001). 
Although many Early Americanists have embraced this tendency to move beyond national or provincial boundaries 
in an era where either no such boundaries existed or were regularly crossed, others have not. Perhaps the most 
critical assessment was offered by historian Gordon Wood, who in a review of Bernard Bailyn’s Sometimes an Art: 
Nine Essays on History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), lamented what he viewed as a loss of focus in the field 
of Early America. For many scholars in the field, he argued, “the United States is no longer the focus of interest,” 
while “the boundaries of the colonial period of America have become mush and indistinct.” See Gordon S. Wood, 
“History in Context: The American Visio of Bernard Bailyn” The Weekly Standard (February 23, 2015). 
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colonies.”11 Such a geographic focus, so narrowly tied to the Eastern Atlantic seaboard, 
reinforces the mistaken assumption that North America’s history during the mid-1760s and mid-
1780s is best located in or very near thirteen of Britain’s colonies. Indeed, that line of thought is 
so pervasive that it has inspired a geographic shorthand readily used by academics and non-
academics alike: the thirteen colonies.  
Yet, if the tendency to associate the American Revolution with thirteen British colonies 
has enjoyed a disproportionally strong hold on studies of the Revolutionary era, it has been for 
practical reasons. It was, after all, at the very moment that thirteen united colonies declared their 
independence from the British Empire that the notion of singling out those colonies as their own 
unit even makes sense in the first place. As a shorthand, the thirteen colonies, specifically refers 
to the British colonies that would eventually form the geopolitical crux of the American 
Republic. Therefore, when studying an era so closely linked with the American Revolution, it 
seems almost natural to limit one’s focus to those colonies that formally rebelled.  
The trouble, though, is that the concept of the thirteen colonies becomes a shorthand for 
more than just a geographic place; the geographic unit also calls to mind a historical political 
process. Simply put, those colonies are understood to be the very ones that would eventually 
break apart from the British Empire. And so, despite the degree of contingency with which 
scholars of the Revolution have approached the period, some teleology remains. Even while 
scholars of the period have increasingly presented the revolution as far from predestined and as 
the product of various motivations as different as the communities whose actions they informed, 
the place—the specific set of colonies—in which the Revolution is believed to have emerged is 
generally taken for granted.  
                                                
11 Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 
2015), xxv. 
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What is more, because Britain counted twenty-six American colonies at the time of the 
revolution, the consolidation of thirteen of them into a single unit marks the creation of two 
geographic referents, not one. By virtue of their exclusion, Britain’s other thirteen colonies are 
lumped together into their own grouping, solely predicated on their colonial status at the end of 
the American Revolutionary War in 1783. For them, a unique teleology defines their relationship 
to the revolution: they were destined to not join their colonial counterparts in declaring 
independence. Indeed, places like Canada easily appear irrelevant to the struggle for American 
independence from the start—a status that proves immensely difficult to counter. 
 
 
The Exception that Proves the Rule? 
 
 Because Britain’s other thirteen colonies are designated as decidedly distinct from the 
those that formally rebelled, they bear the burden of their own significance within a 
historiography that limits their visibility. Constrained by their presumed irrelevance, places like 
Canada are easy to ignore until they appear exceptionally pertinent to the history of the 
revolution. For Canada, such moments of unique significance exist, but are confined to two 
incidences between the years 1774 and 1776—a narrow period bookended by the passage of the 
Quebec Act in June 1774 and the conclusion of the Continental Army’s Canadian Campaign 
some two years later. Parliament’s Quebec Act altered Canada’s administrative structure, 
sanctioned the practice of Catholicism, and expanded the colony’s boundaries.12 Controversial 
from the start, the legislation became a notable item in a growing list of grievances that fueled 
                                                
12 For more on the Quebec Act and its impact on the colonial administration of Canada, see Donald Fyson, 
Magistrates, Police and People: Everyday Criminal Justice in Quebec and Lower Canada (Toronto: Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2006); Hilda Neatby, The Administration of 
Justice under the Quebec Act (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1937); Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The 
Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966); Hilda Neatby, Quebec Act: 
Protest and Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1972). 
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colonial unrest in much of British America. Given the timing, many even considered the act to be 
part of Parliament’s loathed Coercive Acts, which colonists had quickly dubbed “Intolerable.” 
Neither the Quebec Act nor the Canadian Campaign can be studied without at least some 
mention of the Canada. 
Yet, rather than testify to Canada’s overall significance to the Revolutionary struggles, 
the Quebec Act and the Canadian Campaign are hindered by the very exceptionality that renders 
them noteworthy in the first place. Because their connection to the revolution seems exceptional, 
it can also appear anomalous. And, in the end, by presenting them as peculiar episodes of the 
Revolutionary era, scholars of the revolution have acknowledged, made reference, and even 
analyzed both the Quebec Act and the Canadian Campaign without undermining the primacy of 
the thirteen colonies. 
Although the Quebec Act proved odious to many colonists in British America, scholars 
of the period have dismissed the legislation’s significance to the revolution because of the 
circumstances surrounding its passage. As they have rightly argued, the act was the end product 
of four years of deliberation. Often, they have gone on to argue that because of the Quebec Act’s 
inception, it was only associated to the Coercive Acts because of unfortunate timing.13 
Consequently, the perceived link between the Quebec Act and legislation like the Boston Port 
Act or the Massachusetts Government Act seems merely coincidental in hindsight. With regard 
to the Canadian Campaign, the tendency to view it as both ill-conceived and ill-fated has done 
much to paint the whole endeavor as anomalous already. But scholars have also tended to 
suggest that because it was the Continental Army’s first major military expedition, the campaign 
was also more symptomatic of the early, directionless days of the Revolutionary War, and not 
                                                
13 See especially Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989). 
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ultimately representative of the broader war effort. The fact that the army would never again 
launch a similar campaign lends credence to that line of thinking.  
Yet, things start to crumble when one digs below the surface. The Canadian Campaign, 
for example, certainly proved the only military offensive into Canada during the war, but it was 
not the only one that was proposed or expected. As the Revolutionary War progressed, 
individuals living in and outside of Canada encouraged, feared, and even planned for a second 
Canadian campaign; Congress itself even sanctioned one of those schemes for a brief period.14 
When analyzed alongside those unrealized or abandoned schemes, the Canadian expedition of 
1775-1776 appears much less like an anomaly, and much more like a single event within a larger 
story. That story, however, requires moving past the thirteen colonies; it requires displacing the 
American Revolution from the geographic framework to which it has long been constrained. 
 
 
Displacing the American Revolution 
 
Bringing into focus the shared histories of Canada and the American Revolution does not 
mean denying the existence of the United Colonies or the fact that, in 1775, the union consisted 
of thirteen members. It does, however, require acknowledging that this geopolitical configuration 
was never assumed to be a closed-off confederation—that other British colonies could, under 
certain circumstances, join that association. In fact, the union began with only twelve colonies, 
and only after the delegates from the United Twelve Colonies invited the inhabitants of Georgia 
to join them did that last colony became a member. 
 By recognizing the fluidity surrounding the makeup of the United Colonies, this 
                                                
14 These unfulfilled schemes are the subject of Chapter Five. For the efforts of one particular military officer named 
Moses Hazen and his efforts to rally support for a second campaign into Canada, see Allan S. Everest, Moses Hazen 
and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976). 
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dissertation encourages readers to appreciate the fact that only thirteen colonies ultimately 
secured their independence from the British Empire without, at the same time, assuming that 
such a future was predestined. Instead of eventual outcomes, this dissertation concerns itself with 
some of the lived possibilities that preceded them. It takes seriously the galvanizing expectations 
that allowed individuals in late eighteenth-century America to not only envision an independent 
confederation of states that included Canada and its inhabitants, but to also act on those 
convictions. That future never came to light, but for countless individuals, its potential 
realization shaped their understanding of American independence in one way or another. This 
dissertation sheds greater light on their experiences. 
This dissertation consists of five chapters organized chronologically. It opens in 1759, 
following the British occupation of Quebec. In Chapter One, I investigate the shifting 
relationship of British colonists in North America to certain locations within the increasingly 
British-occupied New France, especially the city of Quebec. In particular, I examine the role of 
almanacs and newspapers in facilitating those relationships, arguing that printed sources often 
integrated Quebec into the lived and imagined geographies of British Americans. I build off of 
that geographic foundation in Chapter Two, which analyzes the ways colonial migration, 
mercantile networks, and parliamentary legislation shaped the first overt attempts to incorporate 
Quebec within the nascent confederation of the United Colonies of America. I argue that the 
Quebec Act of 1774 sparked the efforts of congressional delegates to invite Canadian subjects to 
directly participate in the union, but only did so because of preexisting connections that date 
back to 1759.     
 Chapters Three and Four focus on the Continental Army’s Canadian Campaign of 1775-
1776, the first major military offensive of the Revolutionary War. Both chapters explore the role 
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of military conflict in further negotiating Quebec’s relationship to the revolution. Although 
scholars have frequently described the enterprise as “ill-fated,” I argue that the campaign 
represented the greatest threat to the colony’s British administration. Chapter Three, in 
particular, brings into focus Quebec’s French-speaking, agrarian peasantry known as the 
habitants. Habitant communities made up the vast majority of the population, but have remained 
either obscure or presented as passive, impressionable observers in much of the literature on the 
Canadian Campaign. In contrast, I argue that habitant communities both resisted colonial 
policies and formed alliances with the Continental forces in ways that allowed the military 
offensive to prove a valid threat to imperial authority.  
Chapter Four concludes my treatment of the Canadian Campaign, arguing that scholars 
have regularly imbued its end with a greater sense of finality than is warranted. As my 
dissertation demonstrates, the Continental Army’s defeat in 1776 marked the end of that 
particular offensive, but was followed by continued attempts to incorporate Quebec into the 
United Colonies. I analyze these efforts in Chapter Five, which traces a number of schemes 
that—although left unfulfilled—confirm the continuing importance of Quebec in the eyes of 
many. Although a second campaign into Quebec never took place, between 1777 and 1783, such 
expeditions were in fact proposed, planned for, and—at least in one instance—officially 
approved. 
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Chapter One  
The Road to Quebec: Reimagining British America 
 
“O! Ye unborn Inhabitants of America! Should this Page escape its 
destin’d Conflagration at the Year’s End, and these Alphabetical 
Letters remain legible, —when your Eyes behold, the Sun after he has 
rolled the Seasons round for two or three Centuries more, you will 
know that in Anno Domini 1758, we dream’d of your Times.” - 
Nathaniel Ames15  
 
Over the course of 1759, Nathaniel Ames did what he had done every year since 1725: he 
prepared the pages of the next edition of his popular almanac, An Astronomical Diary. Unlike 
those in earlier years, however, the changes he introduced in 1759 reflected shifting geopolitical 
realities brought about by the ongoing Seven Years’ War.16 Many of those alterations came in 
the wake of the widely celebrated British victory against French forces at Quebec City in that 
year. Indeed, most of the almanac’s supplemental material concerned the now British-occupied 
stronghold. Ames dedicated the last three pages of the handbook—a significant portion of the 
text not made up of monthly climatic and celestial forecasts—to describing the battle in a section 
entitled “On the Reduction of QUEBEC, Sept. 18, 1759, by General WOLFE and the brave 
Troops under his Command, &c.”17 In doing so, Ames both revealed and reinforced the general 
sense of significance that British subjects throughout the empire came to associate with Canada 
at the time.18 
Yet other changes Ames introduced more fully reflected the impact the victory had on 
                                                
15 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1758 (Boston, 1757). 
16 British American colonists often referred to the Seven Years’ War as the French and Indian War. I have avoided 
using the more informal designation because, although more reflective of the struggles colonists faced in North 
America, it obscures the global dimensions the war attained. Additionally, the Seven Years’ War was not the only 
such conflict that involved Native peoples and both French and British colonists in either the eighteenth or seventh 
centuries. On the Seven Years’ War as a global conflict, see especially Daniel A. Baugh, The Global Seven Years 
War, 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (Harlow, England/ New York: Longman, 2011); 
Mark H. Danley and Patrick J. Speelman, The Seven Years’ War: Global Views (Boston: Brill, 2012). 
17 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1760 (Boston, 1759). 
18 The victory was celebrated in newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, songs, poems, and later plays. Many British 
subjects celebrated the victory during days specifically designated for public thanksgiving. 
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British America specifically than on the British Empire as a whole. In part, his almanacs 
revealed attempts to situate the conquered territory within a network of roads that made up the 
local, colonial geographies of British America. Although the military victory at Quebec was an 
indisputable imperial triumph, colonists like Ames also bestowed meaning on that success by 
first positioning Quebec within a geographic vernacular that was uniquely theirs. These 
alterations shed light on an often-overlooked shift in studies of the period. Although countless 
British subjects celebrated the victory as an imperial success, and scholars have justifiably 
argued that “Americans were never more British than in 1763”19 (when the war formally ended), 
colonists in British North America experienced many of the geopolitical consequences of the war 
in ways that were decidedly different than those of individuals elsewhere in the empire. This was 
especially true in regards to Canada.  
To be sure, studies of the war have certainly emphasized both the immediate and long-
term consequences of the war on North America’s colonial and native populations.20 Yet, the 
victories as well as the defeats that peppered the American theater of war before the war’s formal 
conclusion are almost always viewed and presented through an imperial lens. The victory on the 
Plains of Abraham, credited with eventually ousting the French from North America, for 
example, is almost always considered an imperial victory that ended up severing the bonds of 
empire between Britain and thirteen of its American mainland colonies. Ultimately, these 
arguments are sound, as the changes brought about by the 1763 Treaty of Paris did fuel colonial 
                                                
19 As Quoted in Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 10. 
20 See especially Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North 
America, 1754-1766 (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2000); Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen; S. Max Edelson, The New 
Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America before Independence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); 
Lawson, The Imperial Challenge; Jean-Pierre Sawaya, Alliance et Dépendence: Comment la Couronne Britannique 
a Obtenu la Collaboration des Indiens de la Vallée de Saint-Laurent entre 1760 et 1774 (Québec: Septentrion, 
2002). 
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resentment in the years leading up to American independence. However, solely approaching the 
victory as an imperial one obscures unique ways in which British colonists in America made 
sense of the shifting circumstances in ways that would shape their own understanding of British 
America and its geographic contours. With the British occupation of Quebec, for instance, many 
colonists in neighboring or relatively nearby colonies felt themselves compelled to reimagine 
their relationship to that city as well as to other locations in New France. As Ames’s almanacs 
help clarify, for many that process involved rethinking geographic connections before anything 
else.  
Like other almanac-makers of the time, Ames had begun including sections on colonial 
roads by the time he was preparing the 1760 edition of An Astronomical Diary.21 These sections 
listed the distances between certain colonial towns and cities situated along well-maintained 
postal roads, often including the taverns, inns, and ferries that either connected those places or 
provided respite for travelers moving along particular routes. In 1759, Ames expanded his 
section on roads to include destinations in New France, such as “De Prarie,” Montreal, and 
Quebec City (Figure 1.1). He announced the changes in his address to his “Courteous Reader,” 
explaining that he had made “an Addition to the Account of the Several Stages and Roads”—a 
disclaimer that, by bringing more attention to it, likely encouraged his readers to peruse that 
section more carefully than they might otherwise have done.22 With new destinations included, 
Ames’s 1760-almanac now included information on “The Road to Albany & Quebec,” linking 
Boston to Quebec, together with various locations in between. Under Quebec, Ames explained: 
                                                
21 Nathaniel Ames started including a section on colonial roads in his 1759 edition of his almanac. In an address to 
his “Kind Reader,” Ames announced the change, explaining “I have procured also the several Stages on the Roads 
from Boston to New-York, &c. from those who have often travelled them, which may be depended upon to be exact, 
as they have been taken down lately, and not from the Roads published these many Years past in other Almanacks.” 
Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1759 (Boston, 1758). 
22 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1760 (Boston, 1759). 
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“This last Place surrendered to his Britannic Majesty’s Troops on the 18th of September, 1759,” 
narrating the particular importance associated with that city, and shaping the manner in which a 
reader would understand its inclusion.23  
 
Figure 1.1: Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1760, 19. 
By including the names and distances to places in New France, Ames was likely 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
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responding to a growing interest in France’s American empire that the Seven Years’ War seemed 
to spark. A mere two years earlier, Ames had explicitly identified that trend, explaining to the 
readers of his 1758 almanac: “AMERICA is a Subject which daily becomes more and more 
interesting,” after which he proceeded to describe its “Past, Present and Future State.”24 Yet, he 
tellingly limited his discussion of its present state to the ongoing contest between Britain and 
France, claiming “At this Time two mighty Kings contend for this inestimable Prize.”25 By the 
end of 1759, in the wake of the British victory at Quebec, the subject of America, particularly 
French America, could only have seemed of greater interest. In fact, in the 1760 issue, Ames also 
chose to include other subsections on roads, including his “Account of the Distance of Places 
from the Mouth of the River St. Lawrence to Missisippi [sic].”26  
Ames’s alterations amounted to more than simply additional information that his readers 
would now have access to, as sites in New France—like Quebec—were formally incorporated 
into the imagined and lived geographies of British colonists in the process. Notably, headings 
such as “The Road to Albany & Quebec” did more than just outline information on places 
leading up to and connecting Albany and Quebec, they also underscored the fact that one road 
connected these two cities. In doing so, Ames provided British colonists with one of the most 
accessible ways through which to integrate New France into geographic categories that were 
already part of their daily existence: colonial roads. Perhaps most importantly, he did so through 
a medium that would have a pervasive and sustained effect on his audience.  
By 1759, Ames himself was well aware that his almanacs would find their way into tens 
of thousands of homes in the New England and middle Atlantic colonies. Almanacs were some 
                                                
24 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1758 (Boston, 1757).  
25 Ibid. 
26 Nathaniel Ames, An Astronomical Diary for 1760 (Boston, 1759). 
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of the few printed sources that regularly made it into the typical colonial household. In her study 
of Early American almanacs, Marion Barber Stowell described them as the “colonial weekday 
bible.”27 Less recently, Samuel Briggs dubbed them a once “honored guest at every fireside.”28 
Indeed, the average colonial library consisted of a bible, an almanac, a primer, and possibly some 
sermons.29 And if that was the case for almanacs in general, it was especially so for Ames’s An 
Astronomical Diary, which was the most popular handbook of its time. By the mid-1770s, his 
almanac alone sold about 60,000 copies per year.30  
Therefore, the information Ames included in his almanacs—as well as the manner in 
which it was presented—would have profound impact in New England and neighboring regions, 
where it could be shared with nearby family and friends. And subjects covered in a given 
almanac would likely be revisited time after time, feeding thoughts and fueling discussion. In his 
edited volumes of Nathaniel Ames III’s diary, Robert Brand Hanson described the link between 
almanac ubiquity and influence, claiming that: “It must be remembered that an almanac (aside 
from the fact that it was likely to be, in many households, the only piece of printed material to 
enter the home in a given year) was, almost by definition, a document to be saved and consulted 
repeatedly.”31 Hanson argued that through constant exposure, together with the “occasional 
direct effort,” individuals regularly “committed to memory and to the collective parlance” much 
                                                
27 Marion Barber Stowell, Early American Almanacs; The Colonial Weekday Bible (New York: B. Franklin, 1977). 
28 Samuel Briggs, The Essays, Humor, and Poems of Nathaniel Ames, Father and Son, of Dedham, Massachusetts, 
from Their Almanacks, 1726-1775 (Cleveland: Short & Forman, 1891), 13.  
29 Stowell, Early American Almanacs, x. 
30 By 1775, with its last issue, the Ames almanacs had a market that encompassed “New England, most of the 
middle-Atlantic colonies, and even eastern Canada.” See Robert Brand Hanson, ed., The Diary of Dr. Nathaniel 
Ames of Dedham, Massachusetts, 1758-1822 (Camden, Maine: Picton Press, 1998), 1: 119. 
31 Hanson, ed. The Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames of Dedham, Massachusetts, 1: 119. As Stowell put it: “The almanac 
was, perforce, a miscellany: it was clock, calendar, weatherman, reporter, textbook, preacher, guidebook, atlas, 
navigational aid, doctor, bulletin board, agricultural advisor, and entertainer. The entire colonial family consulted its 
almanacs freely and regularly.” See Stowell, Early American Almanacs, ix. 
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of the material found in almanacs.32 Ames’s 1760 almanac, it seems, would likely be a key factor 
fueling ongoing discussion in New England of the celebrated British victory at Quebec during 
the year 1760.  
What is more, Ames was not alone in presenting Quebec as a notable topic of 
conversation. Indeed, given his profession as an almanac-maker, Ames worked hard to ensure he 
was including information that was either useful or at least understood as a subject of interest for 
his readers. This often meant that he not only kept abreast of current events, but also of the 
information deemed relevant or noteworthy by other almanac-makers. The shift so, noticeable in 
Ames’s almanacs, was also visible in those of others. 
 
The “Canada versus Guadeloupe” Debate 
 
 Almanac makers were not wrong to consider the British victory at Quebec a notable topic 
of conversation. Not only was Quebec at the center of countless sermons, poems, songs, and 
toasts made in the wake of the celebrated success, the eventual fate of the occupied city was 
almost immediately debated. At question was whether Britain should retain its recent conquest 
once the war ended. Doing so was by no means guaranteed, given that the war was still 
underway and French forces near Quebec were attempting to regain control of the city. Even if 
Britain claimed the city—or French Canada more generally—at the end of the war, the victorious 
nation could still return the conquered territory to France as it had done previously in King 
George’s War.33 Within this atmosphere of jubilation mixed with uncertainty, many weighed the 
benefits and negatives of Britain retaining the conquered territory, with some doing so in print. 
                                                
32 Ibid., 1: 119. 
33 British forces captured the Fortress of Louisbourg in 1745. Although some imperial agents were in favor of 
keeping the fortress, Britain formally returned it in with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). 
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Eventually, because the British had already captured the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe 
in May of 1759, the debate over Quebec’s future came to involve the earlier conquest. Although 
interested in presenting more than just a simple comparison between the two regions, many 
British subjects argued over which conquest would be more valuable to retain. 
 Benjamin Franklin, a British American colonist who was in London during the Battle of 
Quebec, was among the first to chime in on the matter.34 By late November, just over a month 
after news of the victory had reached Britain, Franklin wrote a pointed critique of all individuals 
who advocated for a quick peace and end to the war. He was especially critical of ministry 
officials and merchants, whom he concluded were motivated by the prospect of their own 
personal gain. Franklin’s commentary, which he titled “A Description of Those, Who, at Any 
Rate, Would Have a Peace with France,” was published in The London Chronicle and got 
straight to the point. He claimed that “Power and Self-interest” were the only prevailing motives 
influencing “great numbers of people, at this time, to wish for a peace with France” even if the 
terms of that peace would prove “dishonourable,” “disadvantageous,” and fleeting to Britain.35 
He went on to lambaste those who strove to “diminish the Importance of every conquest we 
make, that the people mayn’t grow too fond of keeping them.”36 For Franklin, the importance of 
Britain’s recent conquest was neither immediate nor constrained to the limits of Quebec City. 
Rather, the significance rested on its promise—on what the victory could portend, both in terms 
of the ongoing war effort and for the overall morale among British subjects. 
 A month later, Franklin addressed the subject again. This time, rather than solely 
                                                
34 In the fall of 1759, Benjamin Franklin was in London in order to represent the Pennsylvania Assembly in its legal 
battle with the Penn family.  
35 Leonard W. Labaree, et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959-
2014) (hereafter BFP), 8: 446-447. 
36 Ibid.  
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critiquing proponents of an early peace, he aimed his criticisms at those who also advocated 
restoring Quebec—and all future British conquests in Canada—to France. In terms of style, he 
also took a different approach, this time opting for satire. The result was his “Humourous 
Reasons for Restoring Canada,” which—like his earlier article—appeared on the pages of The 
London Chronicle in late December.37 Franklin presented in ironic fashion the so-called benefits 
the British Empire would reap by restoring Canada to France “if we reduce it.”38 Among other 
arguments, he reasoned: “We should restore Canada, that we may soon have a new war, and 
another opportunity of spending two or three millions a year in America; there being great 
danger of our growing too rich.”39 And if that did not stress the excessive wastefulness of 
sacrificing Quebec enough, Franklin later asked: “What can be braver, than to show all Europe 
we can afford to lavish our best blood as well as our treasure, in conquests we do not intend to 
keep? Have we not plenty of Howe’s, and Wolfe’s, &c. &c. &c. in every regiment?” After all, 
Franklin eventually concluded, “it has always been the character of the English to fight strongly, 
and negotiate weakly; generally agreeing to restore, at a peace, what they ought to have kept, and 
to keep what they had better restored.”40 
 Franklin’s objective was to undermine all arguments for restoring Canada—if, indeed, 
the region fell to British forces—by the subtle logic of satire. Once having read his eleven 
“reasons” for restoring Canada, a reader was expected to reach the obvious conclusion that doing 
so was simply and inescapably foolish. Yet, leaving nothing to chance, Franklin at one point in 
                                                
37 Benjamin Franklin’s pamphlet The Interest of Great Britain Considered is perhaps the best-known publications of 
the “Canada versus Guadeloupe” debate. Yet, preceding that publication by a number of months, his “Humourous 
Reasons for Restoring Canada” presented an early—and ironic—version of many of the arguments he would later 
explore more fully in his pamphlet. See Verner W. Crane, ed., Benjamin Franklin’s Letters to the Press 1758-1775 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950).  
38 BFP, 8: 449.  
39 Ibid., 8: 450. 
40 Ibid., 8: 452. 
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his letter depicted the policy of restoring Canada as morally questionable as well. After 
describing in incendiary language the near-constant, unprovoked violent acts that the French and 
their Native allies allegedly inflicted on British America’s exposed, defenseless, and apparently 
innocent northern frontier settlements, Franklin sarcastically advised his readers that despite 
these evils, “let not us be the executioners of Divine justice.”41 As he saw it, the British 
annexation of Canada was not only the smart move, it was the virtuous one as well. To instead 
restore it to France was to either prevent or prolong God’s plan. 
 Replete as Franklin’s letter was with “benefits” that would stem from restoring Canada to 
France, it also clearly indicated what he thought an expanded British Empire that included the 
region would bring. In addition to increasing British commerce by securing a monopoly on the 
Native American fur trade, it would “occasion a large additional demand for [British] 
manufactures.”42 This was a particularly crucial point, as one of the most persuasive arguments 
for restoring Canada at the time was the possibility that without a powerful enemy curtailing 
British American expansion, the crown’s hold on its North American colonies would weaken and 
possibly even come to an end.43 It was likely in anticipation of these counterarguments that 
Franklin alluded to this advantageous consequence at the beginning of his letter.44  
 Like those with whom he disagreed, at least in regard to Canada, Franklin did view New 
France’s existence as constraining the growth of Britain’s North American colonies. But he 
contended that rather than severing the bonds of dependence that connected British Americans to 
                                                
41 Ibid., 8: 451. 
42 Ibid., 8: 450.  
43 Although this argument was not new, it was rendered a key component of the “Canada versus Guadeloupe” debate 
by William Burke in his pamphlet A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men (1759). Although it was Burke who first 
voiced that fear in print, it is likely that similar arguments had already been aired in more mundane conversations 
and debates throughout the British Empire.  
44 In fact, both of these claims are found near the top of Franklin’s letter. They make up much of his first “reason” 
for restoring Canada. 
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their king and ministry, the territorial expansion would strengthen those ties in ways that 
benefitted both the crown and its colonies. In hinting at this logic, Franklin began to formulate an 
argument that he would put forth in a more persuasive and detailed manner in just a few months. 
In his predictions, Franklin was not only arguing for the retention of conquered territory, he was 
also imagining what an expanded North American empire would mean. And in doing so, he 
envisioned the process through which Canada could enter Britain’s North American Empire, 
together with how British Americans themselves would enter Canada as well. Like Ames before 
him, Franklin approached the conquered city through a decidedly North American lens. 
 Yet months later, in his widely-read and famous pamphlet The Interest of Great Britain 
Considered, Franklin provided his most detailed and meticulous defense for retaining Canada. 
Writing in early 1760, Franklin acknowledged at the outset that “while the War continues” and 
“its final Event is quite uncertain,” “it may therefore be too early to say, what Advantages we 
ought absolutely to insist on.”45 However, he persuasively reasoned: “the unhappy Continuance 
of the War affords us Time to consider, among several Advantages gain’d or to be gain’d, which 
of them may be most for our Interest to retain.”46 And in what amounted to upwards of fifty 
pages, Franklin did just that, arguing strongly for the retention of Canada in the event that Britain 
claimed control of that region when the war finally came to an end.  
 Among other minor claims, his contentions revolved mostly around the economic 
advantages that would come to Britain from an expanded American presence as well as the 
increased sense of security that its subjects would feel. He even described three kinds of security 
available to Britain and its American colonies, insisting that only through the retention of Canada 
                                                
45  Benjamin Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain Considered: With Regard to her Colonies, and the Acquisitions 
of Canada and Guadaloupe (Boston, 1760), 5. 
46 Ibid., 5.  
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would Britain obtain them. As he described them, these kinds of security were: “1. A Security of 
Possession, that the French shall not drive us out of the Country. 2. A Security of our Planters 
from the Inroads of Savages, and the Murders committed by them. 3. A Security that the British 
Nation shall not be oblig’d, on every new War, to repeat the immense Expence occasion’d by 
this, to defend its Possessions in America.”47 He also took the time to meticulously refute any 
argument to the contrary. In fact, much of Franklin’s pamphlet clearly responded to another 
widely-read work: William Burke’s A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men.48 More generally, 
however, Franklin’s claims were components in what the historian J.M. Bumsted referred to as 
“the great press war of 1759-62” (also known as the “Canada versus Guadeloupe debate”).49  
 Superficially, the debate revolved around the empire’s supposed choice between retaining 
its conquests in Canada or Guadeloupe, and, indeed, many individuals who participated in the 
debate tended to favor the retention of one place or the other. However, as Bumsted correctly 
pointed out, “the press debate was far more general than the label ‘Canada versus Guadeloupe’ 
would suggest,” considering that a comparison of each conquest’s specific merits featured little 
in the pamphlet war.50 As Franklin’s own pamphlets make clear, many of the arguments found in 
the debate had more to do with British America and its future place in the empire than with the 
conquered territories themselves. 
 When responding to Burke’s Letter Addressed to Two Great Men, Franklin took 
particular issue with that pamphlet’s claim that the French presence in Canada was a necessary 
evil that prevented the American colonies from unchecked—and “dangerous”—expansion that 
                                                
47 Ibid., 11-12. 
48 William Burke, A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men (London, 1759). As suggested by its title, Burke’s 
pamphlet was, itself, a response to an earlier pamphlet.  
49 J.M. Bumsted, “The ‘Canada-Guadeloupe’ Debate and the Origins of the Grenville Programme for America” Man 
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50 Ibid. 
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could lessen the bonds of imperial allegiance and even inspire secession. More than once, 
Franklin denied the possibility that British Americans could come together in efforts to break 
away from the empire. In regards to this possibility, he declared, “there are so many Causes that 
must operate to prevent it, that I will venture to say, an Union amongst them for such a Purpose 
is not merely improbable, it is impossible.”51 He then added: “and if the Union of the Whole is 
impossible, the Attempt of a Part must be Madness: As those Colonies that did not join the 
Rebellion, would join the Mother Country in suppressing it.”52 The retention of Canada would 
not change those circumstances, but, according to Franklin, it would do away with the needless 
suffering and destruction that afflicted British subjects inhabiting the empire’s American frontier 
settlements. It would also bring more wealth to Britain, both by contributing greater stores of raw 
material to Britain and generating more consumers for British manufactured goods. And as 
Franklin saw it, those consumers would be both British migrants and the soon-to-be acculturated 
French subjects then living in Canada, but who would come to resemble British subjects 
elsewhere in British America. 
 Toward the end of his pamphlet, Franklin addressed what he described as another 
commonly-voiced objection to the British retention of Canada: the belief that the empire “could 
not People it without draining Britain of its Inhabitants.” In response, Franklin argued that not 
only would that not be the case, but the “peopling” of Canada with British subjects could occur 
without the migration of a single resident of Britain. “The annual Increment alone of our present 
Colonies,” he claimed “without diminishing their Numbers, or requiring a Man from [Britain], is 
sufficient, in ten Years, to fill Canada with double the Number of English that it now has of 
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French Inhabitants.”53 His conjectures were founded on the contemporary rate of natural 
increase in British America as well as the strong belief that its inhabitants would enthusiastically 
welcome the opportunity to settle in territory that was generally understood to be only sparsely 
populated.  
 Nevertheless, Franklin’s estimations reveal a surprising assumption, or at least one that 
seems surprising in hindsight, in light of Canada’s demographic situation in the mid-1770s. 
Franklin believed British American subjects would migrate to Canada in such numbers that they 
would outnumber the French subjects then living in the region within a couple of decades. Thus, 
even before Britain had claimed military control of the colony, Franklin and his countless readers 
could conceive not just an annexed addition to Britain’s North American Empire, but rather an 
expanded empire on its way to being culturally, politically, and demographically integrated. 
Even the French subjects who would remain under these circumstances would be brought into 
the fold. As Franklin explained, “Those who are Protestants among the French, will probably 
chuse to remain under the English Government; many will chuse to remove, if they can be 
allowed to sell their Lands, Improvements and Effects.”54 He then added: “The Rest in that thin-
settled Country, will, in less than half a Century, from the Crouds of English settling round and 
among them, be blended and incorporated with our People both in Language and Manners.”55 In 
articulating these predictions, Franklin both voiced and dismissed what many would see as the 
greatest hurdles to cultural assimilation in Canada: the use of the French language and the 
practice of French Catholicism. According to the pamphlet, these concerns would all but 
disappear in the future. The Canada that British subjects had grown increasingly curious about—
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and the one slowly incorporated into their maps and colonial almanacs—was a region that many 
came to believe would soon become as familiar culturally as it was becoming geographically. 
 
Early Migrants 
 The possibility that Canada could eventually be annexed to an expanding British America 
was not only envisioned theoretically. Although maps, almanacs, pamphlets, and other visual 
texts provided British subjects a foundation upon which to envision connections between their 
communities and the northern province, some of the earliest concrete links were established 
through migration. Even before France ceded the colony to Britain, British colonists had arrived 
on the scene, bringing much-needed supplies to the war-torn region. Most of these early migrants 
would remain in the area after the Seven Years’ War, forming the core of a small, but notable 
community of English-speaking subjects who would eventually be known as Britain’s Old 
Subjects in Canada. In the years after 1763, that community would grow as more British 
colonists settled in the area. These individuals were typically merchants, speculators, or a 
combination of the two—people whose priorities and livelihoods lent themselves to geographic 
relocation. Far outnumbered by the French-speaking colonists who remained in the region, the 
influence of Canada’s Old Subjects on imperial policy would vary, but would start at an early 
date.56 
These early migrants first came to Canada during the weeks and months following 
another British victory in the area. On September 8, 1760, French forces in Montreal capitulated 
to British troops under the command of General Jeffrey Amherst, effectively placing the whole 
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of French Canada under British military control. French troops would continue to focus their 
energy on regaining military losses like Quebec City and Montreal, and therefore continued to 
claim the attention of British commanding officers such as Amherst, Thomas Gage, and James 
Murray. Yet, after the occupation of Montreal, these same officers also worked to consolidate 
their hold over their conquests and introduce military rule over the tens of thousands of 
inhabitants who had come under their control. More specifically, the administration of the colony 
was handed over to three military officers: General James Murray, General Thomas Gage, and 
Colonel Ralph Burton, who took over as governors of the districts of Quebec, Montreal, and 
Trois Rivières, respectively.57  
But consolidating control over these recently-occupied French strongholds required more 
than establishing basic governmental structures; it also seemed to demand geographic 
reconnaissance as well as greater access to both provisions and everyday supplies within the 
depleted region. The generals almost immediately took steps to address these needs. Within days 
of the French surrender at Montreal, General Amherst explicitly invited “the traders and 
adventurers” from neighboring colonies to “transport themselves” to both Montreal and Quebec 
City. Demonstrating the high degree to which the British forces, together with Canada’s 
inhabitants, needed provisions, Amherst requested that such individuals come equipped with 
“quantities of molasses, salt, wines, teas, sugars, and all kind of grocery, as likewise sheep and 
every thing also, that may occur to them to be useful.”58 His invitation and Canada’s pronounced 
lack of supplies were reiterated in countless colonial newspapers, broadsides, and sermons. By 
                                                
57 On the British military occupation of Quebec, see A.L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1933). 
58 Jeffery Amherst to Governors [Francis Bernard, Benning Wentworth], 19 September 1760, Jeffery Amherst 
Papers, Series I, Vol. 5, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor. MI. 
 
  
27 
late October, newspapers were already reporting on the generous donations and merchandise that 
would soon be making their way to Quebec. On October 20, 1760, for instance, the Boston 
Evening Post announced: “A number of transports were in the Downs, bound to Quebec, with 
large quantities of bedding, cloathing, and other necessaries for the garrison of that place.”59  
In Quebec and Montreal, Amherst attempted to foster goodwill among the conquered 
inhabitants by issuing placards, written in both French and English, announcing the changes he 
had introduced. Once signed, such notices were ordered to be read, published, and posted “in the 
usual places,” which often meant outside church doors. In the placards, Amherst described his 
efforts to procure assistance from neighboring British colonies.  He explained that together with 
the newly instituted governors, Amherst had “given orders… to the different governors of the 
English colonies nearest to Canada, to post up and publish notices to their colonists to repair 
hither with all sorts of provisions and supplies.”60 They had done so, he argued, “for the common 
good of the troops and the habitant” given that “the meagre support which Canada has received 
from France for the past two years” had apparently exhausted the region’s “wealth, her supplies, 
and her necessaries.”61 Thus, at the same time that Amherst publicized the specific steps he and 
other British military officers had taken to obtain supplies for the destitute region, he made sure 
to place the blame for the disagreeable state of affairs squarely on France. In doing so, the 
commander-and-chief of the British forces not only attempted to quell grassroots resistance, he 
also portrayed any future purveyor of food or other basic necessities as a savior of sorts.  
Many of the people who responded to Amherst’s plea did so for various reasons, 
including personal gain. For example, one of the early migrants, Alexander Henry, saw not just a 
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region in need of supplies, but also new opportunities to make a profit. He would later recount 
his travels in a journal. As he described it, the French surrender of Montreal signaled “the 
surrender of all Canada.”62 He quickly sought to “avail [himself] of the new market which was 
thus thrown open to British adventure” by making his way to Albany, “where [his] commercial 
connections were, and where [he] procured a quantity of goods with which [he] set out, intending 
to carry them to Montreal.”63 Ultimately, because he set out so late in the year when inclement 
weather made travel into Canada difficult, Henry was unable to make it to Montreal as quickly as 
he intended. He ended up biding his time at Fort William Augustus, off the Saint Lawrence 
River, until enough snow had fallen and waterways had frozen to allow a traveler with 
appropriate clothing and equipment, such as snowshoes, to journey into Canada during the 
winter. 
It is worth noting that merchants and speculators transported more than just themselves, 
their goods, and their wealth to Canada. Like all migrants, their movements also extended the 
personal and professional networks they had long built for themselves. In fact, many individuals 
who relocated to the colony did so with the support of their current or prospective business 
partners. But extending those networks was not the same as sustaining them. Despite the 
opportunities available to them in Canada, merchants and speculators lost access to crucial 
resources like regular postal services. Addressing that absence became an early priority and 
inspired one of their first collective actions as a community.  
In early 1762, British merchants—with the support of acting Governor James Murray—
petitioned for the establishment of routine postal services. Within a year, the British postmasters 
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general began making arrangements to address those needs. In January and March, 1763, 
Anthony Todd, the Post Office Secretary, wrote to the deputy postmasters general of North 
America, Benjamin Franklin and John Foxcroft, pleading the case of the distressed merchants. 
Taking into account a letter from Governor Murray as well as a memorial from the “British 
Merchants” in Quebec, Todd explained that those individuals labored “under many difficulties 
for the want of a safe and Speedy Conveyance of Letters.”64 He then expressed the “wish” of the 
postmasters general that Franklin and Foxcroft “might find it practicable to establish a regular 
Post between That Government and New York.” Todd ended his letter with a directive politely 
veiled as a recommendation: that Franklin and Foxcroft consider appointing Hugh Finlay as the 
postmaster of Quebec. In March, 1763, Finlay set out for British America, confident that he 
would soon assume that post. 
Finally, on June 10, 1763, Franklin and Foxcroft confirmed Finlay’s appointment. The 
new postmaster of Quebec would quickly establish profitable mail services that not only 
connected Quebec, Trois Rivières, and Montreal, but also linked those cities to some of the mail 
packets moving in and out of Albany, New York. In September 1766, James Parker, the 
comptroller of the postal service for North America, wrote to Benjamin Franklin, expressing his 
surprise at the profitability of the Quebec route. “The post office at Quebec,” he noted, “seems to 
turn out some profit to the General Office when it was thought it would hardly clear its own 
expenses.”65 Evidently, channels of communication between Canada and certain places in British 
America supported their own existence. And because the addressee of a letter—not the sender—
paid the postage at the time, those outside Canada’s borders clearly saw the need for such 
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communication as well.  
 
 
1763 
 
On February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris brought to an end both the Seven Years’ War 
and, by default, the longstanding debate on Canada’s future in post-war North America. Rumors 
that the treaty had been signed began to circulate in British America in early spring, and by mid-
May, colonial newspapers not only confirmed those details but immediately published transcripts 
of the peace treaty and its provisions. As Article IV of the document made clear, “Canada, with 
all its dependencies,” was now under the control of “his Britannick Majesty.”66 After 
establishing just how geographically extensive this conquest was, the article also stipulated that 
the British monarch—King George III—would “grant the liberty of the Catholick religion to the 
inhabitants of Canada.” He would allow “his new Roman Catholick subjects” the right to 
practice their religion “as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.” Such a provision made it clear 
that the French and British imperial agents who had helped craft the treaty expected most of the 
Canada’s colonial population to remain in the area. Yet despite these expectations, the diplomats 
accounted for the real possibility that many Canadian residents would prefer to relocate to places 
like France itself. Assuring these individuals that they were both free and safe to do so, the treaty 
nevertheless specified that they would need to vacate the colony within the next eighteen 
months, after which “the term, limited for this emigration,” would end.67 
 As it happened, most of Canada’s French subjects did indeed remain in the region after it 
was ceded to Britain. Collectively, they were designated the colony’s New Subjects—a label that 
described their recent status within the British Empire and not their deep ties to the region. 
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Besides communicating how long certain individuals had been under British rule, the use of 
labels like Old and New Subjects reflected very real differences in the linguistic and religious 
practices of British Canada’s colonial population. But the danger with such static categories was 
that they also presented the province’s colonists as divided neatly into two cohesive 
communities, inherently distinct from each other. They also mistakenly obscured sociopolitical 
differences within the English- or French-speaking communities.68 Placing too much stock on 
labels like Old or New Subjects, therefore, risks projecting an ahistorical and overly simplistic 
binary on post-Conquest Canada.  
Reading too much into these categories also lends credence to what the historian Allan 
Greer has referred to as “the Myth of Conquest.”69 In essence, that myth is the belief that “the 
cession [of Canada] constituted an epoch-making tragedy with social as well as political 
dimensions”—a view that Greer describes as “a product of French Canada’s social stresses in the 
1860s, not the 1760s.”70 Despite clear political shifts that resulted from Britain’s annexation of 
Canada, Greer persuasively argues that “the transfer of New France from one empire to 
another—struck at French-Canadian society only in limited and selective ways.”71 That was 
particularly true for most of the colony’s French inhabitants, who lived in rural hamlets along the 
Saint Lawrence and Richelieu River valleys.  
Taking into account such circumstances and looking past the language of official policy, 
the arrival of Britain’s Old Subjects in Canada becomes a far more complicated—and ultimately 
more interesting—phenomenon. Rather than harbingers of societal division, these migrants can 
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be seen as individuals who, together with Canada’s New Subjects, simply sought to negotiate 
their place within a newly conquered colony. Moreover, in their subsequent struggles against the 
military and civil administration of the province, they can better embody their more dynamic 
aspirations and appear less one-dimensional in character. With some recent exceptions, most 
scholars of post-conquest Canada have presented the colony’s Old Subjects as self-seeking 
newcomers who were only interested in securing a colonial government that gave them 
disproportionate political power over their French-speaking counterparts. That view is neither 
surprising nor completely unjustified, given that Canada’s first governors tended to describe 
them unfavorably. James Murray (the first acting governor of the province), for instance, 
characterized them as “the most immoral collection of individuals he had ever met”72 
 As Franklin’s pamphlets in the “Canada versus Guadeloupe” debate presumed, the 
annexation of Canada concerned more than just the newly-acquired territory; it had just as much 
to do with the affairs of British America as a whole. Immediately after the 1763 Treaty of Paris 
was finalized, British imperial policymakers focused much of their attention on consolidating the 
crown’s control over its dramatically expanded American empire. To that end, such officials 
sought to shape migration and settlement within North America. For example, the Board of 
Trade, which the king and his Privy Council had tasked with developing a plan to govern 
Britain’s American holdings more effectively, advocated a course of action that would 
discourage or prevent settlement in the interior of mainland America. As Max Edelson recently 
argued, “the Board of Trade called for settlement across the mainland’s coastal plain and in the 
islands, command over coastal and Caribbean navigation, and a limit to colonization in the North 
American interior.”73 The new British province of Quebec, not surprisingly, would be of crucial 
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importance in such imperial schemes.  
 In the eyes of British policymakers, Canada was the ideal destination for would-be land 
speculators and settlers. For one, within this newly conquered colony were upwards of 65,000 
conquered, French-speaking subjects. An influx of English-speaking subjects from elsewhere in 
the British empire would theoretically strengthen imperial ties between Britain and the somewhat 
remote province. For another reason, by redirecting colonists to Canada, the British government 
could more fully avoid future conflicts with Native nations in hotly-contested places in the North 
American interior, such as the Ohio Country. Although its geographic gains were impressive, 
Britain came out of the Seven Years’ War with an equally monumental debt. Lessening the 
chance that British settlers found their way into regions like the Ohio Country also reduced the 
possibility that the empire would become embroiled in other costly wars, at least in the 
immediate future. And although this line of thinking would have found traction among a war-
weary British ministry coming out of the Seven Years’ War in any case, the outbreak of 
Pontiac’s Rebellion in the spring of 1763 made it that much more appealing.74     
 The outbreak of hostilities between British settlers and Native peoples in the American 
northwest directly influenced King George III’s Royal Proclamation of 1763, which established 
the Appalachian Mountains as a westernmost boundary of colonial settlement.75 In doing so, it 
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specifically designated everything west of its line Native land, announcing that “the several 
Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, 
should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchase by Us, are reserved to them.”76 The only 
regions not limited to the natural boundary of the Appalachian Mountains in which colonial 
settlement was formally sanctioned were those within the boundaries of Quebec and West 
Florida—boundaries that the proclamation itself established and which were located far from the 
mountain range. However, even Canada and West Florida’s governors were explicitly forbidden 
from granting land to colonists in regions outside the clearly-stipulated boundaries of their 
governments. And therefore, despite claiming sovereignty over land that had clearly never been 
relinquished to Britain by the Native peoples who inhabited it, the British imperial government 
very specifically directed colonial settlement away from the American interior and into regions 
like Canada. It did so, the proclamation explained, because it was “just and reasonable, and 
essential to our Interest, and the Security of our Colonies.”77  
 In the end, and partly because of the efforts of the Board of Trade and its imperial agents, 
British subjects did come to exploit settlement opportunities in Canada. While many individuals 
came from Britain itself, many others relocated to the province from elsewhere in North 
America. Colonists like Thomas Walker and Moses Hazen, for instance, left New England to 
take advantage of the empire’s newly acquired access to Canada’s countryside and established 
trade networks. Like other subjects who migrated to Canada in the wake of the 1763 peace 
treaty, Walker and Hazen both eventually secured significant land grants known as seigneuries. 
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Access to seigneurial plots was made easier by the fact that Canada’s French inhabitants were 
given eighteen months to leave the colony if they wished to remain subjects of France. Yet not 
only within the boundaries of Canada—or those of newly acquired provinces—did colonial 
settlement flourish; neighboring colonies also experienced growth. Because of the empire’s new 
dimensions and the encouragement to individuals who migrated to designated portions of the 
recently-annexed holdings, the frontier regions of some its older colonies like New Hampshire 
also attracted newcomers. As Paul Wilderson recently put it: “migration into the western and 
northern wilderness areas of the province began even before the Treaty of Paris was signed, and 
between 1761 and 1775 New Hampshire grew faster than any of the other twelve mainland 
colonies to the south.”78 Moses Hazen, for example, came to own significant holdings in both 
Canada and the Coos region of the northern Connecticut River valley in New Hampshire.79  
 Tempting as it may be to view Canada’s newly-arrived colonists like Walker and Hazen 
as mere opportunists with little regard for Canada or its inhabitants as anything other than 
resources to exploit, many of the Old Subjects nevertheless worked hard to make themselves at 
home in the province. Walker, in particular, became an active participant in the colony’s 
changing political structures. Like other Old Subjects who placed considerable stock in the 
promises articulated in the Proclamation of 1763, Walker was ever ready to defend what he 
considered cherished British rights as well as to push for the creation of a representative 
legislative assembly. In the process, he also became a respected—albeit controversial—advocate 
of the colony’s growing community of English-speaking merchants.80  
 In addition to directing colonial settlement to provinces like Canada, the Proclamation of 
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1763 also outlined Canada’s first civil government, establishing what many scholars have 
regarded as the colony’s first constitution. Among other declarations, the proclamation made 
clear that Canada’s governor—James Murray—would be instructed to “summon and call 
General Assemblies… in such Manner and Form as is used and directed in those Colonies and 
Provinces in America which are under our immediate Government.” He would do so “so soon as 
the state and circumstances” of the colony would allow it.81 Following the Proclamation of 1763, 
then, colonists throughout British America looked for signs that civil government was indeed on 
its way to Canada. In the summer of 1764, colonial newspapers began publishing reports 
announcing the arrival of civil administrative officials. On August 13, 1764, for example, the 
Boston Post-Boy printed an extract of a letter written by “an Officer at Quebec” on May 30. In 
his letter, the officer announced: “We have Chief Justice [William] Gregory with some Attornies 
at Law, &c. lately arrived at Quebec.”82 Despite the arrival, the officer added that it was believed 
“the Civil Government will not take Place ‘till sometime in September, at which Time, by the 
Treaty of Peace, all the Inhabitants that does [sic] not go to France must become British 
Subjects.”83  
 To be sure, reports like the one published in the Boston Post-Boy did not ultimately share 
much new information; their purpose rested on their ability to reaffirm expectations. Having 
placed their confidence in the Proclamation of 1763’s promises, British Americans throughout 
the continent felt invested in Canada’s administrative future. How and when civil government 
was introduced in that colony were matters that seemed tied to colonial administration 
throughout Britain’s American empire. Canadians’ ability to elect representatives to a legislative 
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assembly, for instance, seemed to guarantee the right of representative government to British 
Americans as a whole, not just those directly affected.  
Throughout the following decade, British subjects throughout the continent continued to 
keep abreast of administrative happenings in Canada despite—or perhaps because of—the 
revolutionary unrest that transpired between the mid-1760s to mid-1770s. One of the events that 
garnered the most interest is what the historian A.L. Burt once dubbed “the Mystery of Walker’s 
Ear.”84 It involved the Old Subject Thomas Walker, who in 1764 was both a merchant and a 
justice of the peace in Montreal, as well as soldiers associated with the province’s military 
administration. As Walker and his wife would later attest, on the evening of December 6, 1764, 
he was attacked by half a dozen disguised men while he was eating supper. During the ensuing 
encounter, one of the attackers sliced off part of his right ear, after which all of the assailants fled 
the scene, thinking Walker either dead or near dead. Later, Walker would accuse soldiers from a 
regiment quartered in Montreal as the perpetrators of the crime.  
Although Walker was perhaps genuinely convinced that soldiers were involved, he was 
also one of the colony’s most vocal critics of Canada’s military government in general and 
Governor James Murray more specifically. His accusations made his protests against military 
rule all the more persuasive, and ultimately convinced many Old Subjects in Montreal to join his 
cause. In his study of the December 6, 1764 incident, Burt described it as “the turning point of 
Murray’s period of government in Canada.”85 Incidents like that of Walker’s ear would 
eventually inspire Canadian colonists to petition for Governor Murray’s recall.  
Outside of Canada, news of the event garnered much attention, as did the subsequent 
trials involving soldiers Walker eventually accused of the crime. Yet, published accounts aimed 
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at more than just outlining the specific details of what transpired, they also spoke to the larger 
implications of the incident. As an example, on September 16, 1765, the Boston Evening-Post 
published an extract of a letter from “a Merchant in Quebec” dated August 3. The published 
excerpt read: “This Colony is in the greatest confusion, Gov. M[urra]y last Sunday came into 
Town and took the Command of the Troops; the Merchants threaten to leave this Place intirely, 
as every man who opposes the G[overno]r in any Thing may expect a party of Soldiers with 
fixed Bayonets to tear him out of his House and drag him to Goal.”86 After painting the 
governor—as well as the administration he represented—as so oppressive that the colony’s 
merchants would rather flee than suffer his presence much longer, the letter continued by 
announcing that Canada’s oppressed colonists were petitioning the ministry for redress. “We 
have all drawn up a memorial, and sent it Home to the Lords of Trade,” the author claimed, 
“desiring that they will have some Compassion on this Colony, and relieve us from the strange 
scene of anarchy & confusion which we are plunged into.”87 The way they saw it, “if the civil 
governor can command both civil and military we can no longer look upon our Lives and 
properties as secure.”88  
Reports such as that had a number of consequences. Effectively presenting Walker’s 
experience as far from unique, they also portrayed the civil government as farcical. Despite the 
formal introduction of civil administration, letters from “merchants” like the one above 
encouraged British Americans to regard the colony as still under military rule. Indirectly, that 
perception would prove powerful as it allowed British colonists to carve out a particular place for 
Canada in the revolutionary unrest of the ensuing decade. Between the mid-1760s and mid-
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1770s, British colonists elsewhere on the continent were given reason to view Canadian 
colonists—especially Old Subjects—as similarly oppressed under unjust imperial governance 
but unable to protest as loudly as colonists elsewhere. To put it another way, British colonists 
who grew increasingly wary of Parliamentary legislation beginning in 1765 with the Stamp Act 
could look upon Canada’s colonial population as sympathetic to their cause whether or not their 
actions justified that perception.  
 
A Silent Participant in a Common Cause 
 
In the midst of the Stamp Act crisis, when British colonists famously protested 
Parliament’s right to tax them without their own consent, many interpreted Canada’s relative 
silence on the matter as proof that its colonists labored under a repressive military government. 
On January 9, 1766, the Pennsylvania Gazette published a report originating in New York. “The 
Stamps,” the account explained, “are by a Military Power forced upon the Inhabitants of Canada, 
Nova Scotia, and the new conquered Settlements in America.”89 It then proceeded to claim that 
“by the same Means it may be enforced upon all America, when the Military Power becomes 
superior to that of” the rest of the continent’s colonies.90 Eventually, claims originating from 
Canada itself seemed to corroborate reports like the one published in the Pennsylvania Gazette. 
On March 29, 1766, for example, the printers of the only newspaper in the colony—the 
Quebec Gazette—made their sentiments on the act abundantly clear. That issue was the first one 
since the newspaper had abruptly ceased publication in November 1765, when the Stamp Act 
came into effect. As they resumed publication, William Brown and Thomas Gilmore explained 
to their readers: “It is with the most sensible pleasure we find ourselves emerged from an 
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involuntary inactivity and once more at liberty to congratulate our former customers and the 
public in general on their being freed from the impositions of the grievous Stamp.” Perhaps for 
emphasis, they went on to describe the detestable act as more “dreadful than the icy chains of our 
inhospitable winter.”91 In the eyes of colonists in nearby provinces, statements like those of 
Brown and Gilmore could easily serve as retroactive proof that colonial opposition to the Stamp 
Act had indeed existed in Canada, but had clearly been stifled by a powerful colonial 
government. No reader would doubt the editors’ hatred for the unpopular legislation; and 
because the Quebec Gazette was the only newspaper produced in the colony, that hatred rang in 
loud and overrepresented ways.  
A few months after the Canadian newspaper resumed publication, it featured a notable 
letter written by an individual named Joseph Cawthorne who claimed to speak for “a Number of 
the Merchants in Canada.”92 In his letter, addressed to “a Committee of Merchants in London, 
Cawthorne expressed a similar viewpoint, albeit in a more forceful and detailed manner. With 
respect to the Stamp Act, he acknowledged the “submission with which that oppressive act was 
received in this military government,” but argued that “it was mere necessity and not our 
inclination which induced us to a compliance.” In fact, Cawthorne argued that the merchants he 
claimed to represent were just as “sensible” as those in other colonies “of the ill consequences 
which would have attended the execution of that act.” They would have protested just as loudly 
as their “neighbours” he asserted, “had we been under the same advantages of Government.” 
Like the printers’ address on March 29, Cawthorne’s letter served as a clear indictment of the 
Stamp Act. Yet, unlike the sentiments expressed by Brown and Gilmore, he took his critique a 
step further in two subtle ways. The Quebec Gazette’s printers seemed to suggest that 
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disapproval of the act was widely felt, congratulating their customers and general public on 
being freed from the legislation’s oppressive measures. Cawthorne, however, left nothing to 
chance: on top of claiming to speak for “a number” of merchants in the colony, he continuously 
made reference to how pervasive his opinions were, at one point describing them as 
“unanimous.”93 
Cawthorne also accomplished more than expressing his distaste for the Stamp Act. He 
also supplied his readers with a rationalization for disregarding as irrelevant the colony’s lack of 
public protests against the act. Rather than revealing acceptance of the law, the absence of 
demonstrations now seemed to bear witness to the restrictive nature of Canada’s government. 
Since British colonists elsewhere had already encountered reports that offered similar 
interpretations, assessments like that of Cawthorne likely met a welcoming audience, ready to 
accept his claims as true. In fact, although his letter was later disputed by an anonymous author 
claiming to speak for the colony’s merchant community, only Cawthorne’s letter found its way 
into other colonial newspapers in British America.94 Within neighboring colonies, where public 
perception already supported the idea that Canada’s inhabitants silently disapproved of the 
Stamp Act, such reports had a lasting effect. Emphasizing the oppressive powers of a strong 
military presence in North America, colonists were able to repeatedly dismiss Canada’s 
lackluster participation in the colonial unrest during the 1760s and early 1770s.  
In the years following the Stamp Act crisis, British Americans’ growing distrust and 
resentment of military forces stationed on the continent likely only fueled their willingness to 
regard Canada as a silent participant in what was increasingly considered a common cause. For 
colonists living in close proximity to British regulars and bearing the personal inconveniences 
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those situations presented, past events like the attack on Thomas Walker perhaps loomed large in 
their fears of dangers to come.95 Thus, when, in the summer of 1774, Parliament passed a 
controversial bill that came to be known as the Quebec Act, British Americans took more active 
steps to unite with the colony’s inhabitants in opposition to a seemingly corrupt ministry. For 
most British Americans, the ability to make common cause with Canada and the colonists 
residing there was a process that, in many ways, began in 1759.  
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Chapter Two 
 
“Le Pape du Canada”: Imperial Policy and Colonial Unrest in 1774 
 
 Enacted in the summer of 1774, the Quebec Act seemingly reversed many of the imperial 
policies stipulated in the Proclamation of 1763. Among other changes, it restored French civil 
law, did away with the possibility of an elected, legislative assembly, and formally recognized 
the practice of Catholicism, making it so that Catholics could hold administrative offices in the 
colonial government.96 It also notably altered the colony’s boundaries, turning what was already 
poised to be controversial parliamentary legislation throughout much of the British Empire into a 
direct concern for individuals residing in neighboring American colonies.97 Indeed, many British 
subjects regarded the proposed expansion of the colony’s boundaries as one of the act’s most 
crucial components.98 When the Reverend Ezra Stiles first learned of it, for instance, his first 
thoughts seemed to be directed at the legislation’s geographic significance. Noting his frustration 
in his diary, he wrote: “The King has signed the Quebec Act, extendg the Province to the Ohio 
and Mississippi and comprehending nearly Two Thirds of the Territory of English America.”99 
Drastically expanded from their 1763 counterparts, the provincial boundaries established in the 
Quebec Act proved difficult to miss.  
Not surprisingly, Canada’s altered boundaries would be the subject of many a map drawn 
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in the wake of the Quebec Act’s passage. Yet, although most of these maps were the product of 
imperial agents or those under their employ, others were the work of private individuals seeking 
a medium through which to better understand and depict their own thoughts on the legislation 
and its broader importance. Stiles, for example, did not simply take up his pen only to express his 
views on the Quebec Act within the pages of his diary, but also in efforts to create an annotated 
map on the subject (Figure 2.1). Entitled “The Bloody Church,” his map made clear that some of 
Stiles’s most pressing concerns related to the legislation’s religious provisions. Ultimately, given 
both his own religious persuasions and ecclesiastic position, his uneasiness was to be expected. 
After all, in the same diary entry in which he recorded the act’s geographic implications, Stiles 
also bemoaned the fact that the legislation “established the Romish Church & IDOLATRY over 
all that Space.”100 Yet, his choice to give his sentiments cartographic expression, and not just 
limit his musing to the written word is telling. Although subtle, the geographic repercussions of 
the legislation are central to understanding Stiles’s map. The disastrous religious consequences 
that his map seems to warn against appear that much more significant because of their broad 
geographic scope. And consequently, in “The Bloody Church” as elsewhere, Stiles presented the 
Quebec Act as a threat to all of British America.  
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Figure 2.1: Ezra Stiles, “The Bloody Church” Beinecke Library, Yale University 
 
  
At first glance, one of the most striking features of Stiles’s map is the stark contrast 
between the province of Quebec, suggestively shaded in noticeable red ink, and the rest of 
British America. Indeed, despite the fact that Stiles also distinguished New England and northern 
parts of the middle colonies from the southern and Chesapeake provinces, he did so in much 
subtler fashion. Rather than the very obvious contrast between a bloody red Quebec and the rest 
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of British America, the tones differentiating the other two regions were purposefully more 
similar in appearance to each other—both being shades of green, with New England’s including 
hints of blue. Straightaway, Stiles communicated his overarching message: there was a clear and 
seemingly ominous distinction dividing British America. 
 Within its expansive boundaries, Stiles described the province of Quebec through the lens 
of Parliament’s recent legislation. He wrote: “Idolatry and the Church of Rome established by 
Act of a Protestant Parliament and the Voice of the English Protestant Bishops to restrain and 
suppress the spreading of the Presbytians, as they are politely called.” If the map’s shading alone 
failed to communicate it, Stile’s annotations made clear that he regarded the Quebec Act’s 
purpose and broader significance as intimately connected to the rest of British America. Like 
other recent Parliamentary legislation, the Quebec Act was geared towards constraining the 
rights and liberties of British colonists both in and outside of Canada. What made it particularly 
concerning was the physical impact it had, formally establishing a religion that countless British 
subjects, like Stiles, consider antithetical to British rights within a clear-cut and indisputably 
expansive region.  
Stiles’ map serves as a vivid illustration of the kind of thinking that shaped responses to 
the Quebec Act throughout North America (and, in fact, within Britain itself). Despite the fact 
that the administrative and religious changes the legislation introduced were specifically limited 
to Quebec’s boundaries, the overall threat it seemed to pose to British rights was not. Countless 
British subjects considered it a dangerous precedent that foreshadowed evils to come. In some of 
the earliest accounts of the act, The Boston-Gazette described it as “the only statute which has 
been passed these two hundred years to establish Popery and arbitrary Power in the British 
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dominians.”101 Others viewed it as a nefarious attempt on the part of Parliament to foment 
animosity between Canada’s Catholic population and colonists elsewhere on the continent. 
Many, like Stiles, regarded it as both. And if anything, the province’s expanded boundaries 
seemed to suggest that the threat was a growing one. Thus, for individuals elsewhere in North 
America, the Quebec Act was cause for concern regardless of its immediate effect on their daily 
lives.  
 
 
Initial Reports and Reception of the Quebec Act 
 
Perhaps more than any other measure taken in Parliament at the time, the Quebec Act and 
its significance seemed only partly defined by its own provisions. More often than not, its 
purpose seemed directly tied to other legislation collectively known today as the Coercive or 
Intolerable Acts. All passed during the same Parliamentary session, these acts were crucial 
milestones in the struggle for American independence, being the catalysts for the First 
Continental Congress.  They included the Boston Port Act, the Massachusetts Government Act, 
the Administration of Justice Act, and the Quartering Act of 1774.102 Read together, these acts 
struck British Americans as all part of a larger attempt to curtail their rights (which many in 
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Britain believed to be the first step in later curtailing their own). Therefore, when news of the 
Quebec Act broke, countless British subjects naturally likened it to these other acts, viewing it as 
working towards the same goal.  
Many scholars of Early America, Early Canada, and the British Empire have argued that 
the assumed association between the Quebec Act and the Coercive Acts was merely the product 
of chance and, more specifically, of bad timing.103 In his study of Britain’s conquest of Canada 
and its effect on imperial policy, Philip Lawson convincingly demonstrated that the act was 
never meant to be part of the Coercive Acts, at least not by its creators.104 Taking into account 
Parliamentary intent—together with the fact that the Quebec Act had been in the works for 
years105—there is little reason to place it on the same footing as legislation like the Boston Port 
Act or the Administration of Justice Act. However, for most British subjects, particularly those 
immediately affected by the Coercive Acts, there was little to distinguish the perceived motives 
behind these various measures. In part, their interpretations stemmed from perceived links 
between Canada and the rest of British America that predated the passage of the Quebec Act—
connections that had begun to take hold since 1759.106 In likening the threat of the Quebec Act to 
those of the Coercive Acts, British Americans reinforced those nascent connections. At the same 
time, they forged new ones, presenting the colonists targeted by these various acts as similarly 
afflicted by cruel attempts on the part of Parliament to oppress them. Indeed, it was partly 
because of—and in regards to—the Quebec Act that colonists came to breathe meaning to their 
revolutionary struggle for independence. More than once, it was described as Parliament’s most 
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odious legislation. 
Most American colonists learned of the Quebec Act from newspaper articles, the earliest 
of which typically consisted of extracts from letters originating in Britain. Over and over, these 
accounts described a dire situation. As colonists would later come to suspect themselves, some 
Britons took the existence of the Quebec Bill—together with its eventual enactment—as a sign 
of a corrupt ministry and a warning of the direction in which it could go. They feared the harmful 
provisions of the act would not be limited to the province of Quebec nor even to Britain’s 
imperial holdings, but instead, would eventually reach across the Atlantic to affect their own 
communities. On August 22, 1774, for example, the Boston-Gazette published an extract of a 
letter sent from London by “a Gentleman of Distinction” claiming just that. Dated June 1, 1774, 
the letter was written while Parliament was still deliberating its enactment. As the “Gentleman” 
saw it, “The object of this bill is too evident to be doubted; in the first place TO CUT OFF THE 
LIBERTIES OF THE REST OF AMERICA, by means of Quebec, and then by a coupdemain… 
to take away the liberties of this country.”107 
Countless reports offering similar assessments continued to appear in colonial American 
newspapers for months to come. On September 19, the Boston Evening-Post published accounts 
of the somber circumstances abroad, reporting: “Large betts are laid, that the Popish religion will 
be established in England as the national church, by an act of parliament, and that the Host will 
publicly be carried through the streets of this metropolis in less than five years time.”108 But 
whether or not Britons truly believed that the Quebec Act could foreshadow such a drastic 
change, the legislation was regularly regarded as proof positive of a corrupt ministry—one that 
Britons took it upon themselves to hold accountable. The Quebec Bill, as it happened, was 
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ultimately at the center of more than one wager. That summer, there were reports of other bets 
being struck in London; “Betts are five to four,” newspapers like the Norwich Packet announced, 
“that the Bostonian and Quebec Bills turn out the Ministry before Michaelmas day next; and five 
to one, war or no war, that they are outed before the first of January 1775.”109 Other published 
accounts noted that “the names of those who voted for the Quebec bill,” were reportedly 
“circulated in almost every city and borough in England and Scotland.”110 With this list, voters 
pitched the next election as one that would “determine whether the Pope or the voice of the 
people is to chuse a British Parliament.”111 
But within the confines of British North America, the reports that rang loudest were not 
those relating to the Quebec Act’s feared consequences on Britons at home, but rather those 
concerning its significance for colonists throughout the eastern Atlantic seaboard. A common 
theme running through most accounts of the legislation—both before and after it was passed—
was that the Quebec Act was part of a long-term scheme to entice Canadians to do Parliament’s 
bidding. One published report, which made the rounds through a number of colonial newspapers, 
held that: 
 
The infamous Quebec bill, which establishes popery and arbitrary power through 
a country, capable of maintaining more people than England, France and Spain, is 
intended to keep the old colonies in awe; and people here in Power make no 
secret of saying, that by keeping the Canadian militia well disciplined, they shall 
be able with them, and the fleet to keep the colonies always in subjection.112 
 
Similarly, another well-circulated account portrayed the Quebec bill as “a well concerted scheme 
                                                
109 The Norwich Packet, and the Connecticut, Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, and Rhode-Island Weekly Advertiser, 
18-25 August 1774, 2. 
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to give a check to the rest of [Britain’s] colonies, and to keep them in awe.”113 Through a 
difference in “religion, laws, and dependency,” the account continued, an animosity between 
Canada and the rest of British America could be maintained. And as if to drive the point home, 
the report went on to claim: “there is no doubt but every encouragement that can possibly be 
afforded to these licensed slaves, these children or Popery supported by a Protestant Court will 
be given,” in an effort to restrain their fellow British colonists on the continent.114  
 All such accounts heavily implied a connection between Catholicism and arbitrary, 
tyrannical rule. Not by coincidence were Canada’s New Subjects often presented as potential 
pawns in Parliament’s corrupt plans. The figure of the pope and his sole, incontrovertible 
influence over all religious matters easily brought to mind the image of a tyrant in the minds of 
most British subjects. Additionally, the ritualistic structures that regulated religious services—
together with the Catholic clergy’s well-known status as divine intermediaries who interpreted 
the bible’s scriptures for the laity—tended to paint practicing Catholics as malleable and 
subservient. As far as religions were concerned, Catholicism seemed tailor-made for the 
imposition of tyrannical rule, at least in the eyes of British subjects who had long associated it 
with French governance and monarchical absolutism.115  
 Because of tyrannical undertones associated with Catholicism, critics of the Quebec Act 
were careful to note the extent to which the legislation sanctioned the “Popish religion.” In their 
letters, they regularly emphasized that Parliament sought to formally establish Catholicism by 
actively supporting its existence through the colony’s civil administration. Rather than simply 
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tolerating its existence—as the Proclamation of 1763 had done—the Quebec Act formally 
established its practice, and seemingly threatened that of protestant religions. The difference 
between a tolerated and established religion was not just a semantic matter. For months, British 
subjects based their critiques of the legislation on that very difference. About a year after 
Parliament passed the Quebec Act, Alexander Hamilton compellingly articulated the distinction 
in the second installation of his “Remarks on the Quebec Bill.” Hamilton explained:  
 
The characteristic difference between a tolerated and established religion consists 
in this—With respect to the support of the former, the law is passive and 
improvident; leaving it to those, who profess it, to make as much, or as little 
provision, as they shall judge expedient; and to vary and alter that provision, as 
their circumstances may require… They are allowed to exercise their religion 
without molestation… But with respect to the support of the latter, the law is 
active and provident… and therefore no reasonable impartial man will doubt, that 
the religion of the church of Rome is established in Canada.116 
 
 Even when critics of the act failed to make an explicit distinction between the 
establishment and the toleration of Catholicism, they nevertheless implied it. If the formal 
establishment of Catholicism meant the colony’s administration not only allowed its existence 
but actively fostered its continuation, then it was necessary that the alterations to Canada’s civil 
administration work in concert with the act’s religious provisions. And, to most British subjects, 
the Quebec Act’s terms appeared to do exactly that. Almost consistently, the act’s religious and 
administrative changes were described closely together—either in the same sentence or in 
consecutive ones—as though the two were connected. Such descriptions are revealing in their 
ubiquity. Time and time again, they sent the message that the religious and administrative 
provisions of the Quebec Act were not merely two components of the same legislation, they were 
interrelated, working together for the same purpose. The overwhelming fear that the Quebec Act 
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sparked boiled down to one overarching implication: that it represented the coming together of 
arbitrary rule and religion in the worst possibly way.  
 Perhaps one of the strongest indictments of the legislation’s implications for British rule 
came in the form of a political cartoon entitled the “Mitred Minuet” (Figure 2.2). First published 
in Britain, the cartoon also appeared in the October issue of the Royal American Magazine after 
Paul Revere fashioned an engraved copy. Its title was purposefully suggestive in both direct and 
indirect ways. Specifically referencing mitres (religious headgear closely associated with 
religions like Catholicism), it also alluded to a type of ballroom dance known as a minuet, which, 
in being depicted, conveyed a sense of formal occasion and celebration. Moving past the title, the 
cartoon itself illustrated a scene in which the British ministry and protestant British Bishops 
appeared all too willing to let the Catholic church dictate imperial policy. On the right, the 
cartoon portrayed Catholic bishops dancing a minuet around a draft of paper positioned near 
their feet and labeled “Quebec Bill.” Behind them were English protestant clergymen looking on 
almost expressionless, evidently unwilling to take any steps to hinder the Catholic bishops’ 
actions. Finally, to the left of all of this, the cartoon depicted members of the British ministry 
looking on approvingly, while the devil looms over their heads.117 The “Mitred Minuet’s” central 
message was clear: the Quebec Bill represented the unnatural—and, by virtue of the devil’s 
presence, immoral—union of government-sanctioned Catholicism and Parliamentary 
administration. 
 
                                                
117 The figure on the left, depicted in Scottish garb, is Lord Bute, On the right, is Lord North. The middle figure 
appears to be King George III, but has not been identified. 
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Figure 2.2: Paul Revere, “The Mitred Minuet” in The Royal American Magazine, Oct. Iss. 
 
 
Altogether, the scene portrayed was one in which agents of Catholic tyranny celebrated—
and possibly authored—the terms of the Quebec bill, which the British ministry allowed because 
of its own corrupt plans and the protestant bishops seemed unwilling to protest. The cartoon’s 
accusatory representation of protestant British bishops was not entirely unique. Although critics 
of the Quebec bill—and later Act—aimed their harshest attacks at Parliament, some also faulted 
an acquiescent community of protestant bishops. In late September, the Pennsylvania Journal 
featured the following reprieve: “Would you believe, that out of all the Bishops, only the Bishop 
of St. Asaph had virtue enough to vote against this bill! I hope we shall never suffer one of them 
to set his foot in America.”118 As a protestant clergyman, the Reverend Stiles also took issue with 
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the passive role played by Britain’s ecclesiastic authorities. When he learned of the act’s passage, 
Stiles noted in his diary that “in this Act all the Bishops concurred.”119 He went on to add: 
“Astonishing that King, Lds & Commons, a whole protestant Parliament should expressly 
establish Popery over three Quarters of their Empire,” alluding once again to the legislation’s 
geographic scope.120  
 
 
The Quebec Act and the First Continental Congress 
 
 In response to the Coercive Acts, colonists throughout much of British North America 
began advocating for a continent-wide association whose representatives could come together in 
general congress to decide on a coordinated response to Parliament’s recent actions. By late 
summer, plans were in motion for the First Continental Congress, set to meet in Philadelphia on 
September 1, 1774. Once these plans were solidified, they became common fodder in colonial 
newspapers. With time, accounts of the First Continental Congress began including more 
specific details, such as the names of delegates chosen to represent a given province. Likewise, 
reports of colonies that would not be participating in the upcoming general congress also 
circulated throughout British America. Far from being objective reports simply updating readers 
on the circumstances leading up to the Continental Congress, such accounts revealed widely-held 
assumptions about the coordinated effort—namely, what it meant and who should be 
participating.  
On September 26, the ever observant Ezra Stiles recorded in his diary that although 
“Letters of Concurrence” had been sent by colonists in Georgia and Nova Scotia, there would be 
“no Delegates from them, nor from the military Provinces of Quebec and the two Floridas nor 
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from Newfoundland nor from the West Indies.”121 Disappointing as this news was, Stiles 
immediately qualified such lackluster responses by noting: “However the English in Canada 
have sent supplies to Boston—Antigua & Barbadoes are in opposition to the new Acts of 
Parliament & Jamaica is coming over.”122 His recorded sentiments brought to light certain 
expectations regarding the roles colonies like Canada would play in the union. And writing from 
Rhode Island as he did, Stiles likely expressed thoughts that were shaped by newspaper accounts 
of the ongoing conference and, thereby, also held by many a British American colonist. 
Throughout British America, it was news that Georgia, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Newfoundland, the 
British West Indies, and East and West Florida would not be sending representatives to the First 
Continental Congress. The thirteen British colonies so often associated with the eventual struggle 
for American independence were not the only ones that most colonists assumed would take part 
in any coordinated opposition to Parliamentary measures.  
Indeed, there was nothing natural about thirteen colonies coming together in opposition 
to Parliamentary legislation. In its first iteration, the union counted twelve—not thirteen—
provinces and was regularly referred to in newspapers as “the Twelve United Colonies,” “the 
Twelve Confederated Colonies,” or even just simply as “the united colonies,” with no direct 
reference to a specific—much less, predestined—number of colonies. The eventual participation 
of its thirteenth member (Georgia) was never guaranteed, just as the potential participation of 
any other British colony was not unimaginable. In fact, not only could other provinces 
conceivably join the ranks of those already unified, many colonists pursued that goal, including 
the very delegates chosen to represent the nascent union. Before bringing the meetings of the 
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First Continental Congress to a close, representatives from those twelve colonies worked to 
invite their fellow British subjects in other provinces to join their union and elect their own 
representatives to congress.  
On Friday, October 21, 1774 congress elected to prepare “an Address… to the people of 
Quebec, and letters to the colonies of St. John’s, Nova Scotia, Georgia, East and West Florida, 
who have not deputies to represent them in this Congress.”123 Within days, drafts of these letters 
were prepared and discussed in Congress, and by the following Wednesday, the address to 
Canada’s inhabitants—after “being debated by paragraphs and amended”—was approved.124 To 
ensure their invitation enjoyed the widest circulation within Canada as possible, congressional 
delegates also voted to translate the document, calling upon the delegates of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and New York “to assist in & forward the dispersion of the said address.”125 
Invitations like that sent to the inhabitants of Canada represented more than just an attempt by 
Congress to widen its geographic orbit and thereby gain leverage in its dealings with Parliament. 
In explicitly inviting other colonies to join them, delegates were forced to articulate what it was 
that united their cause with that of places like Canada. In doing so, they not only needed to 
identify shared grievances, but to also persuade their readers that their only hope was to come 
together in coordinated opposition to tyrannical British legislation.  
Of its many letters of invitation, Congress’s “Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec” was 
its most earnest. Clocking in at nine pages, that particular address was the longest of the lot. 
What is more, it was arguably the most carefully drafted of Congress’s invitations. Because it 
was addressed to a colonial population which was still largely composed of French-speaking 
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individuals, congressional delegates were at pains to explain in meticulous detail not just which 
British rights were under attack by a cruel Parliament, but also why those rights should be 
cherished and why their curtailment justified collective resistance. As a result, Congress’s letter 
to Canada’s inhabitants reads more like an instruction manual to the union’s project of resistance 
than do any of its other invitations.   
The address opened with a quick explanation clarifying why Congress had sent such a 
letter. Its representatives, the message read, had come together to take stock of their shared 
grievances and consider “the state of public affairs on this continent.” Having done that, they 
“thought proper to address your province, as a member therein deeply interested.” They then 
quickly made reference to the circumstances under which Canada entered the British Empire, 
and rather than describing a jubilant British victory, which carried the risk of alienating most of 
the colony’s New Subjects, their letter only recounted “a gallant and glorious resistance” on the 
part of the conquered French subjects. As they saw it, the subsequent turn of events was 
joyous—“we rejoiced in the truly valuable addition,” the delegates assured the colony’s 
inhabitants; they had even hoped that “the Divine Being” would bless them and their posterity 
with “the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government.”126 These hopes, 
which they dated back to the conquest—and which they claimed the Proclamation of 1763 had 
fulfilled—not only remained strong, they were the central reasons Congress claimed to be 
reaching out. 
Strategic though the letter was, it also reflected genuine assumptions about the colony 
and what its incorporation in the union was expected to bring. Since 1763, British Americans had 
waited for the establishment of civil government, critiqued the overbearing influence of the 
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military, and likely looked for signs that a representative, elective assembly would finally be 
instituted in the new British colony. Some had done so in large part because they had either 
migrated to Canada or had planned to do so in coming years. And many genuinely believed that 
Canada’s French-speaking, Catholics would grow to cherish the rights and liberties of “English 
Subjects.” Yet they did so because they also expected that these individuals would come to 
assimilate culturally through a process of Anglicization.  
Nevertheless, it was clear Congress recognized it was addressing a colony whose 
population was far from Anglicized. Given that most of the document read like an instruction 
manual on the British constitution and form of government, Congress evidently believed 
Canada’s New Subjects remained woefully unfamiliar with the rights they claimed to be fighting 
for. Moreover, the letter was noticeably silent on the religious provisions of the Quebec Act. 
Scholars of the period have often interpreted the authors’ failure to address the religious nature 
of the legislation as proof of disingenuous motives on the part of Congress, arguing that the 
silence suggests congressional delegates sought to entice Canadian colonists into a union in 
which they would have little-to-no voice.127 Yet, Congress’ intentional avoidance of the subject, 
while calculated, was not entirely disingenuous. Since news of the Quebec Act had reached 
North America, most critics of the legislation aimed their critiques at the legal standing the act 
had given Catholicism, not at the continued existence of practicing Catholics (in fact, 
Catholicism was passively tolerated elsewhere in British America). What most people feared was 
the combination of imperial policy and a religion largely seen as conducive to tyrannical rule. 
More than likely, Congress merely attempted to avoid any confusion by staying clear of the 
emotionally-charged subject. That being said, Congress’s silence on the subject, together with its 
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language elsewhere, also suggests that Canada’s Catholic colonists were being invited into a 
union that would provide them very limited roles as long as they remained Catholic.  
Congress’ “Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec” became public knowledge. Extracts of 
congressional proceedings began appearing in print in mid-September. Although Canada and the 
Quebec Act had already garnered much attention in the weeks leading up to the First Continental 
Congress, published extracts revealed the degree to which they also shaped the manner in which 
congressional delegates understood their union, shared grievances, and ultimate purpose. In an 
October issue of the Pennsylvania Packet, more than one page was dedicated solely to the 
“Extracts from the Votes and Proceedings of the American Continental Congress.”128 After an 
opening section in which Congress outlined the various circumstances that had led to its general 
meeting (including Parliament’s statute “For making more effectual provision for the 
government of Quebec”), came a list of Congress’ resolves. Within that list was evidence that 
congressional delegates had resolved that the Quebec Act along with other acts of Parliament 
were “infringements and violations of the Rights of the colonists: & that the repeal of them is 
essentially necessary in order to restore harmony between Great-Britain and the American 
colonies.” As they described it, the act established “the Roman catholic religion in the province 
of Quebec, abolishing the equitable system of English laws, and erecting a tyranny there, to the 
great danger, from so total a dissimularity [sic] of religion, law and government to the 
neighbouring British colonies, by the assistance of whose blood and treasure the said country 
was conquered.”129 In the fall of 1774, there was thus no question that the Quebec Act weighed 
heavily on both revolutionary action and rhetoric—it was explicitly proclaimed one of the 
reasons for the creation of the United Colonies and a grievance to be addressed. 
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The Quebec Act and Patriot Identity 
 
 Even outside the confines of the Continental Congress, the Quebec Act shaped the ways 
British colonists came to understand and justify the Revolutionary unrest of the period. Exposed 
to sermons, newspapers, pamphlets, and personal correspondence, countless colonists throughout 
North America appear to have viewed the Quebec Act as a justification for revolutionary action. 
Many also considered the opposition to it as one of the requirements expected of all patriots. As 
legislation that was continuously attacked in print—and likely in private conversations as well—
the Quebec Act became part of a standard litany of complaints against a corrupt Parliament. 
When individuals strayed from that norm by viewing it as either inoffensive or even beneficial, 
they could incur the wrath of nearby patriots, just as occurred for the Reverend William 
Edmiston of Baltimore Country, Maryland. 
 On January 17, 1775, after receiving news that Edmiston had made some problematic 
assertions, Baltimore County’s Committee of Observation called on the clergyman to answer for 
his wrongdoings. Edmiston had reportedly claimed “That all persons, who mustered, were guilty 
of treason; and that such of them as had taken the oath of allegiance, and took up arms, were 
guilty of perjury.”130 Just as troublesome was the fact that he had “approved publicly of the 
Quebec bill.”131 As they made clear, the members of Baltimore’s Committee of Observation 
“were of the opinion that such declarations have a tendency to defeat the measures, 
recommended for the preservation of America, and her liberties.” and therefore “resolved 
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unanimously” that the Reverend Edmiston be directed to attend their next scheduled meeting. 
Once present, he went through the motions of recanting many of his earlier statements, making 
sure to also excuse his assertions by observing that in the midst of political turmoil, it was all too 
easy to vocalize “sentiments hastily adopted.”132 
 With respect to his earlier stance on the Quebec Act, Edmiston assured the committee 
that:  
 
upon the most serious reflection, I disapprove of the Quebec bill, as it establishes 
the Roman catholic religion in the province of Quebec, abolishes the equitable 
system of English laws, and erects a tyranny there, to the great danger (from so 
total a dissimularity [sic] of religion, law and government) of the neighbouring 
British colonies, by the assistance of whose blood and treasure the said country 
was conquered.133 
 
Although perhaps sincere, Edmiston’s altered thoughts on the Quebec Act more likely reflected  
views he sensed the committee expected to hear. Indeed, his language reads as overly scripted, as 
though there was a ready-made formula with which to disapprove of the legislation. Much of 
Edmiston’s recantation read as though it was plucked from the published “Extracts from the 
Votes and Proceedings of the American Continental Congress” or the newspaper articles that 
similarly printed excerpts of Congress’s initial resolves. In fact, most of it mirrored Congress’ 
language on a word-for-word basis even with regard to the misspellings like “dissimularity.”  
 Importantly, Edmiston’s public recantation was partly for the benefit of Baltimore 
County’s Committee of Observation, but not completely. Immediately after declaring his 
newfound aversion to the Quebec Act, Edmiston added: “I tenderly love my country—I wish for 
her prosperity, and devoutly pray, that the present contest may terminate to her advantage. And I 
sincerely hope that brotherly love will bury in oblivion all animosity between me and my 
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parishioners, with whom to live in harmony and peace is my warmest wish.”134 Those last 
declarations with which the clergyman concluded his statements revealed more than the 
rhetorical flourish with which he ended his thoughts. By specifically articulating his desire that 
the animosity between his parishioners and himself be eventually forgotten, Edmiston shed light 
on some of the circumstances leading to his unfortunate encounter with the committee: probably 
one or more of his parishioners brought his unpopular assertions to the committee’s attention in 
the first place. Such actions, in turn, suggest that distaste for the Quebec Act was widespread and 
increasingly expected of all individuals who claimed to cherish British America and the rights 
enjoyed there.    
 In New York during the early days of March 1775, for instance, expressing support for 
the Continental Congress went hand-in-hand with proclaiming disapproval of the Quebec Act. In 
an effort to support Congress’s resolves, including its call for a second Continental Congress, 
“the Friends of Freedom” in New York reportedly assembled and marched through the city on 
Monday, March 6, 1775. Early that morning, they reportedly gathered around the local liberty 
pole, where they began their procession some two hours later “attended by music.” As they 
marched, standard bearers carried a large “Union flag” that included a number of key 
inscriptions: on one side were the phrases “George III. Rex and the Liberties of America. No 
Popery;” on the other was “The Union of the Colonies, and the Measures of the Congress.”135 
The message could not have been any clearer. With just a few phrases—specifically, twenty-one 
words—New York patriots managed to communicate their general support for Congress, their 
disapproval of the Quebec Act, and their continued allegiance to a king they believed would not 
endorse Parliament’s most recent actions. Like other colonists in the years and months leading 
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up to the union’s declaration of independence, New York’s “Friends of Freedom” were careful to 
qualify their resistance as the reasonable opposition of loyal British subjects.136  
Tellingly, atop their carefully designed flag was a clear condemnation of the Quebec Act. 
To be sure, New Yorkers inhabited a colony physically affected by Canada’s soon to be 
expanded boundaries. For that reason, their disapproval of the act was not entirely surprising. 
Yet, like colonists elsewhere on the continent, patriots in New York had bemoaned the 
implications of other parliamentary legislation like the infamous Boston Port Act of 1774, 
making common cause with Bostonians by sending aid and calling for the act’s repeal. In other 
words, the Quebec Act was not the only piece of legislation that had claimed the attentions of 
New York colonists since the summer and fall of 1774. Nevertheless, it was the only one to 
grace the union flag of revolutionaries interested in communicating their political stance in the 
spring of 1775, at least by direct allusion.  
 
 
The Quebec Act in Canada 
 
 In Canada, unlike elsewhere in British North America, responses to the Quebec Act were 
far more varied. Members of the colonial administration—including the current governor who 
had taken over the administration of Canada in 1766—were generally supportive of the 
legislation, often touting it as a practical approach to governing a colony whose inhabitants were 
mostly French-speaking, Catholic subjects.137 From their point of view, it also had the added 
benefit of constraining restless and vocal English-speaking Old Subjects, many of whom were 
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known to have played notable roles in disempowering the province’s first governor, James 
Murray.138  
From the colonial population at large, the Quebec Act elicited various responses. The 
French-speaking landed elite, known as seigneurs, generally supported the act, viewing it as a 
means through which to increase their authority over their tenants (the French-speaking agrarian 
peasantry known as the habitants). The Catholic clergy, too, welcomed the new legislation, 
almost immediately becoming some of its strongest advocates within Canada. Most of the 
colony’s merchants—many of whom were English-speaking Old Subjects—were the Quebec 
Act’s greatest critics. Yet the vast majority of the colonial population—the habitants—were 
largely unaffected the by the act’s passage, and for the most part took a cautiously neutral stance 
on the issue.  
 Indeed, if there was anything the Canadian habitants felt strongly about in regards to the 
Quebec Act, it was that their clergymen should not themselves urge their parishioners to take a 
strong political stance on the issue. Far from being the impressionable “children of Popery” that 
protestant British Americans often assumed them to be, the habitants reached political decisions 
based on their own regionally-specific concerns. And pressing as the Quebec Act appeared to be 
for countless British Americans throughout the continent (including, of course, certain 
individuals in Canada itself), it failed to have a significant impact on most of Canada’s 
inhabitants. As historian Donald Fyson has argued, the Quebec Act—like the imposition of 
British rule before it—did not have any immediate effect on the local politics and administration 
of justice in the Canadian countryside. Due to the region’s demographic profile, French subjects 
were all but assured a continued role in local governance.139 The Quebec Act, therefore, 
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amounted to abstract bureaucratic measures that promised little—if any—foreseeable impact on 
the daily lives of most of Canada’s inhabitants.  
 Regardless of the habitants’ seemingly understated reaction to the Quebec Act, British 
Americans elsewhere on the continent eagerly sought news of the legislation’s reception in 
Canada. They parsed every available report for clues as to the general population’s sentiments 
towards the act. Even when they received distressing news, they found ways to either counter or 
dismiss its more discouraging aspects. For example, when in November the New-Hampshire 
Gazette published a report from “a Gentleman of undoubted Veracity,” claiming that the 
“principal Merchants of [Quebec]” had publicly burnt the letter Congress had sent them in 
October, the publishers took it upon themselves to argue the opposite.140 Labeling the report “a 
most infernal Falsehood, by Ministerial Tools,” they declared that in reality “the Canadians, 
French as well as British, are much dissatisfied with all the Revenue Acts for North-America; as 
also with what is called the Quebec Bill.”141 The editor then argued that not only were Canadian 
colonists dissatisfied with legislation like the Quebec Act, but that they had reacted favorably to 
Congress’s invitation to join the union. “It is asserted,” they claimed, “that Town-Meetings are 
held on these Affairs from Montreal to Quebec, and reported that they have chosen Delegates for 
the Continental Congress in May next.” The commentary ended with the assertion that 
Canadians were currently in the process of “preparing Petitions and Remonstrances for the 
Repeal of the Quebec Bill.”142  
 Thus, British Americans suspicious of parliamentary legislation and supportive of the 
coordinated efforts of Congress as well as the union it represented looked for evidence to suggest 
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Canada’s colonial population was similarly dissatisfied with the Quebec Act. Even the slightest 
semblance of colonial unrest could be considered a sign, taking place as it did under what was 
generally considered Canada’s oppressive colonial government that prevented its subjects from 
expressing their views as openly as they would otherwise have done. And as it happened, such 
biased observers eventually found what seemed to constitute proof of Canadian dissatisfaction 
with the legislation in the actions of certain Old Subjects.  
 On November 12, 1774, quite some time after news of the Quebec Act reached Canada 
one hundred and eighty-six Old Subjects signed a petition pleading that the injurious legislation 
be repealed. Perhaps recognizing that they represented a community vastly outnumbered by the 
colony’s other subjects—most of whom were habitants—the petitioners quickly worked to 
emphasize their own significance. After explaining that they had entered the province because of 
the faith they had placed in the promises of the Proclamation of 1763, they claimed that their 
presence had been beneficial for the colony. They had settled in Canada, they asserted, 
“purchasing Houses and Lands and carrying on extensive Trade Commerce and Agriculture 
whereby the Value of the Land and Wealth of it’s Inhabitants are more than doubled.”143 On top 
of these noteworthy contributions, the petitioners assured their king, they had “paid a ready and 
dutiful Obedience to Government and have lived in Peace and Amity with your Majesty’s new 
Subjects.”144 Taken together, the petition’s opening lines presented the respective Old Subjects 
as a loyal community worthy of recompense. Despite the fact that they remained a minority, by 
claiming sole responsibility for the increase in the colony’s land values and the population’s 
wealth, the petitioners positioned themselves as best they could for requesting the Quebec Act’s 
repeal.  
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 To buttress their cause, the petitioners described themselves as “utter Strangers” to 
French civil law and as injured not only by the act’s immediate introduction, but also by what 
was sure to be its “ruinous” consequences.145 They claimed that the change in the province’s 
administration would be disastrous to their “Properties,” and by extension—given their earlier 
boast about their impact on the colony’s land values and overall wealth—Canada more generally. 
They made a succinct but strong case for the act’s repeal and managed to imply that their 
sentiments were generally felt by all of the colony’s Old Subjects—individuals whom they 
portrayed as loyal to a fault, given their unquestionable faith in the 1763 proclamation’s 
promises.  
 Of course, petitions like the one sent in November 1774 were not the only documents 
making their way to the crown or the British Parliament. Governor Carleton, Lieutenant 
Governor Hector T. Cramahé, and other administrators in Canada sent their own assessments of 
the Quebec Act and its reception in the colony. Although they were just as likely to depict the 
Old Subjects as displeased with the new legislation, they were quick to accuse them of being 
self-interested individuals with little-to-no regard for the New Subjects’ well-being. Indeed, 
imperial officials like Carleton tended to regard the Quebec Act as legislation that would protect 
the happiness of the New Subjects from their power-hungry, English-speaking neighbors. Armed 
with contesting representations of the colony’s Old Subjects, king and Parliament seemed 
unlikely to take the petitioners’ requests seriously. But the same cannot be said for British 
Americans elsewhere on the continent, many of whom tended to place more stock on the claims 
of Canada’s English-speaking community than on those of imperial agents like Carleton.  
 Indeed, the belief that Canada’s inhabitants—particularly its Old Subjects—were just as 
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displeased with the Quebec Act’s implications as were the other colonists led revolutionary 
agents and certain provincial assemblies to send their own letters inviting the colony to join the 
United Colonies. In late February, Boston’s Committee of Correspondence penned one such 
letter, and, by early April, English-speaking inhabitants from Montreal replied. Likely penned by 
Thomas Walker, but also signed by three other colonists, the response to Boston’s Committee of 
Correspondence likely only inspired revolutionary agents in Boston—and wherever else news of 
the letter circulated—to continued holding out hope that Canada would eventually take part in 
their coordinated opposition to Parliament.  
 After assuring Boston’s committee members that they felt deeply about “the sorrows and 
afflictions of our suffering brethren,” Walker and his fellow colonists claimed that far from being 
in a position to help Boston’s afflicted residents, Canadian colonists like themselves were “more 
the object of pity and compassion than yourselves.” 146 According to the letter writers, “the 
apprehension of the evils to come upon us, in a short time, from the unlimited power of the 
governors, strikes all opposition dead.” They nevertheless claimed that most of Canada’s 
inhabitants secretly wished the United Colonies well. “Few in this colony, they argued, “dare 
vent their griefs; but groan in silence, and dream in lettres of cachet, confiscations, and 
imprisonments.” They even went as far as to assert that “both English and Canadians… wish 
well to your cause; but dare not stir a finger to help you.” And thereby, striking a careful balance 
between ostensibly supporting Congress’s efforts and outward compliance with imperial policy, 
Walker and his associates asked “whether English delegates would be accepted… without 
entering into the general association for the non-importations of goods from Great Britain, or the 
non-exportation of the products of this colony, and the Indian countries above.” More to the 
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point, they wanted to know whether they could be “serviceable” to the union’s cause “without 
bringing down ruin upon [their] own heads.”147 
 For the next several months, revolutionary agents in the United Colonies held out hope 
that Canada would one day join their union. They sent emissaries, spies, and letters to the colony, 
all the time ready to be convinced that there was enough support for what was increasingly 
referred to as “the common cause.” This continued even after the Second Continental Congress 
first met on May 10, 1775, at which point the Revolutionary war was underway. Indeed, in the 
early months of the war, Canada would weigh just as heavily in the minds of revolutionary 
Americans as it had done in the weeks leading up to the start of the union. And in the end, their 
expectations regarding Canada were not unfounded; although somewhat muffled, colonial 
resistance to the Quebec Act continued in Canada itself. On the morning of May 1, 1775—the 
day on which the legislation finally went into effect--colonists defaced a bust of the British king 
that was located in one of the town squares in Montreal. They painted his head black, draped a 
rosary made out of potatoes around his neck, and then appended a script to it which read: “Voila 
le Pape du Canada ou le sot Anglais,” which translated to “Behold the Pope of Canada or the 
English fool.” Like British Americans elsewhere, certain Canadian colonists made a bold 
statement about the melding of Catholicism and British imperial policy by clearly conflating the 
figure of British king with the pope. The colony’s English-speaking colonists believed their 
cherished rights as British subjects were being threatened by a monarch they now associated with 
the pope—a figure symbolizing arbitrary rule.  
But in feeling unnecessarily burdened by an overly demanding and intrusive colonial 
government, they were not alone. Aware of colonists’ mounting dissatisfaction with the Quebec 
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Act and fearful of the outbreak of military warfare and what it meant for his colony, Governor 
Carleton sought to shore up the province’s defenses. Among the various steps he took to 
accomplish that aim, Carleton sought to rally most of Canada’s militia men. In the process, he 
managed to alienate countless New Subjects who did not respond well his summons. Feeling 
personally burdened by a colonial government who had long been comfortably removed from 
their everyday routines, many of Canada’s French-speaking subjects would eventually join their 
English-speaking counterparts in resisting Carleton’s authority. If not exactly coercive legislation 
on par with the Boston Port Act or the Massachusetts Government Act, the Quebec Act was 
seemingly just as intolerable. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Facing South from Quebec: Beyond Benedict Arnold’s March of 1775 
 
“Where is he, your King? He is in town facing the mouth of a 
cannon.” - Jean Bilodau, habitant from the Sainte Marie 
Parish in Nouvelle Beauce, winter 1775.148 
 
 During the fall of 1775, Ignace Couture travelled southward from his home in Pointe 
Lévy, Canada to the nearby region of La Beauce, a distance of a little more than fifty miles. 
Pointe Lévy sat across the Saint Lawrence River from the colonial capital, Quebec City, and was 
the site of a resistance movement in which Couture played a key role. Indeed, his journey to La 
Beauce was an attempt to secure military aid. Months earlier, Guy Carleton, the governor of 
Quebec (commonly known as Canada), had declared martial law, attempting to mobilize local 
parish militias throughout the Canadian countryside. He hoped the added manpower would help 
thwart an attack the Continental Army appeared increasingly poised to launch.149 Fearful of a 
large-scale invasion, the governor was especially interested in galvanizing the Canadian 
habitants, the French-speaking agrarian peasantry who made up the vast majority of the colonial 
population.150 Yet, countless resisted his call to arms. Many habitants from neighboring parishes, 
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like Saint Vallier and Saint Michel, responded to the governor’s summons by assembling at 
Pointe Lévy in coordinated opposition. With time, some even advocated for the Continental 
troops who began making their way to the colony in September 1775 in what became known as 
the Canadian Campaign of 1775-1776 or, more commonly, the invasion of Quebec. For many, 
resisting Carleton’s orders came to mean supporting the encroaching army. Others took it a step 
further by actively seeking out the Continental forces. Couture, for one, approached La Beauce 
for the sake of approaching one of the army’s officers, Colonel Benedict Arnold, and the soldiers 
under his command.151  
 Couture’s movements illustrate part of a lesser known history of the Continental Army’s 
Canadian Campaign, one of the first major military offensives of the American Revolutionary 
War. As Continental forces marched through Canada, some of the colony’s inhabitants moved 
too. Through their actions and words, much of Canada’s colonial population shaped the course of 
the Canadian Campaign together with the landscape on which it took place.152 They supplied the 
troops with crucial intelligence, directions, provisions, shelter, artillery, and manpower. They 
travelled to various parishes in order to stir up additional support for the Continental troops. 
They even stymied the efforts of loyalists who supported the British administration’s military 
operations, occasionally both apprehending and delivering certain individuals to the Continental 
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forces.153 Far from being an enterprise carried out by Continental troops alone, the Canadian 
Campaign bore the unmistakable imprint of the colony’s inhabitants from the start.  
 Yet, certain routes weigh more heavily on historical memory than others. Although 
encounters like the one between Couture and Arnold at La Beauce brought together different 
forms of resistance that jointly shaped the course of the ongoing campaign, only Arnold’s has 
attained mythological status. His march through the Maine “wilderness,” which was the second 
leg of a two-pronged offensive into Canada, remains one of the most studied episodes of the 
campaign.154 In fact, scholars have written entire monographs on his march alone.155 Even those 
who have looked past Arnold’s march specifically regularly privilege the perspective of the 
Continental forces more generally—whether under Arnold or the campaign’s commanding 
general, Richard Montgomery. Habitually framing their studies around the Continental Army and 
its movements, scholars of the Revolutionary Era tend to approach Canada as the troops did: 
starting in Cambridge or Albany, they eventually make their way into the colony. Only when the 
army reaches Canada do they incorporate both the colony and some of its inhabitants into their 
studies. In the process, the trajectories of the campaign’s commanders have become the basic 
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plot lines in studies of the campaign, while Canada, which served as the scene for much of the 
offensive, takes on the mistaken appearance of a colony out of time. If Arnold’s historiographical 
footstep is heavy, Couture’s has remained inappreciably light.  
Bringing Couture’s movements into greater focus, however, accomplishes more than 
simply filling a historiographical gap. By shedding greater light on the colonial turmoil that 
shaped much of Canada’s political and social landscape in the summer and fall of 1775, 
Couture’s mission invites scholars to revisit one of the Continental Army’s earliest campaigns in 
ways that better illuminate Canada’s often-overlooked place in the American Revolution. The 
Canadian Campaign was, after all, Congress’ most concrete attempt to oust the British 
administration from the colony and subsequently incorporate Canada within the nascent union of 
the United Colonies. Despite the tendency of scholars of the Revolutionary era to describe the 
campaign as ill-fated from the start, its eventual fate was far from predestined and—for the first 
months of the offensive at least—it was even considered the least likely of two possible 
outcomes. This historical contingency, together with many of the early successes the Continental 
forces faced, is best understood within the context of the habitant resistance movements that 
individuals like Couture strove to further. 
Adopting perspectives like those of Couture also compels us to acknowledge that—like 
Couture himself—the habitants at Pointe Lévy, Canada’s administrative apparatus, and much of 
the rest of the colonial subjects in the region did not sit in wait for the Continental troops to bring 
the activity surrounding the offensive to them. Rather, in anticipation of the troops’ entry, they 
took countless steps to sideline, mitigate, or encourage the army’s endeavors. These actions 
proved formative for the Continental Army’ campaign, providing the very circumstances that led 
to that army’s early military successes—successes which colonists both in and outside of Canada 
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considered signs of a greater victory to come. It was also with habitant support that Benedict 
Arnold’s troops completed their famed march to Quebec. 
 Throughout this chapter, my focus has been on Carleton’s administration and the 
Canadian habitants. Although both Native peoples and other sectors of Canada’s colonial 
population, such as English-speaking colonists, the French-speaking landed elite (or seigneurs), 
and the Catholic clergy, were likewise embroiled in the campaign, the role of the habitants in the 
offensive remains disproportionally obscure.156 This is particularly troubling because habitant 
involvement, perhaps more than any other factor in the campaign, demonstrated just how close 
Carleton came to suffering complete defeat in the fall and winter of 1775-1776—indeed, just 
how close the United Colonies came to adding a fourteenth member. Parish resistance 
movements, like that at Pointe Levy, reveal that Canada’s colonial government faced various 
attacks in 1775. They also reframed the Canadian Campaign into an offensive shaped by the 
coming together of two forms of resistance: that of the Continental Army and that of Canadian 
habitants. Understanding the scope and influence of habitant resistance, therefore, does more 
than merely add to historical understandings of the Canadian Campaign, it alters them.157 
Encounters like those between Couture and Arnold chip away at the mistaken—but all too 
pervasive—notion that the Continental Army’s military offensive was ill-fated from the start. 
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Imperial Anxieties in Canada 
By the summer of 1775, the atmosphere in British North America had changed drastically 
from that of the mid-1760s and early 1770s. With the outbreak of hostilities in Lexington and 
Concord, it was clear the revolutionary fervor of the previous decade would neither be quashed 
swiftly nor through bureaucratic channels alone. Like many governors on the continent, Carleton 
worried about the growing colonial unrest and what it meant for his administration. Throughout 
the summer and into the fall of that year, he wrote to Thomas Gage, the commander-and-chief of 
the British forces in North America, voicing his fears about the growing discontent in Canada. 
Despite always associating the revolution’s origins with New England—like many other British 
and revolutionary officials of the time—he never felt sheltered from its reach.158 If anything, the 
growing revolutionary unrest seemed to demonstrate just how porous the boundaries of the 
colony really were.  
As June came to a close, the governor worried about the colony’s vulnerability, both to 
the infiltration of revolutionary agents themselves as well as their ideas more broadly. On June 
28, 1775, he wrote to Gage about the then-current state of affairs in Canada, describing a colony 
largely at the mercy of “the Rebels” and their harmful influence. Carleton spoke of their “diligent 
Endeavours” to “poison the Minds of these poor People,” and inclosed copies of “printed 
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Papers” the Rebels had apparently conveyed into Canada.159 Even when the governor spoke of a 
time when he “heard little of [the rebels],” he still admitted to the existence of “small parties 
coming down through the Woods into the inhabited Parts of the Country, to intimidate the 
Inhabitants.”160 It seemed he governed a colony constantly sheltering individuals who were 
actively working against his administration.  
Thomas Ainslie, a captain of the British militia, also described the early summer as a 
period of unceasing incursions. During the month of June, he claimed, “The Agents & friends of 
the Congress had not been idle—by word & by writing they had poison’d [the] minds” of the 
“Canadian Peasants.”161 Like Carleton, Ainslie viewed the threat of revolution as one that 
originated elsewhere, but was exported into the colony through the movements of “Agents & 
friends” of the United Colonies. And like the governor, he also depicted those agents as 
continuously active. While still recounting the events of June, he detailed their ubiquitous—if 
short-lived—sojourns in Canada, contending: “Arm’d strangers had appear’d in some of the 
Parishes below Quebec; they disappear’d suddenly:—nobody knew their business—it was 
conjectur’d that they came to learn the sentiments of the Country People, & the state of 
Quebec.”162  
Yet Ainslie’s portrayal of the “Arm’d strangers” did more than simply bear witness to 
their unflagging efforts. In emphasizing the covertness with which they moved, Ainslie also 
depicted congressional envoys as fantastical figures who appeared and disappeared suddenly, 
remaining at the same time visibly present yet elusively out of reach. Indeed, Ainslie’s language 
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suggests that he—and likely others—believed that emissaries of the United Colonies maintained 
an unceasing, wraithlike presence in Canada. Somehow hidden from view, these agents could 
make an appearance at any moment. His account might even suggest that individuals in Canada, 
but especially those supportive of the British administration, saw emissaries even when or where 
they were not physically present. The expectation that such “Arm’d strangers” could turn up 
suddenly also meant that individuals like Ainslie were ever watchful for their next appearance. 
Additionally, in hinting at the ease with which the “emissaries” or “agents” of the United 
Colonies moved through the Canadian countryside, individuals like Carleton and Ainslie also 
helped redefine the countryside itself. The more common the presence of congressional envoys 
seemed, the more the British administration and its supporters came to regard the physical 
landscape with suspicion. Beginning in the summer of 1775, many began to consider large 
stretches of the colony to be hospitable to harbingers of revolution. Ainslie, for example, 
explained how disconcertedly accessible Canada was to New Englanders in a journal entry in 
which he alluded to the “facility” with which “the Hunters of N[ew] England [could] traverse the 
woods” all the while acknowledging that “Woodsmen may enter this Province by more ways 
than one.”163 To illustrate his point, Ainslie outlined three main waterways which provided 
access to the colony. The Chaudiere and Saint Lawrence rivers, he argued, were both passes 
“well known to the back settlers in Massachusetts & in N[ew] Hampshire.” But there was a 
third—that was “easier” still—by way of the “St. Johns river in Nova Scotia and Madawaska 
River over the carrying place to Kamouraska on the River St. Laurence,” which brought any 
traveler to a mere “hundred miles below Quebec.”164 
Activity along the Chaudière river during that summer corroborated some of Ainslie’s 
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claims. Habitants in the area had been especially active in aiding and abetting Continental 
agents.165 When Etienne Parant, whom Governor Carleton had appointed militia captain of the 
Nouvelle Beauce parish of Sainte Marie, received orders to arrest three spies suspected of being 
in the region, he seems to have taken steps to avoid doing so. Parant allegedly knew who the 
spies were, as well as where they were located: at the house of an individual named Claude 
Patry. But Parant elected to first send “the wife of… his neighbor,” who spoke English, to warn 
them.166 Not until the following morning did he send a search party after the spies, and the party 
apparently “went slowly for fear of catching them.”167 Parant’s actions—as well as those of 
Claude Patry and the members of the captain’s search party—demonstrated a general willingness 
to help emissaries of the United Colonies. Yet it is also worth noting that despite Parant’s 
commitment to assisting the spies, he did, indeed, follow the orders with which he was tasked; he 
merely chose to execute them in ways that benefitted his purposes.   
Not surprisingly, the colony’s administration began to focus on forestalling incursion. 
That summer, Hector Cramahé, the lieutenant governor, appointed guards to police all activity 
around the mouth of the St. Francis river as well as at Sartigan, which sat alongside the 
Chaudiere river, about fifty miles south of Quebec.168 Meanwhile, Governor Carleton began the 
process of fortifying posts at Montreal and Oswegatchie. He was confident that such posts would 
help thwart future attacks, but recognized that there were “other Avenues into the Province” all 
the same.169 Perhaps most importantly, Carleton also called upon the colonial population, 
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requesting that they assemble into militias in order to contribute to the defense of the province.  
 But the governor found that his efforts were hindered almost immediately, as the majority 
of his colonial subjects appeared unwilling to come to the colony’s defense. Although most of the 
colony’s landed elite, the seigneurs, responded promptly to Carleton’s orders, most of the 
habitants did not, producing top-heavy militias. The difficulties the governor faced in his ensuing 
efforts to marshal the more reluctant habitants—the backbone of the militias—to action became 
a sore point for Carleton, and one he constantly alluded to in his outgoing correspondence. Even 
at the end of July, when he considered the difficult task of raising Montreal district’s militia to be 
“in some Degree effected,” he refused to place much confidence in that body.170 As Carleton 
explained to Gage: “they are not in that Temper I could wish, nor can I depend much upon them 
at present, not even for the Defence of their own Province.”171 Given Carleton’s motivations in 
mobilizing the militias, their seeming unreliability all but negated their existence in the eyes of 
the governor. 
 As the summer progressed, Carleton’s fears of becoming more directly embroiled in the 
revolutionary disturbances of the time sharpened. He began to worry about “the Rebels” leading 
a military charge into Canada. Indeed, by early August, both intelligence and “many 
Circumstances” led him to believe that the colony was “in no small Danger of falling into [the 
Rebels’] Hands.”172 According to the governor, they were “collecting a large Force upon the 
Lakes”—“much greater, allowing for Exaggerations, than is necessary to defend what they have 
got.” The governor believed a much greater British force was needed so as to overawe the 
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Continental troops into inaction, or even retreat. His letters to Thomas Gage reflected that need, 
such as one written on August 5, which included a subtle warning to the commander of the 
British forces. He wrote: “While they see so weak a Force to support them, it will be very 
difficult to bring the Canadians even to defend their Country against an Enemy, who has vowed 
to destroy it with Fire and Sword, if they stir, and have Friends and Emissaries enough through 
the Country to whisper this constantly in their Ears.” 173  
 Carleton’s letter portrayed a desperate situation. As he presented it, the colony’s 
administration was vulnerable to the Continental Army’s military presence at the same time that 
its inhabitants seemed susceptible to the army’s promise, or, perhaps more appropriately, to its 
threats. Indeed, certain colonists appeared to have already aligned themselves with the 
revolutionary cause and its “emissaries,” and looked to be both numerous and dispersed enough 
to undermine the governor’s authority throughout Canada. They also seemed tenacious in their 
efforts, constantly “whispering” the unpleasant prospects that awaited anyone who resisted the 
Continental troops and their efforts in the colony. Paired with anxieties like those of Thomas 
Ainslie, Carleton’s recollections provided a poetic expression to a sentiment that was spreading 
throughout Canada’s colonial administration as the summer of 1775 progressed: agents of 
revolution were seemingly everywhere, whether heard in whispers or seen in phantom-like ways.  
 Thomas Gamble, the British Quartermaster who was stationed in Quebec at the time, 
corroborated the growing unease, lamenting to Thomas Gage that he feared “little must be 
Expected from this Quarter.”174 He explained, “many seem to be of oppinion that if The Rebels 
were to Invade this Colony; that the Canadians wou’d not oppose them,” as it was “very Certain 
                                                
173 Ibid. 
174 Thomas Gamble to Thomas Gage, August 2, 1775, TGP, American Series, Vol. 133, William L. Clements 
Library, Ann Arbor. MI. 
  
83 
that the Rebels have had many Emmissarys among them, which have had a bad Effect.”175 
Indeed, many British administrators and sympathizers came to believe that the colony’s habitants 
would do more than “not oppose” the Continental forces, they began to suspect that these 
colonial subjects would even join the Continental Army’s attack. And it was not just the colony’s 
administrators who judged the habitants in such ways, individuals outside of the colony did too. 
As Ainslie recounted, “Agents for the Congress in this Country represented to that body that 
nothing was to be apprehended from the Canadians in their present temper of mind, that so far 
from opposing the Continental troops, they would receive them with open arms, nay that perhaps 
great numbers would join them, for that they appear’d to be thoroughly tinctur’d with the true 
spirit of Rebellion.”176 
 To some extent, Ainslie’s assessments rang true. Although it is not only unlikely, but also 
impossible to say whether the habitants were, in fact, “thoroughly tinctur’d with the true spirit of 
Rebellion,” revolutionary envoys did report back to Congress, often presenting the situation in 
Canada in a positive light. Like British administrators in Canada, proponents of a military 
campaign in the United Colonies were utterly engrossed in discerning the inclinations of most of 
the colony’s inhabitants. Although congressional delegates acted largely out of concern for the 
united colonies they represented, they nonetheless considered the success—and even 
practicality—of any kind of military enterprise as dependent on Canadian support.177 As Samuel 
Chase so aptly put it by mid-August 1775, “A Previous Condition, a sine qua non, of Marching 
into Quebec, is the Friendship of the Canadians: without their Consent and Approbation, it is not 
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[to] be undertaken.”178 
 As the summer progressed, a steady supply of favorable reports from emissaries returning 
from Canada justified Congress’s decision to sanction a Canadian campaign as well as the choice 
of General Philip Schuyler, who commanded the Continental Army’s Northern Department, to 
lead one. Armed with manifestos asserting the army’s friendly intentions towards the colony’s 
inhabitants, Schuyler and General Richard Montgomery led the charge into the colony along 
Lake Champlain, followed not long after by Benedict Arnold, who would march to Canada 
through the less conventional route along the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers. Reaching out to 
Canada’s colonial inhabitants as they marched northward, Schuyler, Montgomery, and Arnold 
hoped that by doing so they would receive both military intelligence and support. Although 
relying primarily on messengers, reports, and their own perceptions, the commanding officers 
consistently viewed their operations—their routes—as two-sided affairs. When Schuyler first 
arrived at Île aux Noix, where the Continental troops first set up camp in Canada, for example, 
he promptly drafted an address to the colony’s inhabitants, assuring them once again of the 
army’s friendly intentions.179 
 
Habitant Parish Resistance Movements 
By the time the Continental Army found its way into Canada, the colony’s habitant 
population had long been at the receiving end of competing overtures. For months, congressional 
delegates as well as members of other colonial associations had invited the colony’s 
inhabitants—both English and French-speaking—to join the United Colonies in opposition to 
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Parliamentary legislation.180 With time, however, the appeals of congressional delegates and their 
emissaries shifted. Although invitations to join in the common cause continued, representatives 
of the United Colonies and the recently established Continental Army began to prioritize military 
concerns in their correspondence. Individuals like General Schuyler and General Montgomery 
strived to assure the colony’s inhabitants, especially the French-speaking habitants, that their 
military endeavors were specifically targeted against the British colonial government, and not at 
the general colonial population—a population, which they consistently described as suffering 
under a common veil of British oppression.  
Representing the other end of the spectrum, British administrators also shifted their 
approach to the colony’s subjects. Over the course of the spring, with the growing threat of a 
Continental Army-led assault, the governor redirected his gaze inward. He continued to request 
additional supplies of British regulars, but increasingly looked on the colony’s inhabitants as an 
untapped source of military manpower. On June 9, Carleton issued a proclamation, which 
officially established martial law in Canada and ordered that “the militia within the [province] to 
be forthwith raised.”181 The governor would not only require that habitants ready themselves for 
military service, but he also chose to appoint parish militia captains himself, without any input 
from the respective parish communities. Doing so ran counter to more conventional practices 
under the French regime, robbing habitants of informal, yet influential, roles in negotiating their 
relationship with the colonial government.  
Since the early seventeenth century, militia captains—appointments often assigned to 
habitant members of given parishes—served as intermediaries between their local communities 
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and the governor, regularly implementing royal orders and reporting on local state of affairs. 
More importantly in the eyes of Canada’s habitants, militia captains often provided a significant 
exception to a seigneur’s otherwise pervasive influence; they enjoyed jurisdictional authority and 
a notable presence in their communities, which including sitting in one of the first pews of their 
local church (although often behind seigneurs). When Carleton appointed militia captains with 
no input from that captain’s parish community, he undermined habitant power in one of the most 
visible ways. What made the governor’s approach even less palatable to parish communities was 
the fact that Carleton granted seigneurs power over their seigneurie’s militias, threatening 
habitant agency even further. Those decisions were noteworthy enough that even politically 
well-connected loyalists commented upon them. On June 15, 1775, the loyalist seigneur and 
businessman François Baby wrote to his friend and fellow seigneur and merchant Pierre Guy. He 
asked him for an update on the current state of affairs in Montreal, inquiring into the disposition 
of the town citizens and the neighboring habitant population as well as asking about Montreal's 
three commanding officers. Their names had been announced in that morning's issue of the 
Quebec Gazette, and he was especially interested in knowing whether they had been chosen by 
the governor or the "Peuple."182 
Like many of his previous policies, the governor’s call to arms enjoyed the support of 
Canada’s Catholic clergy. A mere four days after Carleton’s proclamation, Montreal’s Vicar 
General, Étienne Montgolfier issued a circular letter that Bishop Briand, ever supportive of the 
British administration, ordered be circulated and read throughout Canada’s parishes.  In it, 
Montgolfier appealed to the colonists’ sense of loyalty to God and king in order to encourage 
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them to take up arms for the colony’s defense.183  
Yet, despite the efforts of the colonial government and ecclesiastic authorities, countless 
individuals throughout the colony resisted Carleton’s call to action. More habitants seemed to 
take up arms in order to avoid forced military labor than in compliance with it. In parishes like 
Terrebonne and Berthier, for example, local inhabitants were prepared to use force in order to 
frustrate the attempts of seigneurs to coerce them into militia service. In both cases, the 
seigneurs of Terrebonne and Berthier claimed that as landowners, they had a right to assemble 
the habitants into militias. However, when Terrbonne’s seigneur, Mr. La Corne, voiced such 
demands, the inhabitants argued against his logic and refused to obey. Recounting the encounter 
in his journal, a French-speaking, Montreal-based loyalist named Simon Sanguinet described the 
region's inhabitants as all having made clear their aversion to enlisting in the parish militia.184 
Tensions apparently rose to such an extent that at one point La Corne made the “imprudent” 
decision “to strike some of those who spoke loudest.”185 As Sanguinet recalled, he even attacked 
an older individual, at the same time that he not only threatened to imprison those who resisted 
his orders, but also spoke to them with the tone of a "maître," or a master.186 Still, La Corne’s 
actions only provoked the habitants further, and before too long, “Mr. La Corne found it 
necessary to get away from them, and go back immediately to Montreal.”187  
But La Corne did not leave quietly; before departing, he assured Terrebonne’s inhabitants 
that he would return in the near future “with a party of two hundred soldiers, who would make 
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them dearly pay for their refusal to obey him.”188 In response to such threats, the inhabitants 
chose to arm themselves with guns or clubs, resolving all the while to “die rather than submit to 
be commanded by their seignior.”189 In the end, however, La Corne’s threat proved hollow. 
Rather than supplying the seigneur with the specified two hundred soldiers with which to enforce 
his demands, Carleton instead chose to send a British officer, a Captain Hamilton, to Terrebonne 
for the purpose of pacifying its armed inhabitants. And in some respects, Hamilton’s visit was 
successful. The inhabitants explained to him that their opposition was specifically directed at 
their seigneur, and that they were not, in principle, opposed to taking up arms for the governor. 
After Hamilton promised them that La Corne would not return to Terrebonne, they abandoned 
their armed defense.  
Hamilton’s visit also revealed some of the limits of Carleton’s power. The simple act of 
sending the captain to deal with the unrest at Terrebonne—and not supplying La Corne with the 
soldiers he had requested—revealed the governor’s general unwillingness to antagonize the 
habitants any further. And although the governor’s envoy, Hamilton, was able to convince the 
armed inhabitants to disband, he was only able to do so after promising them that La Corne 
would not be returning. Therefore, in hopes of alleviating the situation, both Carleton and 
Hamilton seemed more inclined to cater to the habitants’ demands than those of an individual, 
whose intentions had been to first assemble, and then command, a militia in service of the 
governor.  
Like the inhabitants of Terrebonne, those of Berthier also balked at the attempts of their 
seigneur to demand military service. From the start, Berthier’s inhabitants were able to control 
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much of the situation. When their seigneur, Mr. Cuthbert, requested that they assemble at his 
house, they responded by declaring that if Cuthbert wished to meet, he needed to come to them. 
Assenting to their request, Cuthbert approached the assembled habitants at a designated location, 
and from there made demands on their military service. Unwilling to comply, the inhabitants 
made it clear to Cuthbert that “he had best retire to his own home, and trouble them no more; for 
that not a man of them would follow him.”190 After their seigneur’s departure, the assembled 
habitants apparently made an oath on a cross, professing that none of them would take up arms 
against the Continental troops. They made two other stipulations. First, they asserted that if any 
of them failed to follow through, the remaining habitants would “burn his house and his barn, 
and destroy his cattle.”191 Second, they also agreed that if Governor Carleton attempted to 
compel them into military service, “they would repel force by force.”192 
The habitant resistance at Berthier enjoyed certain similarities with that at Terrebonne, 
which help shed light on the ways habitants interpreted and responded to attempts to compel 
them into military service. As both cases demonstrate, confrontations between seigneurs and 
their habitant tenants certainly brought to the surface underlying tensions between a landed elite 
and peasant, agrarian communities. But they were also politically-loaded encounters that were 
undeniably tied to the Continental Army and the revolutionary rhetoric of the United Colonies it 
represented. In subtle ways, the demands that individuals like La Corne and Cuthbert hurled at 
habitant communities forced many colonial inhabitants to position themselves within the 
growing intercolonial conflict, even if in the most indirect of ways. Consequently, the manner in 
which habitants reacted reveal some of the ways the vast majority of Canada’s population 
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experienced the start of the campaign.  
Yet, despite clear similarities between habitant resistance at Terrebonne and Berthier, 
there were also a number of key differences. At Berthier, the inhabitants were not only more 
aware of the links between their seigneur’s efforts and the suspected military endeavors of the 
Continental forces, they were also much more willing to claim a place for themselves in the 
shifting circumstances. So opposed were they to taking up arms in support of Carleton’s 
administration that on top of publicly eschewing it, they were willing to risk their homes, barns, 
and livestock if they failed to live up to their promise. They also took a more explicit stance 
relative to the Continental troops. Although they did not claim to support them, or even plan to 
align themselves with the Continental Army, they did vow to refrain from taking up arms against 
them. By positioning themselves in such ways, habitants helped reshape parishes like Berthier 
into spaces that fostered resistance to the British colonial government, but nonetheless fell short 
of actively supporting the Continental Army or its revolutionary causes in the early fall of 1775. 
Also unique to Berthier was the attempt of a second seigneur to mobilize the militia. 
Some time after Cuthbert’s own efforts to assemble the inhabitants, the seigneur of a nearby 
parish, Mr. Lanaudiere, passed through Berthier. While there, he announced that Carleton had 
employed him to command the parish’s inhabitants against “the provincials.”193 He also 
announced that he would return to assemble the inhabitants, first needing to depart to his estate. 
But upon Lanaudiere’s return, Berthier’s inhabitants took him and the seventeen others who had 
accompanied the seigneur prisoners. Afterwards, “Warm debates ensued amongst them, whether 
or not they should send Mr. Lanaudiere to the provincial camp near St. John’s.”194 In the end, the 
Berthier habitants chose to set the party free in exchange for Lanaudiere’s assurance that he 
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would “obtain for them General Carleton’s pardon for this outrage,” and would never again 
return to Berthier on a “like errand.”195  
Once again, Berthier’s habitants were willing to take up arms to resist coerced military 
service. Yet in their dealings with Lanaudiere, as opposed to those with Cuthbert, the parish 
inhabitants were more than just inclined to use force, they actually held the seigneur and his 
party captive. The immediate aftermath of their actions, in which they debated handing the 
imprisoned party over to the Contintental forces, is particularly revealing. It reflected the 
changing atmosphere surrounding Berthier. Between their initial interaction with Cuthbert and 
their more recent encounters with Lanaudiere, the Continental forces under General Montgomery 
had by mid-September established a small foothold in the colony, encamped as they were outside 
of Fort St John’s, which they were currently besieging. Their mere presence provided added 
recourse to Canada’s inhabitants.  
Although it did not cause habitant resistance, the arrival of the Continental troops in 
Canada did affect the choices available to parish communities. Individuals, like the inhabitants of 
Berthier, could now attach themselves and their own objectives to an existing army that would 
bear much of the weight of their combined undertakings. Moreover, in weighing the benefits of 
delivering Lanaudiere to the troops at St. John’s, the act of opposing military service was 
reshaped for Berthier’s inhabitants. They now had choices that more directly involved the 
Continental troops. Ultimately, however, it is clear that in the eyes of the parish habitants, the act 
of resisting their governor still did not equate to supporting the Continental Army. Although they 
opposed Carleton’s orders by refusing to take up arms under Lanaudiere, in the end, they still 
avoided any kind of direct association with the encroaching troops. Instead, they sought the 
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governor’s pardon. The decisions, reached at Berthier, speak to the multiplicity of options that 
habitants enjoyed, and serve as reminders that the parish resistance movements that swept up 
much of the colony were the work of habitants, whose choices reflected their own concerns and 
expectations—concerns and expectations that did not always overlap neatly with those of the 
colonial administration, the Continental forces, or others residing in Canada.  
 
Trans-Parish Resistance 
 Habitant opposition at Terrebonne and Berthier was far from the only resistance 
movement in the colony. At different parishes and in different ways, countless habitants fought 
against Carleton’s call to arms or the attempts of others—including seigneurs—to force them 
into military activity. Like the inhabitants at Terrebonne and Berthier, however, efforts to avoid 
forced mobilization were not necessarily precursors to large-scale habitant support of the 
Continental forces in Canada. To be sure, they did result in pockets of resistance in which 
participating inhabitants were more inclined to form alliances with the encroaching troops and 
vice-versa. Yet, perhaps more importantly, such habitants were also more inclined to form 
alliances with other habitants in nearby parishes, who were likewise resisting Carleton’s orders. 
The resulting multi-parish resistance movements, which coalesced around locales like the Isle 
D’Orléans, and the parish of Pointe Lévy, were not only habitant-led, like the initial acts of 
resistance at Berthier and Terrebonne, they also often predated the arrival of the Continental 
troops within the habitants’ immediate surroundings.  
For habitants committed to opposing Carleton’s orders, the prospect of unified resistance 
was appealing. That was especially the case for those living in parishes near Quebec City, where 
the colonial government’s reach was more strongly felt. Having already fought against the 
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attempts of seigneurs and colonial officials to raise parish militias, the inhabitants in countless 
parishes in the Quebec district were especially receptive to calls for multi-parish resistance 
movement. For many living along the south shore of the Saint Lawrence river, those 
opportunities came in the form of invitations from Point Lévy’s habitants to come together in 
unified opposition.  
As was the case elsewhere in the Canadian countryside, many habitants in Pointe Lévy 
took issue with the governor’s call to arms. As colonial officials would later put it: “When the 
government sent officers to invite this parish to side with the King, they sent envoys to invite 
people in the neighboring parishes to join them in resisting the government’s approach.”196 Those 
envoys included individuals like Ignace Couture, who on top of being cited as one of “the most 
mutinous and seditious” inhabitants of Pointe Lévy, seems to have visited a number of nearby 
parishes in the hopes of consolidating resistance to Carleton.197 His efforts—as well as those of 
his fellow envoys—paid off. Together with members of eight other parishes, the inhabitants of 
Pointe Lévy mounted a formidable opposition in the fall of 1775, where they stood guard, facing 
the city of Quebec from across the Saint Lawrence River. There, they helped form what colonial 
officials would eventually refer to as “the seditious and riotous assembly at Pointe Lévy.”198  
The shift to multi-parish, or trans-parish, resistance reframed habitant opposition, further 
distancing parish communities from the colonial government while simultaneously making them 
even more inclined to align themselves with the Continental troops. To be sure, trans-parish 
resistance seems to have been primarily motivated by habitants’ commitment to buttressing their 
own opposition as well as protecting themselves and their property from any retributive violence 
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on the part of Carleton’s administration. And certainly, many habitants came together solely for 
the sake of mounting a more robust defense of a common cause. It is, therefore, tempting to view 
various large-scale resistance movements as extensions of the more decentralized shows of 
opposition that often preceded them. Yet by unifying with other parishes, habitants altered the 
otherwise disjointed parish struggles in more profound ways. Participating individuals were no 
longer solely contesting specific efforts to establish militias within their own communities, nor 
singling out individual seigneurs or government officials in their grievances. In coming together 
in coordinated opposition against the governor’s call to arms, habitants were repackaging their 
efforts into a broader struggle against administrative policy. In the end, they positioned 
themselves more concretely against the colonial government, which was a change that, although 
subtle, certainly influenced the movements of the Continental forces, and contributed to their 
successes in Canada.  
To complicate matters even further, as trans-parish resistance movements, like that at 
Pointe Lévy, were underway, the geopolitical situation in Canada was simultaneously shifting. 
Continental forces under General Richard Montgomery had not only entered the province, by 
November 13, they had successfully occupied Fort Chambly, Fort St. John’s, and Montreal. 
Because of such changes, the actions of habitants opposing Carleton’s orders were increasingly 
politicized in ways that reflected the binary divisions of the ongoing campaign and not 
necessarily an individual’s personal intentions. In short, opposition to the governor was 
increasingly identified as support for the Continental Army, whether intentional or not. 
Sanguinet's description of La Corne's contentious encounter in Terrebonne, for example, 
explained that the habitants resisted attempts to raise parish militias "because some among them 
had read them the [Continental] Congress's letter of October 26, 1774"—one of several inviting 
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Canada's colonial population to join the United Colonies in their common cause.199 Significantly, 
participating habitants began to reinforce that dichotomy. In these shifting circumstances, their 
resistance movements could and did benefit from closer alliances with the Continental troops. 
And like the initial decision of Pointe Lévy’s inhabitants to send representatives to neighboring 
parishes in order to solicit support, the habitants at the subsequent general assembly held at that 
same parish made use of envoys to reach out to the Continental forces in their vicinity. In the fall 
of 1775, the closest forces were those who entered the province in October and November, under 
the command of Colonel Benedict Arnold. Once again, Ignace Couture set out from Pointe Lévy 
on a familiar mission to obtain additional support for the resistance movement in which he was 
currently engaged. The difference, however, was that Couture was now soliciting the aid of an 
army that already desired habitant support.200 
 
The Coming Together of Resistance Movements 
 Benedict Arnold’s troops began arriving in Canada in late October, finally making contact 
with the colony’s inhabitants in Sartigan. Exhausted and poorly provisioned, the troops depended 
heavily on local inhabitants for food and shelter. Being among the first to arrive, Arnold 
promptly secured provisions for his forces, which included soldiers who had recently arrived in 
the area as well as those still marching toward Quebec. To provide for those still marching, he 
enlisted habitants from the frontier region to transport available supplies—an act that many 
officers and soldiers involved in the campaign noted in their journals. For instance, in his journal 
entry for November 2, 1775, Captain Henry Dearborn made note of the arrival of “Frenchmen 
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with 5 oxen & Two horses.”201 Recounting the same event, Captain Simeon Thayer also added 
that the sight of it caused Captain John Topham and himself to “shed tears of joy.”202 Perhaps 
more poetically than any other, the army surgeon Doctor Isaac Senter also recorded the arrival of 
provisions, describing a vision of “horned cattle, four footed beasts, &c. rode and drove by 
animals resembling Plato’s two footed featherless ones”—a vision that elicited “Exclamations of 
joy,” with “Echoes of gladness” resounding “from front to rear!”203 It was, therefore, with 
habitant assistance that Arnold’s forces entered a colony already altered by parish resistance 
movements and Continental Army victories. And thus, the march that Arnold led through the 
“howling wilderness” of the Maine backcountry—a march that is often lauded as an almost-
impossible feat of bravery and perseverance—was completed with the help of Canadian 
habitants.  
Having regrouped after entering the province, Arnold’s troops began making their way 
northward, tapping into local networks of support along the way. Eventually, they found their 
way to La Beauce, where the local population seemed predisposed to assisting the Continental 
Army, already having helped conceal revolutionary agents who had passed through the region 
during the previous spring and summer. Habitants in the area, such as the parish militia captain, 
Etienne Parant, or the parishioner Claude Patry, known to have housed “spies,” likely presented 
their past actions as proof of their general goodwill towards the Continental Army. 
During their stay in La Beauce, Arnold’s soldiers encountered Ignace Couture and 
became better acquainted with the current state of affairs at Pointe Lévy. In accordance with 
Couture’s wishes—as well as those of the many habitants he represented—Arnold’s troops did 
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begin making their way to the south shore parish. Once there, they set up camp and, eventually, a 
magazine of provisions and military supplies.204 Given the parish’s location, it is likely the 
Continental forces would have found their way there during the course of the campaign 
regardless. After all, Arnold’s destination had been Quebec City, and Pointe Lévy was the closest 
mainland parish to the capital, south of the Saint Lawrence River. And rather than being an 
obstacle, the river provided the troops a measured distance from which to regroup and formulate 
an plan of action, all the while keeping their eyes on Quebec.  
But Arnold’s stay in Pointe Lévy was lengthy, suggesting that more brought the troops 
there than pragmatism alone. Moreover, during that stay, the Continental troops amassed a 
considerable amount of provisions and necessary instruments with which to maintain their 
ongoing offensive—so much so, that they established a base at which habitants from nearby 
parishes willingly and unwillingly furnished the army with additional supplies.205 The duration 
and nature of Arnold’s stay in the parish, therefore, suggests not only a greater reliance on 
habitants’ resources and labor than would otherwise be expected, but also an awareness of the 
opportunity to do so. Consequently, the Continental Army’s sojourn in Pointe Lévy, and its 
continued association with the parish in the months following was at least partly the result of 
overtures like those presented by Couture. 
If habitant shows of support did not wholly determine the Continental troops movements, 
they certainly facilitated them. Despite Arnold’s preexisting connections to merchants in the 
colony, such as John Halsted, who came to visit the colonel at Pointe Lévy, the Continental 
forces would not have been able to sustain their campaign without the provisions and shelter that 
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habitants in the colony provided them.206 Given the political tensions that informed much of the 
region’s resistance movements, securing habitant assistance became all the easier. That was the 
case even with habitants who were loyal to Carleton’s administration or simply wished to remain 
as neutral as possible, as the presence of widespread resistance hampered their ability to either 
disregard or disobey the requests and commands of Continental officers or habitants working 
with them. But the state of affairs that Continental troops encountered did more than simply 
ensure better access to provisions and shelter, it also allowed greater access to crucial 
intelligence that kept the army informed of happenings in the colony, increasing the viability of 
the Canadian Campaign in the process. 
Even before the Continental forces set foot in the colony, habitants had been instrumental 
in the circulation of information concerning the campaign. Those friendly to the army’s cause 
helped disseminate various letters or proclamations that Congress, colonial assemblies, and 
Continental officers had addressed to Canada’s inhabitants. They also housed, supplied, and 
guided emissaries of the United Colonies who passed through the province. Moreover, as the 
actions of Captain Parant in La Beauce demonstrated, habitants did not simply transmit news, 
they substantially shaped and controlled networks of information. Importantly, habitant 
involvement in the transmission of information did not only continue after the start of the 
campaign, it intensified, especially as many habitant communities—like those of Pointe Lévy 
and the Nouvelle Beauce parishes—formed associations with the Continental troops. Individuals 
from parishes throughout the colony continued to publicly and privately endorse the army’s 
ongoing offensive. Some made announcements in front of or near parish churches, like Caron du 
Plaquet dit Chevalier from the parish of For Saint Féréol, who “read all of Congress’s orders,” 
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and later helped spread rumors of the Continental Army’s favorable odds in the colony.207 Other 
individuals shared similar views, but opted for more covert approaches, such as going door-to-
door to share their opinions with their neighbors or by hosting exclusive meetings in their homes 
or establishments. Pierre Gravel, an innkeeper from Château Richer parish, for example, was 
known to host “meetings to foster the spirit of rebellion.”208 So too was Frans Germain from Cap 
Santé, who was reputed to have held “seditious meetings.”209 Many parish inhabitants also 
continued to house or serve as guides to individuals directly involved in the campaign, which 
increasingly included other Canadian habitants. 
But perhaps one of the most important changes that occurred as the campaign advanced 
was that habitants became crucial sources of information themselves, not just the transmitters of 
information the United Colonies hope to disseminate. Those working with or for the Continental 
Army kept its officers apprised of various happenings in their respective surroundings. If they 
encountered anyone who was either an avowed or suspected supporter of Carleton’s 
administration, habitants could—and often did—bring their existence to the attention of parish 
resistance leaders, Continental officers, or other individuals with close ties to the army. During 
one of Ignace Couture’s trips through the countryside surrounding Pointe Lévy, for example, he 
noted the presence of two individuals who “aroused  [his] suspicion,” and he apparently reported 
them to Joseph Lambert. Lambert was an habitant from the parish of Pointe Lévy who Carleton 
had appointed parish captain in the fall of 1775, but who had instead served the Continental 
troops in that same rank.210 Captain Lambert, in turn, allegedly reported the news to the troops 
“immediately,” and the two individuals, Jean Brum and Joseph Winter, were eventually captured 
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by a Continental Army guard.211 Elsewhere, in the parish of For St Féréol, “the three sons of a 
certain Augustin Cynard,” not only stood guard in opposition to the colonial government, they 
also apparently “reported the names of those who refused to do so to the rebels.”212 
The kind of minute information that individuals like Couture and Cynard’s sons provided 
the Continental forces—either directly or by way of other habitants—was invaluable to an army 
that had recognized the centrality of the colonial population from the start. Not only did the army 
benefit from having additional eyes and ears on the ground, so to speak, it enjoyed better access 
to habitant communities—communities spread out over geographically-extensive regions, and 
which largely remained linguistically inaccessible. In the process, large stretches of the colony 
itself, not just the inhabitants living in it, became knowable in ways that were beneficial to the 
encroaching army. Habitants had a personal and well-established familiarity with their 
immediate surroundings. The socioeconomic realities that tied members of this largely agrarian 
peasantry to their farms, and thus, to their parishes, provided the foundation for a manner of 
knowing the Canadian countryside that was primarily place-based, a type of “situated 
knowledge.”213 In other words, habitants knew where resources, such as provisions, shelter, or 
weaponry could be found, whether these were to be discovered, bought, or confiscated. They 
also knew where individuals sympathetic to the Continental troops could be located. Perhaps 
above all else, they knew how to navigate Canada: not only how to move through the 
countryside or waterways that made up the colony, but when to move and how best to do it. By 
sharing their situated knowledge of the Canadian countryside, habitants helped the Continental 
forces move through the colony, provision themselves throughout the campaign, and even 
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establish a foundation from which to launch military assaults.  
One of the most evident ways in which the Continental Army benefitted from their access 
to habitants’ situated knowledge was in the securing of foodstuffs. As the campaign continued, 
the Continental troops had an ever-growing need to supplement the limited provisions available 
in the province, whose colonists increasingly lost confidence in the troops’ promises of future 
payment. Taking provisions by force became a somewhat common practice, especially if the 
owner in question was a confirmed or suspected loyalist. Throughout Canada, during the course 
of the military offensive, habitants helped the troops supplement their provisions by periodically 
pointing out the houses of known loyalists, which the troops could then loot. A well-known 
habitant supporter of the Continental forces, Maurice Desdevens from Point aux Trembles, for 
example, was reputed to have “used every effort to have several loyalists looted” in his parish.214 
Usually, however, the loyalists whose property was looted were seigneurs, demonstrating the 
ways habitants continued to view their associations with the Continental troops as beneficial to 
their own aims.  
 
Geographic Designations of Resistance 
In the weeks following Arnold’s arrival, circumstances in the colony—but especially 
around Quebec—shifted notably. Elsewhere in Canada, the Continental Army had recently 
enjoyed a series of victories. By mid-November, Arnold received word that after successfully 
occupying Montreal, Montgomery was making his way to Quebec, the last remaining British 
stronghold in the colony.215 The general’s early successes, together with the support the army had 
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long received from the colonial population, worked to undercut morale in the capital. Writing 
from Quebec in early November, the lieutenant governor, Hector Cramahé, lamented in a letter to 
the secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Dartmouth, that the “rebels” had the support of “the 
Canadian peasants,” whom he argued “neither the zealous exertions of the gentry, clergy, or 
bourgeoisie could prevail upon to do their duty, and for want of a force, we could neither awe or 
compel them to it.”216 The leanings of the “Canadian peasants,” together with their support for 
the Continental troops,  had been crippling for the British administration. As Cramahé explained, 
“two battalions in the spring might have saved the province. I doubt whether twenty would 
regain it.”217  
Although hyperbolic, Cramhé’s language was not groundless. Habitant support had been 
crucial for the Continental Army. By late November, when General Montgomery sanctioned the 
first of what would be two Canadian regiments, that support would grow to include active duty 
in a Continental Army.218 Habitant willingness to work with the Continental forces had also 
shaped the ways British imperial agents in Canada experienced and gave meaning to the ongoing 
campaign. As they saw it, because the colonial government had lost the allegiance of the vast 
majority of the colonial population, the colonial administration came to face the possibility of 
more concrete military and legislative losses. 
By mid-November the geo-political situation around Quebec also shifted because of 
actions Governor Carleton took to safeguard his authority within the fortified walls of the capital. 
Barely escaping Montreal before the Continental forces occupied the city, Carleton had fled to 
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Quebec City, bringing along with him his growing distrust and frustration with many of his 
colonial subjects. On November 22, very soon after returning to Quebec, he issued a 
proclamation, commanding all who would not join the militia in defense of Quebec to vacate the 
city.219 From a military standpoint, his actions were strategically sound. Sheltering inhabitants 
who so openly supported the Continental cause would be both undesirable and risky. Expelling 
them greatly improved his chances of withstanding the siege, but only at a price. Doing so also 
meant that individuals who openly aligned themselves against his administration had wandered 
out and settled elsewhere in a colony that, for many months, would remain physically closed off 
to the governor. And thus, although Carleton’s November 22 proclamation worked to reshape the 
city into a loyalist stronghold, it simultaneously reframed Quebec’s environs into a potential 
shelter for those disloyal.220  
Carleton’s proclamation also gave geographic expression to a political distinction that 
he—and members of his administration—were increasingly convinced of. Canada’s countryside 
appeared hospitable to sedition and, therefore, unfriendly to his administration. Such fears would 
shape the way many individuals associated with the colonial government remembered the 
Canadian Campaign. For instance, Bishop Briand, who had tirelessly worked to further 
Carleton’s cause in the colony, would in September 1776 declare: “almost the whole colony 
wanted Quebec to be captured.” 221 Likewise, Simon Sanguinet of Montreal also claimed that “all 
of the countryside to the south [of the Saint Lawrence River] was at the service of the 
Bastonnois”—a term many Canadian colonists used to refer to “rebels” from the United 
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Colonies.”222  
Within days of Carleton’s proclamation, the Continental forces under Montgomery and 
Arnold mounted a siege of Quebec City, reinforcing the geo-political boundary the governor had 
proclaimed on November 22. Directly outside the city’s walls, the colonial government faced 
resistance, but not just from the Continental forces. For months, Carleton had fretted over both 
habitant resistance and the Continental Army’s aims. What he had feared the most, however, 
seemed to be the possibility of them working together. For the governor, the simple fact that 
Ignace Couture sought out Benedict Arnold would have been cause for concern. By November, 
the opposition he faced was the product of the coming together of the Continental Army’s 
Canadian Campaign and the trans-parish resistance movements that began that previous summer.  
 
Conclusions 
 When Ignace Couture marched south to the lower Canadian region of La Beauce, he 
helped bring about more than just a meeting between himself and Arnold; he helped effect a 
strategic alliance between the encroaching troops and his own parish resistance movement. This 
would ultimately reshape the Continental Army’s military presence in Canada. For historians, his 
movements also provide an avenue into an alternative history of one of the American 
Revolutionary War’s earliest offensives. Couture was living proof of one of Governor Carleton’s 
greatest fears in the months leading up to and encompassing the Canadian Campaign: the 
widespread existence of habitant sedition. Since the late spring of 1775, Carleton—as well as 
members of his administration—had agonized over their suspected proclivity to assist 
revolutionary envoys and spies. With time, especially after his attempts to mobilize parish 
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militias, he grew to fear their outright resistance to his authority and possible future support of 
the Continental Army. Habitants themselves corroborated his fears when many not only 
participated in coordinated parish uprisings against his call to arms, but also aligned themselves 
with the encroaching Continental troops.  
Their parish uprisings, when taken seriously, reveal a colony that, in many ways, proved 
receptive to the Continental Army’s Canadian Campaign. Although resistance movements, like 
that at Pointe Lévy, were the product of habitant agency, they were uprisings that benefitted from 
alliances with the Continental forces who entered the colony in the fall of 1775. Together with 
the Continental troops, they helped bring about a military campaign that proved a viable—but all 
too forgotten—attempt to incorporate Canada within the nascent union of the United Colonies. 
To be sure, over the course of the coming winter and spring, the joint efforts of the 
Continental troops and Canada’s colonial population shifted in as action led to inaction. On the 
night of December 31, 1775, after attacking a surrounded Quebec City, the Continental Army 
suffered a demoralizing defeat. Their commanding general, Richard Montgomery, was both 
killed and instantly rendered one of the Revolutionary War’s first martyrs. And, although not 
fatally wounded, Arnold found himself injured during the course of the attack. Even more 
devastating, the army lost almost half of its men to death or imprisonment. After an encouraging 
fall that counted a number of notable victories, the Continental Army’s luck seemed to have 
turned.  
In the months following the failed attack, the thinly-manned Continental troops 
maintained a protracted siege of Quebec City. Because winter had made navigation impossible in 
the Saint Lawrence River, the skeletal force was able to maintain their presence in the area. They 
knew just as well as the British forces in the besieged city did that the arrival of 
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reinforcements—whether British or American—would likely decide the fate of the military 
campaign. Unfortunately for the Continental Army, the Canadian habitants knew that as well. In 
the harsh reality of winter, the recently-defeated American forces quickly took on the appearance 
of a risky bet.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Controlling “7/8ths of Canada”: Ending the Canadian Campaign 
 
On May 6, 1776, the Continental Army lifted its siege of Quebec City. Earlier that 
morning, a small British squadron under the command of Commodore Sir Charles Douglas 
sailed up the Saint Lawrence River, reaching the city’s port. On board the ships were about two 
hundred British Regulars and Hessian mercenaries meant to reinforce Governor Guy Carleton’s 
besieged forces in the colony. They were only the advance guard of what would ultimately be 
upwards of 10,000 British reinforcements to arrive in Canada during the summer of 1776 
alone.223 And yet, their arrival had an immediate effect on the ongoing siege. Within hours of 
Douglas’s landing the military offensive, which had lasted more than four months, came to an 
abrupt end.224 
Part of a larger campaign fought in Canada during the American Revolutionary War, the 
end of the siege garnered much attention at the time. In some ways, it still does. For scholars of 
the Canadian campaign, the events of May 6 constitute a point of emphasis.225 On that day, the 
Continental Army’s affairs in the colony seemingly took a decisive turn for the worse. Never 
again would the remaining troops advance as far as Quebec. In fact, during the weeks that 
followed, they increasingly lost their hold over fortifications and parishes previously under their 
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control.226 Moreover, the apparent suddenness with which the siege was lifted, following months 
of near inactivity—due to ice-choked waterways and the ongoing siege—only reinforces the 
sense of its historical importance. 
Yet most narratives present the end of the siege as much more conclusive than is 
justified. Rather than solely representing the end of a particular assault within a larger military 
campaign, the Continental defeat at Quebec is regularly treated as the end—or the beginning of 
the end—of the Canadian Campaign in its entirety, as though the two incidents unfolded at the 
same time. As it happened, however, the Continental Army’s campaign did not end on the 
fringes of Quebec on May 6. Rather, it continued well into the following month, only coming to 
a close on June 18 when the remaining troops evacuated the colony’s southernmost fort of St. 
John’s.227 And therefore, by privileging the end of the siege, May 6 has also become more than 
simply a date often studied. It has increasingly served a narrative purpose as well, as it 
overshadows and influences the ways events that either preceded or followed it are understood. 
What came before is often viewed as a precursor to this later defeat, while what came after is 
generally reduced to its extension, as if what followed was merely the working out of an end that 
had all but technically taken place. 
Recognizing that the campaign continued into mid-June is not to deny that events in early 
May amounted to a demoralizing setback for the Continental forces; in fact, they were 
recognized as such. Writing from Montreal on May 10, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, there on a 
mission authorized by the Second Continental Congress, referred to the defeat as a “sudden turn” 
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in Congress’s Canadian affairs.228 Viewing the situation from a different perspective, Henry 
Caldwell, a lieutenant colonel of the British militia, happily considered the altered circumstances 
signs that the administration’s fortunes could be changing for the better.229 Still elsewhere in 
North America, countless individuals weighed in on the meanings of the defeat. For the 
imprisoned British Major Christopher French, for example, it meant both a crucial British victory 
and a payout. On May 13, French penned a letter to the American General Charles Lee, seeking 
to collect on the bet they had made months earlier. He believed the events of May 6 had settled 
the matter, writing: 
 
You, no doubt remember that, when you pass’d thro’ this place in Jany last, you 
made a Bett of Ten Guins. with me that Quebec would be taken by the Provincials 
in the course of the current Winter, That Event has not happen’d (nor is there now 
the last prospect that it ever will, as there are Accounts, not only of its having 
been reinforc’d by a part of His Majesty’s Fleet & a large Body of his Troops, but 
that His Excelly. Genl. Carlton has drove them entirely from before it) and indeed 
your own Papers, unaccustom’d as they are to communicate to the Public any 
thing which argues against their Successes, have lately inserted some very 
desponding Letters from that Quarter.230 
 
French’s assessments were severe. Whether Lee agreed with him that a Continental 
victory at Quebec was no longer feasible remains unknown. However, even Lee, who had 
literally bet on the Continental Army’s odds as late as mid-January 1775, was unlikely to enter 
into a similar wager by late May. Favorable for some while foreboding for others, the gravity of 
the situation at Quebec quickly sunk in. 
Still, as even Carroll and Caldwell themselves recognized, the larger campaign remained 
                                                
228 Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll of Annapolis, 10 May 1776, in Charles Carroll, Dear Papa, Dear 
Charley: The Peregrinations of a Revolutionary Aristocrat, as told by Charles Carroll of Carrollton and his 
father… Eds., Ronald Hoffman, Sally D. Mason, and Eleanor S. Darcy (Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, 2001) (hereafter DPDC), 2: 907. 
229 Henry Caldwell, The Invasion of Canada in 1775: Letter Attributed to Major Henry Caldwell (Quebec: Literary 
and Historical Society of Quebec, 1887). 
230 Christopher French Journal, 1776, American Revolution Collection, Ms Amrev1776, Connecticut Historical 
Society, Box 6A, Vol. Q, page 23. 
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undecided. During the weeks that followed, countless individuals involved in the campaign faced 
a number of choices that all spoke to the ongoing—if nonetheless altered—viability of the 
Continental Army’s military endeavors. And these choices call for further contemplation not 
only because they reveal the simple fact that the campaign continued, but because they also 
speak to a contingency that has since been lost. For many involved or invested in it, the 
campaign was just as pressing—just as real—in the weeks following the May 6 defeat as it had 
been previously. Bringing the story of the campaign to a close at the moment the siege was lifted 
is to deny that reality for the sake of narratives that are aesthetically, but ahistorically, tidy. 
At the core of this chapter is also the question of familiar narratives and their end points. 
In rethinking the lifting of the siege, I simultaneously underscore the connections between 
assumptions and endings. Because deeply entrenched endings often reflect as well as reinforce 
long-held assumptions, they inform the questions scholars ask as well as the ones that remained 
unasked. In this chapter, I question one ending in particular in an effort to disentangle the study 
of Canada and the American Revolution from engrained assumptions that have long constrained 
it. Specifically, I ask: What if the story of Canada and the revolution did not end in the early 
afternoon of a day in May of 1776? What would the resulting narrative reveal, and how would 
the overall story change?  
 
 
A Continental Army’s Defeat 
 
What followed the Continental Army’s lifting of the siege was—and continues to be—
described as a chaotic retreat.231 Within hours, the Continental troops not taken prisoner fled the 
scene, leaving both crucial supplies and the occasional sick or injured soldier behind. 
                                                
231 The tendency to present the Continental troops’ retreat from Quebec as chaotic has been common in both primary 
and secondary accounts. 
  
111 
Contemporary accounts emphasized the disarray left in their wake, describing roads that were 
“strew’d with arms, cartridges, cloaths, bread, pork, &c.”232 Some accounts stressed the 
prevalence of dinners abandoned “at the fire” or the sick evidently left to fend for themselves.233 
One observer even claimed that during the troops’ retreat, “Their confusion was so great” and 
“their panic was so violent,” that whichever way one looked, “he saw men flying & loaded carts 
driving full speed.”234 May 6, it would seem, was a day filled with commotion.  
Yet, despite the fact that the initial retreat from Quebec took place over the course of 
hours, wrestling with the significance of the Continental Army’s surrender and retreat from the 
capital city requires looking past a single date. Decisions made as early as the fall and winter of 
1775 contributed to the defeat. Even the British reinforcements, whose very arrival was 
inextricably tied to the Continental retreat, were, in some ways, the product of decisions made 
some four months earlier. In late December, Secretary of State for America, Lord George 
Germain, had set in motion plans to reinforce the British troops in the colony, and it was the 
advance guard of this larger force that finally disembarked at Quebec in early May.235 By then, 
news of Parliament’s decision to reinforce the British troops in Canada had already spread 
throughout much of British North America, and as the spring of 1776 progressed, officers in 
Canada made tactical choices about how to pursue, build on, or desist from the siege in ways that 
accounted for the reinforcing fleet’s expected arrival.236 They even took extra measures to ensure 
the earliest detection of its approach. Both Continental officers and their supporters in the colony 
                                                
232 “Journal of the Most Remarkable Events…,” LAC, R9767-0-4-E, 112. Also found in Ainslie, Canada Preserved, 
89. 
233 John Enys, The American Journals of Lt. John Enys, Ed. Elizabeth Cometti (Blue Mountain Lake, New York: 
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235 Mackesy, The War for America, 56-57. 
236 News of Parliament’s decision to send reinforcements to Quebec circulated in colonial newspapers during the late 
winter and spring of 1776. Such accounts often included estimates of the number of forces involved. 
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recruited local inhabitants living alongside the Saint Lawrence river, to the east of Quebec, 
encouraging them to monitor and report the movements of the fleet if and when it appeared. 
During the first days of May, many habitants did just that. By maintaining signal fires, they were 
among the first to communicate the approach of Douglas’s squadron.237 
But British reinforcements were not the only additional troops expected in the late winter 
and early spring of 1776; throughout this period, the Continental troops also anticipated the 
arrival of their own reinforcements. In fact, the first of these reached the colony more than a 
week before Douglas’s squadron appeared on the scene. Commanding the first set of 
reinforcements, General John Thomas arrived in Montreal on April 26.238 Like Douglas, Thomas 
commanded only a fraction of the troops then making their way towards the colony. More 
Continental soldiers were already marching or preparing to march toward Quebec—most 
notably, those under Generals William Thompson and John Sullivan. Yet, unlike that of 
Douglas, Thomas’s arrival signified reinforcements for an army that was simultaneously 
shrinking. The enlistments of more than half of the Continental soldiers in Canada expired on 
April 15. Due to a number of intentional as well as unintentional delays, many of these soldiers 
would not leave for another two weeks, on April 29.239 Nonetheless, their imminent departure 
put a damper on the otherwise welcome sight of Thomas and his troops. 
Arriving in Quebec some days later, Thomas quickly assumed command of the besieging 
forces. One of his first actions was to call for the siege’s suspension. During a Council of War on 
May 5, he settled on a plan for a cautious and somewhat limited retreat.240 The army outside the 
                                                
237 Parishes in which habitants maintained signal fires included: Berthier; Cap St. Ignace; Kamouraska; L’Islet; 
Rivière Ouelle; St. Jean Port Joli; St, Roch; St. Vallier. BTW, 75-81; 94-105; 109-116. 
238 Ammi R. Robbins, Journal of the Reverend Ammi R. Robbins… (New Haven: B.L. Hamlen, 1850), 9. 
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Battle for the Fourteenth Colony, 285-287. 
240 Ibid., 305. 
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capital city would move upriver to the parishes of Jacques-Cartier and Deschambault, where its 
troops would regroup, fortify those locations, and help to ensure the Continental Army’s 
continued control over the remaining “7/8ths of Canada.”241 Ultimately, Thomas’s reaction was 
not surprising. He would later bemoan to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Vose of having been “so 
Deceiv’d in the Situation of [the] Army.”242 Still, the general’s choice was not the defeatist move 
of a commander with no options left to him. A calculated retreat—one that aimed at solidifying 
his control outside of Quebec—would strengthen his overall position in the colony, potentially 
allowing for a successful occupation of the capital in the future. What took place on May 6 can, 
therefore, be thought of as the immediate—but overly rushed—execution of a plan that had 
already been loosely decided on. The key difference, however, was that Thomas and the 
Continental troops were now on the defensive, losing many of the benefits they would have 
otherwise accrued.  
 Yet, if the Continental retreat from Quebec was chaotic, by the very next day, some 
order had been restored. On May 7, General Thomas called together a council of war at the 
parish of Deschambault, less than fifty miles outside of Quebec. The bleakness of the situation 
was not lost on him; Thomas acknowledged shortages in provisions and artillery, and called for a 
further retreat, directing most of his army to Sorel, another eighty miles upriver.243 After the 
council, though, he also instructed eight hundred of his men to remain at Deschambault and 
Jacques-Cartier, where they would be able to “proceed up or down” the St. Lawrence river, 
depending on the situation.244  
                                                
241 Ibid. 
242 Joseph Vose, “Journal of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Vose, April-July, 1776,” ed. Henry Winchester Cunningham 
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The decisions reached at Deschambault, made so quickly after the retreat began, 
constitute some of the first interpretations and responses to the defeat on the part of the 
Continental troops. They, therefore, reveal much about how it was experienced on the ground. 
Clearly, Thomas and his men found themselves in an unfavorable position. The general’s choice 
to oversee a further retreat speaks to that. Yet at the same time, Thomas’s choice to position 
some forces at Deschambault and Jacques-Cartier, in readiness to move against Quebec if 
needed, demonstrates that despite the seriousness of the altered circumstances, he did not 
consider them irreversible. Importantly, he was not alone in holding such an opinion.  
As the Continental officers in Canada were responding to a quickly-changing military 
situation, members of a diplomatic committee also in the colony were likewise preoccupied with 
the defeat and its significance. Although their duties differed from those of Thomas, their 
assessments were similar. Months earlier, Congress had appointed Benjamin Franklin, Samuel 
Chase, and Charles Carroll of Carrollton to a committee tasked with fomenting support for the 
United Colonies and their army in Canada.245 Above all else, Franklin, Chase, and Carroll were 
to persuade the colony’s inhabitants that their interests and those of Congress were “inseparably 
united.”246  
Of the committee’s various instructions, perhaps the most pressing was that they oversee 
the creation of representative assemblies through which Canada—and its inhabitants—could join 
the union.247 They were to explain that such representative bodies provided congress an avenue 
for “collecting the sense of the people,” and would consequently, empower the congress to act in 
                                                
245 Congress appointed the committee on February 15, 1776. After doing so, they also passed a resolve that Carroll 
prevail upon his cousin John Carroll, who was a Catholic priest, to join the committee in Canada. John Carroll did 
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the general interests of all involved.248 However, as members of the committee, Franklin, Carroll, 
and Chase were additionally instructed to “settle all disputes between the Canadians and the 
continental troops,” which meant that they were authorized to make decisions regarding military 
strategy and personnel.249 Their responsibilities, therefore, straddled political and military lines. 
Not entirely unusual, the multifaceted nature of the committee’s undertaking was especially 
appropriate for the situation in Quebec. The province’s political unification with the United 
Colonies was not only more desirable when the Continental forces enjoyed successes in the 
colony, it was also much more feasible. In giving Franklin, Chase, and Carroll such wide-
reaching powers, Congress explicitly recognized the link between its military and political affairs 
in the colony.250  
The committee members arrived in Canada on April 27 and made their way to the army’s 
headquarters in Montreal two days later.251 Their correspondence—especially that of Chase and 
Carroll, who alone remained in the colony until June—provides yet another avenue into some of 
the earlier assessments and responses to the changing military situation of early May. Their 
letters reflect the unique perspective of individuals who—while present in the colony—were 
physically removed from the action around Quebec. Instead, their letters provide glimpses into 
how quickly information concerning the Continental defeat moved, and how it was interpreted 
from a measured distance, within the confines of the Continental Army’s Canadian headquarters. 
Just as importantly, Franklin, Carroll, and Chase’s responses also reflected concerns that had 
more to do with Congress’s political objectives relative to Canada.  
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By May 10, the committee members began writing letters, both describing the defeat at 
Quebec and interpreting its significance. In a letter to his father, Charles Carroll of Annapolis, 
Carroll explained: 
 
The principal part of our Commission, is frustrated by this sudden turn in our 
affairs, and tho’ our stay can be of no great service yet as in the present 
circumstances our departure would discourage our troops & friends in the country 
we have resolved to remain here till further advices from below: In a few days 
they will assume courage & spirits, and I hope face the enemy in the field.252 
 
Carroll’s message was mixed. On the one hand, he was convinced that the Continental troops’ 
defeat outside of Quebec sounded the proverbial death knell for his—and his fellow members’—
mission. Yet, on the other hand, with the changed circumstances, Carroll came to view his 
continued presence as militarily important in ways it had not been before. The same defeat that 
had undermined the political viability of his undertaking had also assigned a certain importance 
to his remaining in Canada. A departure would only weaken morale among the remaining 
Continental troops and their supporters. Tellingly, for Carroll, the end of Congress’s political 
affairs—even if only temporarily—did not signal the end of the army’s campaign. Keeping up 
the “spirits” of those who would carry out that campaign proved to be a strong enough reason for 
his continued stay.  
In the following days, Carroll’s position shifted slightly. Faithful to his decision to stay in 
the colony until “advices from below” dictated otherwise, he remained in Canada, although 
accompanied only by Chase (Franklin departed on May 11).253 In letters penned in mid-May, 
Carroll continued to portray the campaign as undecided, but gone were his declarations that his 
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physical presence would continue to be of much help. Instead, Carroll increasingly expressed an 
earnest desire to return home.  
On May 16, ten days after the siege was abandoned, Carroll wrote another letter to his 
father, once again from Montreal. It was a short message with very little in the way of definitive 
detail. In regards to the military situation in the colony, Carroll simply expressed a number of 
hopes and estimations. He hoped, for instance, that the troops would maintain their ground at 
Deschambault; he assumed the number of reinforcements at Carleton’s disposal remained 
inconsiderable; he was even unsure about the length of his own stay in the colony, writing “God 
knows when we shall leave Canada perhaps in a few days perhaps not this month.”254 In short, 
Carroll’s was a letter rife with uncertainty. The most indisputable piece of information 
concerning Canada was Carroll’s own frustration with what he described as “the confused state 
of things in this province.”255 One particular hope, however, seems to demand the reader’s 
attention. Carroll ended the letter with a postscript—a simple, offhand remark that read: “I am in 
hopes in a few weeks our affairs will wear a more promising aspect.”256  
That one line, set apart from the body of the letter, also stands against notions that 
individuals somehow experienced the days and weeks following May 6 as a predetermined and 
steady decline in the Continental troops’ fortunes. In coming to terms with the altered 
circumstances, individuals like Carroll continued to envision—and often voice—various 
possibilities. And if the chance that Continental Army’s affairs could wear “a more promising 
aspect” remained imaginable in mid-May, it certainly was the case earlier that month. 
Evidently, however, Carroll no longer believed the possibility of success warranted his 
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continued stay in the colony. Indeed, by the very next day, both Carroll and Chase began to 
advocate for their departure. In a letter to John Hancock, they put it simply: “In the present 
situation of our Affairs it will not be possible for us to carry into execution the great Object of 
our instructions, as the possession of this country must finally be decided by the sword; we think 
our stay here no longer of service to the public.”257 Similarly, in a separate letter to his father, 
Carroll explained: 
 
war must decide who are to be masters of Canada, George the 3d. or the united 
Colonies: our commission was to settle a governt., or rather to induce the 
Canadians to settle one for themselves: this is no longer practicable they must 
receive a governt. from their masters, they are not fit to choose one for 
themselves. This I say was the principal end of our commission, and to redress 
grievances, the present state of things put both out of our power.258 
 
Echoing Carroll’s initial assessments of early May, both letters held that the army’s 
recent military defeats jeopardized the committee’s diplomatic mission. A key difference was 
that Carroll and Chase came to view their physical presence as wholly unnecessary, as somehow 
separate from the unfolding situation in Canada. The campaign remained undecided, but the role 
they would play in deciding its fate appeared far more certain: they would play none. Instead, the 
colony’s entry into the union would be the result of military force.  
Carroll and Chase’s altered language spoke to a subtle but significant shift in thinking; 
one that has gone unnoticed.259 Unification through military conquest alone was not the last 
approach available to the United Colonies after attempts at political unification were abandoned; 
it was a different approach with a different endpoint. The Continental Army would occasion 
Canada’s incorporation, not facilitate it. Therefore, rather than suggesting that Carroll and Chase 
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grew to view Canada’s incorporation into the still-forming union as less and less likely, their 
changing attitudes more accurately reflected a reimagining of Canada’s potential entry within 
that union. And in rethinking how Canada would come into that union, Carroll and Chase also 
reenvisioned what its entry would mean for both the colony and the larger union, redefining the 
character and dimensions of the United Colonies in the process.  
By claiming that “the sword” would decide who possessed Canada, or stating that war 
would determine who would be the colony’s “masters,” the congressional committee members 
began drawing weighty distinctions between Canada and the United Colonies more generally. As 
they now envisioned it, the colony would be the only one in the union to be brought in through 
military force, while its inhabitants would become conquered subjects in the process, even if 
only temporarily. Securing their support or allegiance—although preferable—was no longer 
considered a prerequisite. As might be expected, redefining Canada’s potential place within the 
union also meant redefining the union itself. In voicing such altered scenarios, Carroll and Chase 
indirectly gave shape to the United Colonies as a political body that could conquer, incorporate, 
and finally govern one of its members. That union could integrate Canada unto itself regardless 
of the sentiments of the colony’s inhabitants. Carroll and Chase’s assessments seemed to 
resonate with their audience. As the summer progressed, Congress would continue to direct 
soldiers and provisions to Canada while simultaneously abandoning attempts at political 
diplomacy.  
 
 
A British Victory 
 
Where the events of May 6 have been presented as devastating for the Continental troops 
in Canada, they have been styled as auspicious for the opposing British forces. The distinction is 
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logical. A decisive defeat, by definition, faces a decisive victory. But, like the situation in which 
General Thomas found himself, Governor Carleton discovered that although the lifting of the 
siege vastly altered his prospects, they nonetheless remained unsettled. The retreat of the 
Continental troops had meant the removal of a pressing threat from the city’s immediate 
surroundings, but Carleton’s control over the same surrounding regions was not as quickly 
restored. After all, military campaigns do not exist separately from the settings in which they 
unfold.260 The neighboring countryside outside of Quebec City, for example, was not some 
neutral stage on which the siege had simply taken place.261 Much of the countryside had 
weathered the changes that came along with the protracted siege in ways that were not undone 
when the Continental troops had fled. Consequently, what Carleton faced when they retreated 
was a changed and arguably unfriendly countryside.  
The governor’s early fears of habitant disloyalty had quickly found validation in what he 
considered their widespread and indiscriminating friendship towards the Continental troops.262 
As early as mid-November 1775, he had grown so suspicious of most of the colony’s inhabitants 
that he had issued a proclamation, commanding all who would not join the militia in defense of 
Quebec to vacate the city.263 Although logical, his actions had also fueled his distrust and sense 
of powerlessness over the countryside surrounding Quebec, as individuals who openly aligned 
themselves against his administration had by left the city to relocate elsewhere in a colony that 
had for many months remained physically closed off to the governor.  
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Understanding the role that vast stretches of Canada’s landscape played in shaping the 
insecurities of many British officials and their supporters helps better illuminate the motivations 
behind some of Carleton’s actions in the days following the end of the siege. Carleton has been 
accused—both at the time and by countless since—for failing to press his advantage by not 
immediately mounting an attack on the retreating forces.264 Yet that advantage, which only takes 
into account the number of soldiers at Carleton’s disposal versus those under General Thomas, is 
not only much more evident in hindsight, it also artificially separates the events of May 6 from 
the environment in which they transpired. The reality of where and when his seeming advantage 
was accrued is ignored, or at least, misunderstood. For Carleton, control over the colony did not 
only require the expulsion of the Continental troops, it also meant starving the channels through 
which “rebels” and rebellious rhetoric infiltrated Canada. Moreover, a numerical advantage—
while not inconsequential—meant something different if inhabitants throughout the colony 
agitated against his administration, occasionally working with or for the remaining Continental 
troops. Not surprisingly, then, some of Carleton’s first decisions following the retreat of the 
Continental forces aimed at reestablishing loyalty within the parishes surrounding Quebec City.  
The exact date remains uncertain, but at some point between May 6 and May 21, the 
governor appointed three envoys to visit and inspect parishes in the district of Quebec.265 The 
men Carleton chose were François Baby, Gabriel Taschereau, and Jenkin Williams—all of 
whom had also been besieged in Quebec for the last few months. During the course of their 
investigative tour, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams inspected at least fifty-six separate 
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parishes.266 They consistently labored in the pursuit of three interrelated, aims: to root out 
sedition, inspire loyalty, and reorganize parish militias in such a way as to better ensure their 
carrying out Carleton’s instructions. All of that, they did within the course eight-to-nine weeks, 
often visiting more than one parish in a single day.  
On May 22, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams left Quebec for the nearby parish of Vieille 
Lorette. There, during the following day, the commissioners conducted their first investigation, 
establishing a procedure that would become routine over the course of the next several weeks. 
They typically began by reading aloud their own charges, quickly shifting into a general review 
of the respective parish’s militia. Throughout their parish visits, Baby and his fellow 
commissioners either re-appointed militia officers or—as was more often the case—appointed 
new ones. Having completed their review of the militia, the commissioners typically concluded 
their proceedings by recommending that the parish communities engage in various acts of loyalty 
and overseeing general cheers of “Long live the King.”267 
During the parish investigations, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams singled out individuals 
suspected of having supported the Continental troops during the previous months. If they had 
been officers in their parish militias, the commissioners demoted, replaced, and at times even 
removed them from such bodies indefinitely. This was the case whether the respective officers’ 
actions were believed to have been voluntary or not. In some parishes, like at Saint Pierre on the 
Isle D’Orléans, where the commissioners dismissed the captain, François Leclaire, for the simple 
reason of “having carried out the rebels’ orders in that rank,” the commissioners provided no 
commentary as to a given officer’s own sympathies.268 However, in other parishes, the 
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commissioners elaborated on their decisions by also speculating on whether the actions of the 
accused had been sincere or not. In the parish of Beaumont, for example, the militia captain 
Joseph Couture Belrive was discharged for having both of his sergeants “carry out the rebels’ 
orders,” even though the commissioners believed that he had only acted “out of weakness.”269 
Likewise, at Saint Jean, Captain Laurent Genais dit Labarre had apparently “acted wrongly out 
of weakness and fear, having declared since that he would rather be burned alive than help the 
rebels or any of the dismissed officers.”270  
On the other hand—and at other parishes—Baby and his fellow commissioners suspected 
militia officers of having assisted the Continental troops willingly. For instance, at the parish of 
Saint Laurent, they dismissed the militia captain, Marc Dufrêne, while also explicitly denouncing 
him for having “always showed a great zeal and sympathy for the rebels.”271 At Cape Saint 
Ignace, Augustin Bernier, the captain, was cashiered for having “helped the rebels as much as he 
could with his seditious advice, his sympathy, and his vigilance in carrying out their orders with 
dispatch. He oversaw corvées, disseminated various publications, held parish assemblies in his 
own home to enlist them in the rebels’ service, and tended and guarded the [signal] fires.”272 In 
other words, the commissioners buttressed their decision to dismiss Bernier by listing the 
numerous services he had performed for the Continental troops, suggesting the former officer 
shared the troops’ sympathies. 
In short, the specifics varied from one parish to the next, but the commissioners 
consistently viewed any form of support for the Continental Army as grounds for dismissal. The 
vacancies that resulted, they filled by appointing individuals they considered loyal subjects. 
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Usually new appointments were made immediately after current officers were dismissed. Yet in 
a few cases, such as at the parish of Château Richer, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams struggled 
at first to find any suitable inhabitants to appoint as militia officers, choosing instead to schedule 
return visits in order to do so at a later date. On May 26, after dismissing the former captain, 
Ustache Bâcon, for having been “coerced to serve the rebels,” the commissioners reported that 
they “searched to no avail for some habitants of this parish deserving of the honor to serve the 
King.” They then “voiced [their] outrage in front of the militia and postponed the appointment of 
officers until the following Tuesday.”273 In the end, they did return to the parish on the day they 
specified, appointing four parish inhabitants to the posts of militia captain, lieutenant, and 
sergeants.274 
At each locale they visited, the commissioners primarily concentrated on the actions of 
the parish’s officers, but they scrutinized and commented on the behavior of the general 
population as well. Here too, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams found that individuals had diverse 
motives. At Saint Pierre, the commissioners determined that “About a fourth of this parish stood 
guard willingly for the rebels, some were forced to do so, and others did not stand guard at 
all.”275 In the parish of Chalesbourg, they cited one Louis Pasquet “for having incited the 
habitants to take up arms for the rebels.”276 Somewhat similarly, at L’Ange Gardien, Nicolas 
Lecomte was found to have “requested a captain’s commission from the rebels, of having 
proclaimed the said appointment throughout the parish, and of having acted harshly in this rank 
throughout the winter.” In the end, the commissioners concluded that he had “used all the means 
in his power to prove his sympathy to the rebels.” Still, at Saint Vallier, a widow with the 
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surname Gabourie (and nicknamed “the Queen of Hungary”) was found to have “caused more 
harm in [that] parish than anyone,” as she reportedly “often held and presided over gatherings in 
her house, raised the people’s spirit against the government, and urged them to side with the 
rebels.” Baby and his fellow commissioners also noted: “To ensure better success of her 
despicable plan, she served them strong drinks.”277  
In sum, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams painted a complex picture of sedition: its 
prevalence varied from one parish to the next, resulting from various motivations. Some 
individuals seemingly acted on their own accord, while others were reportedly forced, deceived, 
or threatened into seditious activities—sometimes by Continental soldiers; sometimes by their 
fellow inhabitants. At times, when speaking of “rebels,” the commissioners clearly meant to refer 
to the Continental troops, while at other times, they also included inhabitants of the colony 
within that category. One such example can be found in their entry for the parish of Saint Jean in 
the Isle D’Orléans, where they described Jean Acelin, Jean Marçau, and Michel Hemond as 
forming “a party of revolutionaries”278 in themselves. And within these already complicated 
circumstances, the commissioners also accounted for the possibility that individuals could 
change their minds in order to pursue different courses of action—or inaction. While examining 
the inhabitants of the parish of Saint Joachim on May 27, for instance, they noted that “A few 
habitants of this parish stood guard once or twice, but afterwards almost all of them refused to do 
so.”279 Evidently, therefore, neither the commissioners themselves, nor those privy to their 
assessments, considered sedition in monolithic terms. Just as importantly, they did not place its 
origins solely on the shoulders of the Continental troops. Parish inhabitants were cited time and 
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again for fostering sedition within their own communities, whether in direct support of the 
Continental forces or not.  
Ultimately, it is because the commissioners’ findings are so variegated that they can be 
depended on. To be sure, the majority of the descriptions—and many of the accusations—cannot 
be taken at face value. Baby, Taschereau, and Williams were envoys of the British governor of a 
colony still partly occupied by the Continental Army. Moreover, the three commissioners had 
themselves also recently withstood a protracted siege. It is extremely likely, then, that they 
introduced their own preconceived notions about habitant actions or sympathies into their 
investigations. In addition, Baby and his fellow commissioners based most of their findings on 
hearsay, an inherently subjective approach to information gathering.280  
Nonetheless, the fact that the commissioners accounted for different degrees and 
rationales for sedition suggests that they had been discerning in their assessments. Indeed, their 
report reflected the very “messiness” of everyday life.281 Individuals take action for a number of 
reasons, occasionally switching sides or taking themselves out of a situation by opting for 
neutrality. Therefore, even if some of the particulars cannot be accepted at face value, the report 
as a whole provides a useful, overall reflection of reality. Moreover, it offers a fairly transparent 
account of the British government’s concerns and administrative priorities, as they were 
experienced at that time. In addition, the commissioners’ report constitutes one of the most 
important sources for the colony during the period immediately following the end of the siege, as 
it also provides a faint glimpse into a largely illiterate and archivally-silent colonial population—
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a population that nevertheless clearly influenced administrative policies.282 
A closer look at various entries in the commissioners’ report reveals that their 
investigations were at the same time reactionary and premeditative measures. The reactionary 
underpinnings were apparent enough: individuals who shirked their responsibilities to their 
governor, assisting the “rebel” troops in word or action were publicly punished for their behavior 
after the fact. These punishments were not just limited to demotions or dismissals. If Baby, 
Taschereau, or Williams found that any individual had received an officer’s commission from 
the Continental troops, they always required that the individual renounce the commission. If that 
individual still had the physical copy of the commission, he was often commanded to burn it in 
front of the parish in such a way as to almost always ensure that he burnt his own hands in the 
process.283  
The premeditative motivations at play, on the other hand, were far more subtle and, 
therefore, more easily overlooked. In publicly designating such behavior punishable, the 
commissioners also cautioned the parish populations against engaging in similar activity in the 
future. Moreover, by replacing militia officers who had acted against Carleton’s wishes, the 
commissioners—and Carleton, by proxy—actively removed individuals who may in the future 
revert to their seditious activities from positions of power.  
Thus, rather than command an immediate attack over the still retreating troops, 
Carleton’s approach to the aftermath of the siege’s end was more holistic. He aimed to secure 
both ideologically and bureaucratically what he had recently secured militarily. Achieving that 
meant re-familiarizing himself with the neighboring parish communities, which over the course 
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of the previous months had seemingly proven so ill-disposed to Carleton’s wishes as to appear to 
him alien populations. His situation had been further complicated by the fact that for more than 
four months, the governor had lost physical access to these communities, having been besieged 
within the walls of Quebec City. The parish investigations that he delegated to Baby, 
Taschereau, and Williams were crucial components of his larger effort to reclaim the city’s 
surrounding regions. In commissioning the investigations, Carleton had in mind not just the 
recently lifted siege, but any future ones as well.  
Refamiliarizing himself went hand-in-hand with an effort to re-integrate the inhabitants 
in nearby parishes to his administration. On June 7, the commissioners provided a brief summary 
of their proceedings at the parish of Batiscan. It read: 
 
Public address to the officers to recommend firmness and diligence when 
executing the King’s orders, to maintain the roads, and to encourage the people to 
carry their goods and food to Quebec &c. 
Reviewed 18 men. [Cheered] ‘Long live the King’ &c.284 
 
Although succinct, their synopsis revealed a great deal about the premeditative motives that 
informed investigations like that at Batiscan. In recommending a strict adherence to the “King’s 
orders” as well as by presiding over cheers of “Long live the King,” the commissioners’ aims 
were mostly self-evident: reestablishing—or at least encouraging—loyalty to the British king. 
Given that Governor Carleton functioned as an agent of the king, the investigations also sought 
to re-inspire loyalty to the governor himself.  
But the seeming transparency of the commissioners’ actions ended there. Their 
investigations were never meant to be known to anyone outside the small cadre of government 
officials who ordered and carried them out, together with the targeted parish populations. In 
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other words, the investigations were never openly-known imperial policy. In fact, if not for the 
sole—and incomplete—remaining copy of the commissioners’ reports, the existence of the 
investigations would not be known today.285 In addition to the covertness with which the 
commissioners received and carried out their orders, few of the inhabitants they accused or 
punished for seditious behavior were later disciplined within the institutional confines of the 
colonial state. As a result, Carleton’s impulse in ordering the investigations was not a purely 
retaliatory one. Instead, what Carleton commissioned was a clandestine reshaping of the parish 
communities to buttress his immediate efforts against the Continental troops still in the colony.  
To return to the commissioner’s summary of the proceedings at Batiscan in early June, it 
should also be noted that they made two other recommendations to the parish community in 
attendance. They encouraged them to maintain the roads surrounding the parish in good 
condition as well as to carry provisions to the formerly besieged city of Quebec. Neither of the 
recommendations were unique; the commissioners made similar suggestions in other parishes 
throughout the summer of 1776. Yet, because of the setting in which they were made, the 
recommendations were most likely interpreted as directions. Both measures aimed at making the 
various parish communities more visible to the colonial state. Ensuring that the roads that to-and-
from various parishes were well maintained worked to make those locales more accessible to the 
British administration. Additionally, in encouraging parish inhabitants to travel to the colonial 
capital, the commissioners simultaneously urged individuals to perform physical acts of loyalty 
as well as strove to supply a poorly provisioned British stronghold, all the while encouraging 
colonial inhabitants with questionable loyalties to become more visible to the colonial state. In 
other words—and in the parlance of the political theorist James Scott—Baby, Taschereau, and 
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Williams labored to impose a certain “legibility” onto both the landscape and the populations of 
the countryside surrounding Quebec.286 Together, stipulations like those the commissioners made 
in Batiscan would help ensure neighboring parishes became more accessible to Carleton in a 
literal as well as figurative sense. 
While enjoying a stronger reach over a population under one’s command was likely an 
ambition shared by all governing officials, Carleton’s efforts betrayed additional motivations. 
Both the timing of and the covert nature of the investigations suggested that they were part of a 
broader attempt to resist any future incursions involving the Continental Army. The middle of a 
military campaign was not the time to conduct an unrelated mission to foster loyalty. Neither was 
it the time to oversee a solely reactionary venture for a campaign that was still underway. 
Instead, the investigations can only be considered part of the governor’s strategic approach to the 
campaign, and must, thereby, be acknowledged as premeditative as well—as part of a larger 
strategy to deal with an unfolding situation. In fact, at one point, Baby, Taschereau, and Williams 
explicitly recommended that a particular parish “be kept under close watch”287—a directive that 
made the most sense if the parish inhabitants’ past support for the Continental troops was 
considered a potential liability in the future as well.  
Therefore, although it cannot be denied that Carleton and the British forces in the colony 
enjoyed a momentous victory that saw the retreat of the Continental troops from the city’s 
surroundings, that victory was not as conclusive as it has often been considered. The governor’s 
own actions suggested that even after the Continental forces retreated, he still did not consider 
the city and its surrounding countryside as free from the threat of military occupation. His fears, 
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of course, had much to do with the Continental troops in the colony, but they had even more to 
do with the colonists who populated these regions. Consequently, the habitants’ almost constant 
absence from narratives of the Canadian Campaign—while not completely surprising given the 
lack of written sources and the tendency to view military campaigns in binary ways—helps to 
silence the lived complexity of the period in general, and the campaign more specifically.  
 
 
“Dismals from Canada:” The Continental Dimensions of a Continental Army’s Defeat 
 
Weighty as the Continental Army’s defeat felt in Canada itself, it also registered strongly 
elsewhere in British North America. Because of the geographic distances involved, news of the 
siege’s end circulated in delayed and haphazard ways. Not until May 18 did colonial newspapers 
in cities like Philadelphia and New York begin reporting on the altered circumstances.288 In fact, 
as late as June 1776, some newspapers were still publishing extracts of letters describing the 
hopeful—if not entirely favorable—state of affairs in Canada. There were accounts of General 
Wooster promising to scale the walls outside Quebec City as long as there was “space sufficient 
between them and the heavens,” and of individuals working to “see what the inside [of the 
fortified city] is made of.” There were also published excerpts of letters from Continental 
soldiers, who expressed in more straightforward ways their “great Hopes of taking the Town 
soon,” as well as those who maintained that Canada was “the key of America.” And among such 
outdated accounts were also inaccurate reports, describing events that had not come to pass. For 
instance, on May 6—the very day the Continental troops abandoned their siege of Quebec—The 
Newport Mercury of Rhode Island published an account of Carleton’s surrender. “It is reported,” 
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the account held, “that an express is gone from Quebec to Philadelphia, informing that General 
Carleton has offered to surrender Quebec, upon condition of his and the garrison’s being allowed 
to march out with the honors of war, and going wherever they please.”289 In fact, congressional 
delegates, like Thomas Jefferson acknowledged the circulation of such accounts when he 
described “letters in [Philadelphia]… which inform that the lower town of Quebec is taken and a 
breach made in the wall of the upper.”290 
Understandably therefore, the initial reports of the siege’s end elicited both despair and 
skepticism among many revolutionaries. By late May, for instance, Governor Jonathan Trumbull 
of Connecticut acknowledged the dissemination of distressing news in regards to the campaign 
while also appearing at a lost at how much stock to place in such accounts. To his son, David 
Trumbull, he described a confused state of affairs in Hartford, where “The News from Quebec 
[was] various.” It seems, however, that various or not, the majority of reports communicated the 
defeat of the Continental troops at Quebec—likely conveying a sense of urgency—because the 
governor also voiced his apprehension that “the Truth is that the Ministerial Troops got up to 
Quebec,” while “our Forces,” who “were in want of Ammunition, were Obliged to retreat.” He 
added only that he hoped “the news is not so bad as the report.”291 
Others expressed similar hopes or simply solicited additional information. John Adams 
referred to the news of the army’s defeat outside Quebec as “the Dismals from Canada,” and 
wondered if it was possible “to get in Boston silver and Gold for the service in Canada.”292 On 
more than one occasion Thomas Mumford from Providence, Rhode Island wrote to Joseph 
Trumbull, Governor Trumbull’s son and the first commissary general of the Continental Army, 
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inquiring into the military state of affairs in Canada. Straight to the point, Mumford merely wrote 
that he wish to know “how Our Army Succeeds in Canady.”293  In addition to soliciting 
information, others took the time to share news regarding the Canadian Campaign as best they 
could, apparently considering such information to be of great interest. In a letter to William 
Graves from early June 1776, Charles Carroll of Annapolis took it upon himself to communicate 
“the latest & most Materiall Occurrences in America & the Generall Sent[i]ments & Opinions of 
the People in it,” some of which included information he received from his son.294 Tellingly, 
Carroll began his report with an account of the siege’s end—an occurrence that seemingly 
enjoyed much of the Marylander’s attention. Despite the setbacks Carroll described in his 
account, he ended his discussion of the campaign by noting that “The American Forces now in 
Canada are said to Amount to nigh 10,000[,] 5000 Effectives & that they will be augmented 
according to Exigencies”—figures that remained heartening.295   
As revealing as it is that individuals questioned the veracity of incoming accounts, or 
even that they hoped the Continental Army’s position in Canada was not as bad as it was 
increasingly described, such reactions do not tell the whole story. What is particularly telling was 
that many British colonists also supported decisions to reinforce or further provision the 
remaining troops. Perhaps most notable were the actions taken by delegates at the Second 
Continental Congress and by Joseph Trumbull in his capacity as commissary general. The 
specific responsibilities the delegates and Trumbull shouldered varied, but they were all 
continental in scope. Congressional delegates served as representatives of their respective 
colonies-turned-states, and as such helped outline the bonds of confederation for a union that 
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spanned much of the Atlantic seaboard. Assembled in Philadelphia, the delegates were 
nonetheless expected to maintain an outward gaze. Likewise, as commissary general, Trumbull 
was also charged with duties of continental proportions. Often based out of Boston and Hartford, 
Trumbull oversaw the provisioning of the Continental Army in its entirety. When news reached 
both Congress and Trumbull of the Continental troops’ defeat at Quebec, they readily took steps 
to mitigate the troops’ losses and support the continued efforts in Canada. In the eyes of those 
whose gaze was focused on the continent, the colony—and matters related to it—evidently 
justified immediate action. 
Congress first deliberated the altered circumstances at Quebec on the morning of May 18. 
Before the day was over, the delegates resolved to send funds “with all convenient despatch” to 
the diplomatic committee members in Canada.296 They also tasked a separate committee with 
examining the new situation—as described in letters—and drafting a proposed plan of action in 
response. Within days, the committee presented its report, and by May 22, Congress reached a 
number of resolves respecting it. These included Congress’s decision to inform General Philip 
Schuyler, the commanding general of the army’s Northern Department, “that Congress have in 
view these two great objects, the protection and assistance of our Canadian friends, and the 
securing so much of that country as may prevent any communication between our enemies and 
the Indians.”297 Relocating limited resources in order to support the army’s military endeavors in 
Canada apparently remained inline with Congress’s larger goals. The delegates’ choices also 
suggested that most of them still considered such continued support as practical in an as yet 
undecided campaign. However, the resolves Congress reached on May 22 were also tempered.  
                                                
296 JCC, 4: 366. 
297 It appears that the initial resolve read “retaining” where it now reads “securing.” The word “retaining” was 
scratched out. JCC, 4: 375-78. 
  
135 
In the midst of dealing with a demoralizing defeat, Congress understandably outlined 
contingency plans “if (unfortunately) our army should be driven to the necessity of evacuating 
Canada.”298 The delegates recommended that individuals in Canada who had supported the army 
should be compensated, and if they desired to leave the colony along with the troops, they should 
be assured of the United Colonies “aid and protection.” They also recommended that military 
officers secure “posts that it will be necessary to occupy in order to retain as much as possible of 
that province, always having in view the security of the frontiers of these Colonies, and the 
necessity of preventing any intercourse between our enemies and the Indians.”299 Evidently, even 
when congressional delegates accounted for the potential failure of the Canadian Campaign, they 
did so in ways that still assumed—or at least allowed for—the army’s continued foothold in 
Canada. Defeat at Quebec did not necessarily mean defeat in the rest of Canada. Having gained 
military occupation over regions in the colony, the Continental troops’ continued control over 
these territories remained imaginable—a reminder that the United Colonies did not simply turn 
their attention away from Canada in the wake of the Continental Army’s defeat at Quebec. 
Indeed, throughout the next several weeks, Congress continued to concern itself with the 
quickly changing circumstances in Canada. The very next day, on May 23, it created a new 
committee with the specific purpose of conferring with the army’s commander-in-chief, General 
George Washington, together with Major General Horatio Gates and Brigadier General Thomas 
Mifflin “upon the most speedy and effectual means for supporting the American cause in 
Canada.”300 And in response to a report the members of this new committee presented the 
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following day, Congress adopted a resolve to inform the commanding officer in Canada “that the 
Congress are fully convinced of the absolute necessity of keeping possession of that country, and 
that they expect the forces in that department will contest every foot of the ground with the 
enemies to these colonies.”301 Much of that meant placing additional responsibilities on the 
shoulders of the Continental officers involved in the campaign, especially those of General 
Schuyler. Yet Congress also put pressure on both itself and the colonies it represented, calling 
for the troops ordered for Canada to “be hastened into that country so soon as provisions can be 
forwarded for their support” all the while pressuring neighboring colonies to supply additional 
troops. “Six thousand militia,” Congress decided on June 1, would be “employed to reinforce the 
army in Canada, and to keep up the communication with that province.”302 Then, five days later, 
Congress appointed a Jonathan Potts as a “physician and surgeon” in “the Canada department of 
at Lake George.”303 The Canadian Campaign was more than simply an undecided matter; it was 
an enterprise that warranted proactive responses throughout the United Colonies. 
Not until early June did Congress begin to consider more seriously the possibility that the 
Continental troops would evacuate Canada. Beginning on June 11, the delegates started to shift 
their attention to New York, taking steps to defend the colony. That day, they resolved to send 
letters “immediately” to “the several colonies”who are to furnish militia for the defense of New 
York,” acquainting these colonies with “the necessity of forwarding the supplies with all possible 
despatch.”304 And yet, even with Congress’s growing recognition of the possibility of failure in 
Canada, its members continued to approve efforts to support the Continental troops in the 
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colony. As late as June 17, Congress approved the following resolves: 
 
That an experienced general be immediately sent into Canada, with power to 
appoint a deputy adjutant general, a deputy quarter master general, and such other 
officers as he shall find necessary for the good of the service, and to fill up 
vacancies in the army in Canada, and notify the same to Congress for their 
approbation.305 
 
That General Washington be directed to send Major General Gates into Canada, 
to take the command of the forces in that province.306 
 
By the time Congress adopted the resolves of June 17, it had already heard accounts from Carroll 
and Chase, who had returned to Philadelphia on June 11.307 Acquainted with the altered 
circumstances in the colony from the very individuals they had appointed to represent their 
interests in the colony, the congressional delegates continued to act in ways that assumed the 
possibility of military success in Canada, even as that possibility seemed to shrink.   
But not just in Congress did reinforcing and provisioning the Continental troops in 
Canada make sense. Support for doing so was evident elsewhere. The initial reactions of Joseph 
Trumbull were especially revealing. Tasked with provisioning the Continental forces throughout 
the continent, Trumbull nevertheless responded to news of the army’s defeat at Quebec by 
promptly redirecting additional supplies to Canada. As commissary general, Trumbull was also 
at the receiving end of countless requests and suggestions concerning the provisioning of the 
troops. Upon learning about the army’s retreat from Quebec, Walter Livingston, then in Albany, 
wrote to Trumbull, not to request that he send provisions to Canada, but rather to acknowledge 
Trumbull’s need to do so. “The late loss which the Continental Arms has met with in Canada,” 
Livingston began, “will among other things obligate us to send an additional quantity of 
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Provisions into that Department.”308 He continued, stating: “I need not mention to you that I 
earnestly wish the Pork was arrived from Connecticut and doubt not but you will assist me in 
ordering it up the moment it arrives at New York.”309  
The significance of Livingston’s letter rests not just in his own reaction to the news, 
which was to advocate and expect additional provisions. Livingston clearly also expected that his 
own response mirrored those of others, including those of the man tasked with provisioning all of 
the United Colonies’ troops. And Livingston’s expectations were not baseless: working to supply 
the army in Canada made sense to others. In the same letter, he also mentioned that “the 
Committee to obviate” his want of supplies had already “wrote letters to the different Districts in 
this County to exert themselves in sending a number of Wagons.”310 Moreover, on May 23, 
Livingston wrote yet again to Trumbull, emphasizing the importance of further provisioning the 
forces involved in the campaign, but also acknowledging the arrival of the pork he had requested 
the previous week, and which Trumbull had evidently believed was justified.311  
Trumbull continued to supply the army in Canada with foodstuffs, primarily pork. On 
June 11, he wrote to “the Colonial Congress of New York,” explaining that General Washington 
was “apprehensive” that “the great augmentation of the Troops” throughout the United Colonies, 
but especially those in Canada, would require “all the Pork, in this & the neighboring 
Colonies.”312 Accordingly, Trumbull wrote to request that all exportation of pork be suspended. 
To Walter Livingston, he provided a more vivid description of the actions he was prepared to 
take in order to secure a constant supply of pork, while also conveying the difficulties involved, 
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writing: 
 
I shall Imediately reduce the Troops here to Fresh Beef, almost wholly, so as to 
spare the more Pork, for Canada. But, can’t Fresh Beef be supplid there, & to all 
the Posts, so as to make the Less Pork necessary in Canada? It will be Cheaper, 
Better for the Troops, & may serve us from Want of Pork. I suppose Canada, may 
furnish some Beef, by Augst & the Congress will now be able to furnish Mr Price 
with Dollars to pay for it, from one of the Prizes lately taken…I must also request 
of you to be informed from Time to Time of every thing you can think necessary, 
for Supplying he Army in Canada, & in the Posts between Albany & that Place. 
That Army is to be Augmented by 6,000 more Troops to be sent from New 
England, as soon as possible. I have sent off a Person, to provide for them ‘till 
they get into the grand Rout from the Lakes to Canada.313 
 
Trumbull’s June 13 letter to Livingston demonstrated the growing burden that supporting the 
troops in Canada proved. The movement of provisions, funds, and troops needed to be carefully 
policed. Yet Trumbull took constant care to do so as well as to ensure that others, such as 
Livingston, buttressed his efforts. Even when he voiced his more despondent thoughts, as he did 
in a letter to his brother Jonathan, in which he lamented “Our Good Angel seems to have 
Deserted us in Canada,” he still considered support justifiable.314 Indeed, he still hoped for the 
“Good Angel’s” return, assuring Jonathan that he had taken steps to assist with that return, which 
included having written to Walter Livingston “on the Subject of Supplying the Army in 
Canada.”315 
 
 
The End of the Campaign 
 
In the weeks following the end of the siege, controlling the situation and troops at 
Deschambault became one of the Continental Army’s main priorities. For individuals like 
Carroll and Chase—physically removed from the parish—that meant maintaining control of the 
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Deschambault itself. However, for General Thomas, who was commanding the troops as well as 
facing difficulties in procuring provisions at Deschambault, maintaining control slowly came to 
mean relocating his troops once again, ultimately concentrating all of his efforts into holding 
onto Sorel. Given Thomas’s military command and proximity, his views were the ones that 
translated into action, which meant by late May, Sorel became the main locus of the Continental 
Army outside of Montreal.316 The relocation to Sorel also meant that the remaining Continental 
troops had all crossed the Saint Lawrence River, finding themselves limited to the southern 
banks of the Lower Richelieu Valley. Thomas had now added a river to the many obstacles 
separating the Continental Army from Quebec. 
The army’s affairs elsewhere in the colony were further complicated in late May, when a 
Loyalist Captain George Forster led a force of about two hundred and fifty (more than two 
hundred of which were Native peoples from the Oswegatchie area) against a Continental 
stronghold at Fort Ceders (also known as Les Cedres, which was around thirty miles outside 
Montreal). Information about the attack spread throughout the lower country, reaching 
individuals who both welcomed and deplored the news. Continental officer, Colonel Timothy 
Bedel, who had actively maintained communications with the strategically placed 
Caughnawagas, learned of the planned assault through them. Immediately upon learning of 
Forster’s movements, several individuals took steps to reinforce either side of the impending 
assault. A seigneur named Jean Baptiste Tesard-de-Montigny recruited a small force of thirty 
“new subjects,” and joined Forster in his attack. Meanwhile, both Bedel and Henry Sherburne 
redirected additional Continental soldiers to Fort Ceders in efforts to reinforce the fort’s 
commanding officer, Major Isaac Butterfield. In the end, neither Bedel nor Sherburne reached 
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Butterfield: Bedel fell sick with smallpox, while Sherburne surrendered after being ambushed 
and made aware of Butterfield’s earlier surrender.317  
Celebrating two victories and control over the few hundred prisoners that came with 
them, Forster and Montigny planned to attack the Continental headquarters at Montreal next. En 
route, though, Forster fell victim to rumors that the local habitants began to spread, which held 
that General Arnold was well-equipped at Montreal with over six hundred troops. In reality, 
Arnold commanded little more than half of that number, but the habitants’ rumor was enough to 
give Forster pause. He promptly retreated from Montreal’s immediate vicinity. In response, 
Arnold, who had subsequently received additional reinforcements as well as help from about two 
hundred Caughnawagas, mounted an attack. In late May, Arnold oversaw the last notable 
Continental Army victory, as Forster anticipated Arnold’s attack and began negotiating terms for 
his own safe surrender. Reaching an agreement with the captive Butterfield and Sherburne, 
Forster agreed to release his prisoners in exchange for his and his troops’ unimpeded retreat. And 
therefore, Arnold, with the crucial assistance of the local habitants and Canaughwagas, 
maintained control of Montreal.318  
Despite all of the attention scholars have placed on early May, it was in the last days of 
May and the first weeks of June that the military affairs in Canada experienced some of the most 
momentous, albeit erratic, shifts. By May 27 and 28, thirty-nine ships carrying the main body of 
British reinforcements reached Quebec. Carleton now had at his disposal an additional eight 
British regiments and at least three thousand Hessian mercenaries.319 Alternatively, just a few 
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days later, the Continental forces weathered a few key changes in personnel themselves. On June 
1, they lost three noteworthy individuals. That day, Carroll and Chase set off from St. Johns, 
finally leaving the colony and heading for Philadelphia to report back to the Continental 
Congress.320 Elsewhere in the colony, General Thomas, who had overseen the Continental 
troops’ defeat and retreat from Quebec as well as their eventual relocation to Sorel, died from a 
bout of smallpox with which he had been afflicted since late May.321 Yet, as Carroll and Chase 
made their way out of the colony, Brigadier General John Sullivan was making his way in. 
Commanding a substantial fleet of his own (about two hundred batteaus), he seemed the 
harbinger of good fortune the Continental troops in Canada had been wanting. Habitants seemed 
to interpret Sullivan’s arrival similarly as well; many eschewed their policy of neutrality—a 
policy some had only been recently adopted—and supported the troops by providing provisions, 
military supplies, and manpower. Some weeks after withstanding a demoralizing defeat at 
Quebec, the Continental forces and their supporters came to expect a favorable turn of affairs.  
Indeed, countless spoke of Sullivan’s arrival in Canada as constituting a “turn” for the 
Continental Army, including Sullivan himself, who considered himself to be “in the Midst” of 
“pleasing prospects.”322 He wrote to General Washington from Sorel on June 5, announcing: Our 
Affairs have taken a Strange turn Since our Arrival.” “The Canadians,” he explained, “are 
Flocking by Hundreds to take a part with us,” making sure to also add that he found most of 
them to be “Exceeding friendly” and that they “come in with the greatest Chearfullness.”323 
                                                
320 Samuel Chase to Philip Schuyler, 31 May 1776, LOD, 4: 105-06; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll 
of Annapolis, 4 June 1776, DPDC, 2: 915. 
321 For more on the prevalence of smallpox during the Canadian Campaign, see Elizabeth Fenn, Pox Americana: The 
Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001). 
322 “General John Sullivan to General George Washington, June 5, 1776” in Letters and Papers of Major-General 
John Sullivan, ed. Otis G. Hammond (Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930), 1: 217-221. Original 
found in the George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress. 
323 Ibid., 219. 
  
143 
Certainly Sullivan was aware of the difficulties facing his troops, but he did not consider one of 
those difficulties being the colony itself; Canada and its inhabitants were not somehow viewed as 
antithetical to the revolution. In fact, soon after entering the colony, Sullivan claimed that 
Canada counted “perhaps as many according to their Numbers” supporters of the revolutionary 
cause as could be found in “Some other Colonies upon the Continent.”324 So encouraged was he 
that by the very next day the general began voicing more optimistic expectations. Sullivan 
believed it was only a matter of days before the Continental troops in the colony would be 
brought to order, and with that as well as “with the Assistance of a kind providence,” they could 
“put a new face to our Affairs.”325  
Others viewed Sullivan’s arrival in similarly optimistic ways. Writing to his father on 
June 4 from Ticonderoga, Carroll described having crossed paths with General Sullivan at St. 
Johns. He also estimated that “with good management,” their affairs in Canada “may still take a 
favorable turn”326—a wish he repeated in a subsequent letter dated June 11.327 Further removed 
from Canada, but no less attentive to the military affairs in the colony, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., 
who was then in Albany, assessed the situation optimistically in a letter to his brother David in 
mid-June. “Our Affairs in Canada,” he claimed “begin to take a Turn & wear a better Aspect. 
General Sullivan is going on with Spirit, having dispatched 12 or 1500 Men down as far as Three 
Rivers to meet Carleton, who is there. We expect soon to hear something more favourable.”328 
Trumbull’s letter was dated June 18, 1776, the very day the Continental Army evacuated 
Canada. Once again, the delay was due to the distance involved. Therefore, although evidently 
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inaccurate, Trumbull’s assessment revealed the hopes that Sullivan’s arrival in Canada inspired 
in individuals as far removed as Hartford. It also demonstrates the attention individuals 
elsewhere in North America placed on the Canadian Campaign as well as the emotional impact it 
had on them.  
The seemingly auspicious turn in the Continental Army’s affairs inspired Sullivan to call 
for more offensive military action. In early June, Sullivan ordered an attack against British forces 
at Trois Rivieres, which General William Thompson would oversee on June 7 and 8.329 
Habitants informants had described the fortification to Sullivan as scantily defended. But with 
the additional troops and vessels at his disposal, Carleton was able to quickly deploy additional 
men to Trois Rivieres, resulting in the defeat and capture of Thompson and many of his 
troops.330 The demoralizing effects of the Continental Army’s defeat at Trois Rivieres, together 
with the apparent advantage Carleton had accrued with the arrival of the rest of the reinforcing 
fleet, inspired Sullivan to reach a series of decisions to relocate his remaining army further and 
further away from Carleton’s advancing forces. On June 18, moving further away meant 
abandoning Canada and bringing the Canadian Campaign to an end.  
 
 
Continuity amidst Change 
 
The conclusion of the Canadian Campaign brought to a close an early chapter of the 
Revolutionary War. It marked the end of one of its first major military offenses, which—
although unsuccessful—left its imprint on the ensuing war effort.331 The campaign was also the 
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last venture into Canada of its kind. The war ended seven years later, in 1783, without so much 
as another military offensive directly involving the colony. Yet despite the outcome of this first 
and only campaign, the question of Canada’s place within Revolutionary America remained 
unsettled. The colony continued to be a topic of discussion within revolutionary circles, and the 
possibility that it would join the United Colonies remained imaginable throughout the late 1770s.  
As it happened, the last months of the campaign overlapped with the first months of the 
drafting of the Declaration of Independence. A milestone document of the revolution, the 
declaration officially established independence as the ultimate aim of the united colonies.332 The 
document itself is emblematic of the transformative fervor of the mid-1770s, during which an 
increasingly unified colonial insurrection crystalized into outright revolt. It, therefore, provides a 
pivotal window into this period, while also communicating how congressional delegates 
understood the meanings, justifications, and even dimensions of the revolution then underway. 
On all three counts, it appears that Canada factored into their logic.  
The Quebec Act of 1774, for example, featured among the enumerated grievances stated 
in the text, and consequently part of the larger rationale for independence. As the delegates 
explained, independence was justifiable for a number of reasons, which included the King’s 
decision to abolish “the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing 
therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an 
example and fit instrument for intruding the same absolute rule into these Colonies.”333 Although 
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the language in the Declaration seemingly reinforced geographic distinctions between the 
“neighbouring” Canada and “these Colonies,” it did so because despite the efforts of many in 
Congress and Canada, the colony remained outside of the formal union. Nonetheless, the same 
language that seemed to voice such distinctions also emphasized connections between Canada 
and the United Colonies, suggesting a porousness in its boundaries. After all, Canada could not 
seem so far removed if it allowed Parliament to intrude on the governmental structures of the 
neighboring colonies.  
Of greater importance, however, was a more presumptuous, although somewhat indirect, 
reference to the colony. The authority of the Declaration was derived from the very delegates 
who, in signing it, formalized their approval of the document and its stated aims. And among 
these many signatures was a space designated for that of a delegate from the colony of Quebec. 
In the end, the space was left unsigned, but its mere existence is worth contemplating. That 
allocated space provides a rare and concrete example of a historical contingency, the significance 
of which—although immeasurable—cannot be overestimated. That Canada did not ultimately 
join the United Colonies does not change the fact that its doing so was viewed as a real 
possibility at the very moment independence was being declared. Given the timing, it is clear 
that these estimations had much to do with the Continental Army’s Canadian Campaign—a 
military offensive that aimed at incorporating the colony into the nascent union through whatever 
means possible. It therefore stands to reason that the outcome of the campaign worked to lessen 
the depth of some of the convictions regarding Canada. It is even tempting to view the seeming 
peculiarities of the Declaration of Independence—as they relate to the colony—as the product of 
a particular moment in which Canada was uncommonly, but also fleetingly, relevant to the 
revolution. But like the unsigned space on the declaration, the years following the campaign’s 
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end witnessed a number of schemes that—although left unfulfilled—confirm the continuing 
importance of Canada in the eyes of many. There might never have been a second expedition 
into Canada, but, in the years that followed, such expeditions were in fact proposed, planned for, 
and—at least in one instance—officially approved.   
 
  
  
148 
Chapter 5 
 
Anticipating a Second Canadian Campaign 
 
The Continental forces who undertook a rushed evacuation of Canada in June 1776 were 
not the same ones who had entered the province the previous year. Among the many leaving 
Canada was a colonel named Moses Hazen. Hazen commanded one of the army’s two Canadian 
regiments.334 Like the men under his command, he was a resident of Canada, having settled in 
the colony in 1763. In leaving the colony, he was also leaving his home, property, and various 
business ventures.  
Legend has it, Hazen’s exit was a fiery one. In an attempt to prevent his home from 
providing respite to enemy forces, he allegedly made time during the height of the army’s retreat 
to return home and, at sunset, set fire to his house and barn. Practical though his purported 
actions were, they were also symbolic. His manor house helped epitomize the financial and 
territorial wealth Hazen had found in Canada, whereas its destruction seemed tangible evidence 
of the downturn in his affairs. Indeed, Hazen himself never completely moved past the various 
setbacks he experienced during the campaign. But as it happens, he was not the architect of his 
home’s destruction. Although his property was burned, sources make clear that other Continental 
officers both ordered and oversaw the torching.335 Yet the enduring traction of the legend and the 
vivid image it paints of a defeated man, laying waste to his own home just as the sun was setting 
serves as a powerful reminder that for some, the end of the Canadian Campaign symbolized 
more than just abstract military losses. And although countless others followed the same route 
out of Canada, their journeys were not necessarily the same. Hazen’s journey, for instance, was 
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shaped by emotional and financial losses that ultimately kept him connected to the very colony 
he was leaving for the duration of the war.  
Over the course of the next several years, Hazen would work to recover losses suffered 
by both himself and the self-styled United States. Between the years 1776 and 1783, he directed 
most of his efforts to drumming up support for a Second Canadian Campaign.336 As this chapter 
will demonstrate, in doing so—as in his march out of Canada—he was not alone. Other 
individuals, including congressional delegates, military personnel, and individuals both in or near 
Canada, also planned for subsequent campaigns in the region. Although self-interest certainly 
influenced the actions of proponents like Hazen, their schemes enjoyed both traction and 
support, shedding light on some of the lived possibilities of the time. For many, the possibility of 
a second Canadian campaign shaped their understanding of the revolution and the Revolutionary 
War. As they understood it, Canada’s eventual inclusion in the United States was neither 
antithetical nor superfluous to independence, but a goal to be actively sought out in the broader 
contest against Britain.  
Accompanied as he was by hundreds of other Continental troops, Hazen’s route out of 
Canada was evidently well-trodden ground. Some two hundred and forty years later, that remains 
the case, albeit in a more figurative sense. Although accounts of the Continental Army’s defeats 
on the outskirts of Quebec City far outnumber those of its final retreat from Canada, scholars of 
the Canadian Campaign frequently describe or at least make reference to the path that individuals 
like Hazen took to flee the colony.337 Indeed, the evacuation of this much reduced army, plagued 
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as it was by sickness, military losses, and a lack of provisions, provides both a tidy and 
emotionally-powerful ending to studies of a military offensive that largely continues to be 
viewed as ill-fated from the start.  
Yet, scholars of Early America, especially those focused on the American Revolution or 
Revolutionary War, do more than merely describe the Continental Army’s route out of Canada; 
most tend to follow that path themselves. Like the majority of individuals who accompanied 
Hazen in his departure from the colony, historians of Revolutionary America very rarely revisit 
Canada in the years following the campaign. But the risks of following the Continental Army out 
of Canada are greater than limiting the degree or duration in which that particular colony comes 
into focus. Doing so also obscures the colony’s much more entangled relationship with the 
revolutionary rhetoric and activity of the late 1770s and early 1780s. Despite the fact that Canada 
would never again be the scene of another military offensive in the war, in the years that 
followed the Canadian Campaign, such offensives were in fact proposed, planned for, and—at 
least in one instance—officially approved. 
This chapter recognizes that the end of the Canadian Campaign marked a shift in the 
American Revolutionary War—one in which the Continental Army, quite literally, directed its 
attentions away from Canada. Part of the chapter, therefore, accompanies the Continental Army 
out of Canada, but in ways that differ from more conventional histories. Privileging Hazen’s 
perspective, I opt for a different way of leaving the colony—one that allows us to walk away 
from Canada while still maintaining one eye trained towards it. And yet, part of this chapter does 
what Hazen did not: it also returns to the colony during the aftermath of the campaign, 
acknowledging the ways the revolution shaped administrative policy in the British province. 
Like Hazen, Governor Carleton, his successor, Governor Frederick Haldimand, and other 
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administrative officials were also preoccupied with the possibility that the Continental Army 
would launch another campaign into Canada. For them, unlike for Hazen, the possibility mostly 
sparked fear and administrative paralysis. 
 
The Aftermath of a Failed Campaign 
In the months following the Canadian Campaign, the question of Canada and its place in 
the union lost steam throughout much of the self-styled United States. Both militarily and 
politically, Congress focused its efforts elsewhere. Indeed, for over a year, the Continental 
Army’s northern department was preoccupied with forestalling a British-led invasion from 
Canada, not mounting one itself.338 And in Congress, where delegates did ultimately broach the 
subject of Canada joining the unified states, they did so only infrequently. Not until the end of 
1777, long after their failed Canadian Campaign, did Congress once again take steps to actively 
court the colony’s inhabitants.  
By then, Congress had approved a “plan for confederation” that it had drafted and 
debated for more than a year.339 Throughout that process, Congress had consistently, if also 
passively, granted Canada special admission into its union. From the outset, delegates stipulated 
that if the colony agreed to all other measures listed in the Articles of Confederation, it would be 
admitted to the confederation of states. It also specified that this course of action was available to 
Canada alone: that “no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be 
agreed to by nine states.”340 In doing so, Congress was offering the northern colony more than 
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just preauthorized admission. The fact that it was the only colony referred to by name suggests 
that Congress considered its inclusion either particularly desirable or very likely regardless.  
Yet, as noteworthy as Congress’s stance on Canada was, it was not a noticeable topic of 
conversation or debate. Unlike many other measures included the Articles of Confederation, the 
article concerning Canada remained virtually unaltered after its first appearance in July 1776. 
The only time it appears to have been formally discussed in Congress was on November 11, 
1777, when Congress approved a motion to remove the word “entirely” from the article.341 This 
changed the beginning of the article’s phrasing from:  
 
Canada acceding to this Confederation, and entirely joining in the measures of the 
United States, shall be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this 
Union. 
to 
Canada acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United 
States, shall be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this Union. 
 
Despite appearances, the lack of overt discussion on the article did not signify Congress’s 
lack of interest in Canada. On the contrary, the scrupulous manner in which the delegates 
debated drafts the Articles of Confederation—at times even rethinking specific word choices, 
like the one mentioned above—makes it difficult to believe that the article’s presence was not at 
least recognized on a fairly consistent basis. Moreover, the minor change that was made to its 
phrasing in November 1777 was not the only change ever made to the article. Although the 
modifications were never never formally discussed, Congress evidently oversaw other minor 
alterations between the first and second draft of the document, one of which included the 
substitution of the term “States” for “colonies.” In being subjected to the delegates’ editorial pen, 
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the provisions of the article were re-acknowledged and reconfirmed. Canada’s entry into the 
Confederation was, therefore, regularly—if also only implicitly—endorsed long after the end of 
the Canadian Campaign. In the end, then, the colony might have remained a fairly silent part of 
Congress’s conversation on the Articles of Confederation, but that, in itself, is telling. 
By November 1777, however, circumstances changed as Canada came back into focus 
for many in Congress. Although the change in phrasing that Congress approved on November 11 
may seem minor, it was meant to facilitate Canada’s entry into the union by appearing to demand 
less of the colony’s inhabitants. It was also introduced in the wake of one of the Continental 
Army’s most notable victories, and at a time during which Canada’s entry appeared more 
feasible. Indeed, it was likely a consequence of that turn of events. On October 17, 1777, troops 
under Generals Horatio Gates and Benedict Arnold defeated British General John Burgoyne’s 
army in the second of two battles fought near Saratoga, New York. The victory proved so 
advantageous to Congress and the Continental Army that historians have long considered it a 
turning point in the war, often crediting it with France’s formal entry in the struggle.342 In 
regards to Canada specifically, the Battle of Saratoga also proved consequential. The army’s 
capture of Burgoyne and his forces immediately weakened British military strength in the 
colony, reduced the threat of a British-led invasion elsewhere, and left Canada far more exposed 
to military assaults itself. For congressional delegates, who had spent more than a year drafting 
the Articles of Confederation, the victory proved timely.  
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Less than two weeks after Congress approved the Articles of Confederation, three of its 
members, William Duer, James Lovell, and Francis Lightfoot Lee, were appointed to a 
congressional committee and tasked with procuring a French translation of the document.343 To 
supplement this translation, the committee was asked to write a separate address to the 
inhabitants of Canada, explicitly “inviting them to accede to the union of these states.”344 
Congress even instructed Duer, Lovell, and Lee to develop a plan for how best to distribute these 
texts and win over the affections of the colony’s inhabitants.345 Evidently, Congress had not yet 
lost hope that Canadian colonists could come to support its cause. Indeed, it was not lost upon 
Congress that there were more than a thousand Canadian soldiers and volunteers among 
Burgoyne’s defeated forces, most of whom were granted permission to return to the colony.346 
Presumably, such individuals would spread the news of the devastating British defeat, or at least 
stand as living proof of the recent turn of events. Months later, a report published in the 
Massachusetts Spy would claim that the commanding general at Saratoga, General Horatio 
Gates, had informed Congress that the Canadians who had fought under Burgoyne had done so 
unwillingly.347 As 1777 came to a close, Canada and its colonial population’s sympathies loomed 
large in Congress’s collective imagination.  
 
Canada after the Canadian Campaign 
If members of Congress, military officials, and readers of colonial newspapers like the 
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Massachusetts Spy believed the loyalties of Canada’s colonial population were still unspoken for 
by 1778, they were not alone. In Canada, Governor Carleton, his successor Frederick Haldimand, 
and other British officials remained preoccupied with ensuring the security of the province long 
after the Continental troops had evacuated the colony. They remained suspicious of much of the 
colonial population, especially the French-speaking habitants and a good number of Canada’s 
Old Subjects. Concerned that many remained seditiously-inclined or simply open to 
revolutionary rhetoric, Carleton and his administration took steps to both tighten their control 
over the colony’s inhabitants and to avoid any policies that could spark distrust or outright 
opposition.348  
The deliberations of Canada’s Legislative Council, for example, reveal a colonial 
government crippled by the threat of sedition. Although the council had technically existed since 
the Quebec Act came into effect, its “first effective legislative session” did not convene until 
January 1777.349 Its minutes reveal some of the most pressing bureaucratic concerns of the 
colonial government long after the end of the Canadian Campaign. And although the voices of 
policymakers ring loudest in the council’s minutes, their anxieties and responses to perceived 
realities allow an imperfect glimpse into much of the colony’s inhabitants. Rather than facing 
newly loyal and obedient subjects in the aftermath of the failed invasion, Canada’s colonial 
administration found that many colonists remained restive and unreliable. Revolution, too, 
seemed a constant possibility, even if only a distant one.  
Not surprisingly, during the council’s first sessions, it passed ordinances that 
strengthened the colony’s defenses and encouraged loyalty among Canada’s inhabitants by 
seeking to mitigate, if not to address directly, their shared grievances. Even years after the 
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Canadian Campaign, Carleton and his council considered any hint of colonial discontent a cause 
for concern. For instance, on April 23, 1778, Hugh Finlay, one of members appointed to 
Canada’s Legislative Council, shared a series of complaints “Canadian Peasants” reportedly held 
at the time. Such complaints, Finlay explained, were brought to his attention by an unnamed 
individual whom he simply described as “an Honorable Member” of the colony.350 The 
grievances depict a colony still afflicted with the aftereffects of the campaign as well as with the 
divided loyalties among the populace, which the earlier campaign seemed to have laid bare. 
In an effort to convey the seriousness of the complaints, Finlay entreated his fellow 
members to act wisely. “Let us endeavour,” he implored, “to avoid the fatal Consequences that 
may attend that Spirit of Disgust which is but too general and rankles in the hearts of our fellow 
Subjects of the Country. This is a critical juncture, he warned.”351 In saying so, Finlay not only 
referenced the widespread discontent that seemed to speak for itself, but placed it within a 
moment of great turmoil. More than just a remnant of grievances past, this “Spirit of Disgust” 
signified a current and ongoing crisis. He explained that the Canadians were not adequately 
compensated for services rendered or supplies furnished to the British troops. Additionally, it 
seemed clear that because the majority of the Canadian habitants were unfamiliar with the laws 
currently in effect in the colony, they were vulnerable to any abuses of power that their parish 
militia captains saw fit to exercise. For these reasons, Finlay claimed that a considerable portion 
of the populace was increasingly discontented—a situation that needed to be addressed promptly 
and carefully. In his opinion, it was not “sound policy” to let these sorts of resentments fester. 
Instead, he called for a policy of appeasement, which would aim specifically at regaining the 
                                                
350 Minutes of the Legislative Council, LAC, CO42, Q Series, 9: 33-35. 
351 Ibid., 9: 33. 
  
157 
confidence of many.352  
Although Finlay’s language echoed that of other council members in months past, he was 
right to argue that Canada’s British administration currently found itself at a critical juncture. His 
call to action came at a time following both Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga as well as renewed 
talk of another Continental Army-led invasion. In the months following the battle, several 
individuals in the United Colonies began proposing military offensives into Canada. As Finlay 
was aware, colonial discontent could prove disastrous to the colony’s British administration.  
 
The Continental Army’s Second Canadian Campaign 
Many capitalized on the sense of momentum that followed the Continental Army’s 
victory at Saratoga by proposing a second Canadian campaign. Among the first advocates was 
Moses Hazen. On October 26, 1777, almost immediately after the battle, Hazen wrote a letter to 
the General Horatio Gates, commending him on his role in the victory and pressing him to 
consider a military assault into Canada. As Hazen understood the situation, “The total Defeat of 
General Burgoyne’s Army” was “only a Part of the Advantages resulting from it” (emphasis, 
mine). Canada, he explained, was now left “unguarded” by the British, and, according to Hazen, 
its inhabitants were “well known” to be friends to the revolutionary cause.353 Given those 
circumstances, the colonel described the colony as “an Easy ‘tho’ a Great Conquest.”354 
Advocating a campaign that very winter, Hazen wrote, “It is now in our Power, It is our Interest, 
and I hope it will be tho’t for our Honour, to add Canada to the Thirteen United States of 
                                                
352 Ibid. 
353 Moses Hazen to Horatio Gates, 26 October 1777, Horatio Gates Papers, MS-240 Series I, Microfilm, New York 
Historical Society. 
354 Ibid. 
  
158 
America.”355 
Perhaps agreeing with Hazen, by mid-November, Gates used his authority as a member 
of Congress’s newly constituted Board of War to lay the groundwork for a future attack. On 
November 15, he wrote to Colonel Timothy Bedel in the Coos region of northern New 
Hampshire, instructing him to raise a regiment for that purpose.356 That same day, Congressional 
delegates approved the final draft of the Articles of Confederation, which, they would afterwards 
request be translated into French. Gates’s schemes were not lost on delegates increasingly 
preoccupied with Canada. Almost immediately after James Lovell was appointed to the three-
man committee tasked with facilitating Canada’s entry into the confederation, he wrote to John 
Adams, asking for his opinion on Gates’s proposed military strike in the colony. In the letter, 
Lovell expressed his own ambivalence. He confided to Adams that despite firmly believing that 
Canada would eventually fall to Congress—and despite his own inclination to acquaint its 
inhabitants with the nature of the union—he was “altogether averse from strong sollicitations to 
that People to become immediately active.”357 He explained that his hesitation stemmed from a 
belief that the burden of carrying out another expedition into Canada was too heavy to take on 
without first confirming its colonial population’s unquestionable and widespread friendship. 
Nonetheless, while voicing his reluctance, Lovell also communicated his openness to differing 
points of view, claiming he stood ready to be convinced otherwise by arguments for an 
expedition “founded in evident Policy.”358 Moreover, his desire for greater assurances of 
friendship meant that while he clearly harbored some doubts about its existence, he did not rule it 
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out completely.   
Lovell’s views on Canada were also complicated by his apparent certainty regarding its 
eventual fate. Despite his own doubts about the benefits of becoming “immediately active” 
(emphasis mine), he was much more convinced of the colony’s long-term future. When speaking 
of the Canadian colonists, his exact words were: “They will fall to us of Course,”359 as though 
the only question that remained to be answered was that of timing. In addition, Lovell’s use of 
the phrase “of Course” also indicates that his conviction was one he expected others to share. 
Perhaps this was largely the case because, between early December and late January, Congress 
would sanction military action in the colony. At first ordering a limited military assault on 
British vessels in Lake Champlain, it would later approve a larger offensive aimed at securing 
Canada entirely. 
On December 3, 1777, Congress sanctioned a surprise attack on British shipping near St. 
Johns, appointing General John Stark, who had helped reinforce troops at Saratoga, as its 
commander.360 Unlike the army’s earlier 1775-campaign, the purpose of his venture was not 
military control of the colony, but rather to further weaken British strength in the colony. Doing 
so would hinder the ability of British forces to march southward as Burgoyne’s army had done in 
the recent past, and simultaneously weaken Britain’s perceived strength in the eyes of the 
colony’s inhabitants and the neighboring Native peoples. Yet given the recent steps Congress 
had taken to invite Canada into its union, it is probable that if Stark’s enterprise proved 
successful, the army’s excursion into Canada would not end there. 
Stark’s commission never became public knowledge. His potential for success was 
consistently tied to secrecy, and special measures were adopted to avoid news of the planned 
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enterprise from leaking out. Congress even appointed James Duane, a delegate from New York, 
to personally relay Stark’s commission and instructions. Indeed, so much stress was placed on 
the need for secrecy that Duane’s letters to General Gates as well as to Stark himself were so 
circumspect that the only information that could be gleaned from them was that Stark had been 
chosen to command an enterprise that was of “upmost importance” to the war effort. In his first 
letter to Gates regarding this new offensive, Duane described it as a venture that Congress “have 
much at Heart.”361 None of the particulars, however, were even hinted at.  
Because of the covertness with which Stark’s enterprise was approached, it is difficult to 
say exactly when support of it gave way to support for a larger offensive, but on January 22, 
Congress officially approved a second expedition into Canada.362 General John Stark would also 
be involved in the new “irruption,” but not as its commander. For that post, Congress appointed a 
French officer with a growing reputation, Major General the Marquis de Lafayette.363 The choice 
to appoint a French officer was not coincidental; Lafayette was expected to attract the support of 
Canada’s French-speaking inhabitants. Once again, Congress acknowledged the centrality of 
Canadian colonists, as their support could either help or hinder a military campaign. Perhaps 
more importantly, given Congress’ willingness to both translate its Articles of Confederation into 
French and appoint a French general to the commanding post of a Canadian campaign, the 
northern front of the American Revolutionary War had increasingly become a struggle that could 
be—and was—framed in the French language.  
The day after Congress approved the second Canadian campaign’s commanding officers, 
its current president, Henry Laurens wrote to Lafayette. By that time, the Board of War had 
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already sent word to the general regarding his recent appointment, and Laurens’s letter contained 
only a brief, nondescript reference to it.364 Yet, that early communication is telling. Despite the 
vagueness with which Laurens approached the subject, his personal reservations about the 
expedition shone through. After directly referring to Lafayette’s recent appointment, Laurens 
revealingly wrote: “to [the subject of the command] I shall add no opinions of my own.”365 His 
meaning was purposely unclear, but because it was a letter addressed to Lafayette almost 
immediately after his appointment, Laurens’s choice of words suggest that his own feelings ran 
counter to those of the majority in Congress.  
He would be more candid in a letter to John Rutledge, another delegate from South 
Carolina, to whom he confided that he considered it a “misfortune” that he did not approve of the 
sanctioned expedition. He explained that he felt that way in part because he was “almost single 
in opinion,” and was clearly burdened by the doubts known to an outlier.366 Although wanting to 
be more hopeful about the fate of the venture, he was apparently more focused on the obstacles it 
posed. Yet, Laurens’s stance was a conflicted one. Although admitting that he felt alone in his 
disapproval of this second Canadian expedition, he also admitted that he believed Lafayette was 
best suited to the task. “There is no Man in our Army,” he claimed, that was “so likely to succeed 
in it as this young Noble Man.”367 Moreover, like Lovell, Laurens also took for granted Canada’s 
eventual entry into the United States, together with that of East and West Florida. For him, it was 
a question of timing, which he worried was not yet right. He wrote to Rutledge: “Canada as well 
as East & West Florida must in a few years fall into the general Union without loss of Blood or 
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expense of Treasure on our part.”368  
Just as was the case in the earlier offensive involving General John Stark, the success of 
this second expedition was also tied to secrecy, making it difficult to determine how other 
individuals throughout the United States viewed it. However, there is proof that the existence of 
the venture was at least known to colonists outside of Congress. Although not many, by the end 
of February 1778, references to the expedition could be found in some colonial newspapers. 
Even before the second Canadian campaign was formally approved, talk of Canada had 
resurfaced outside of Congress. On January 21, 1778, the day before Congress approved a 
second Canadian campaign, Nathaniel Ames III recorded in his diary: “no News except vague 
Report that the Canadians have again declared in our favor, drove ye Britons into Quebec.”369 
Although incorrect, the vague report Ames referenced, helps reveal how widespread news 
concerning Canada could be. 
By late February, however, the viability of the campaign was already being questioned by 
the very men who were to command it. The Marquis de LaFayette was among the earliest critics. 
In fact, the day after he arrived in Albany, where he was to take over the command of the 
offensive, Lafayette wrote a discouraging letter to the president of Congress. Addressing 
Laurens, he explained, “I can not give up all ideas of penetrating into Canada, but I give up this 
of Going there this winter upon the ice.”370 Providing a clear indication of his own sentiments 
regarding the expedition, Lafayette meant this account to dissuade Congress from continuing to 
pursue the venture. As he insisted in this letter, however, Lafayette did not oppose the idea of 
any future campaigns into Canada—it was this particular one he no longer supported. For him, as 
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for Laurens, it was also a question of timing. “I see,” he subsequently insisted in a separate letter 
to Washington, “that I could do something was the expedition to be begun in five weeks—but 
you know we have not an hour to looze, and indeed it is now rather too late, had we every thing 
in readiness.”371 He nonetheless postulated, “If [the expedition] may begin again in the month of 
june by the easted [sic], I can’t venture to assure—but for the present moment such is the idea I 
conceive of the famous incursion.”372  
Lafayette would continue to suggest postponing the campaign until June. To George 
Clinton, he wrote: “I am told also that we can get in the heart of Canada in the summer. I dare 
hope you’l be so kind as to favor me with your opinion about those matters.”373 And in a letter to 
George Washington, Lafayette made a passing remark which read: “I am told that in the month 
of june there is a very easy way into the heart of Canada.” Still, in yet another letter—this time to 
Laurens—Lafayette would again speak to the issues of timing. “If we had three or four weeks 
before us,” he qualified, “it would do very well, but I am told that the ice is bad by the twentyth 
of March, and be pleased to consider how far it is from here to St. Johns.”374 His message 
throughout all of these accounts was simple: current circumstances did not justify a Canadian 
campaign, but future ones might. And far from presenting his assessments as singular, Lafayette 
strove to show how commonly-held these sentiments were. In the letter he wrote to Clinton on 
February 23, 1778, he claimed that “The expedition displeases every body.”375 Likewise, in 
another letter to Laurens, Lafayette wrote: “I have consulted every body, and every body answers 
me that I schould be mad to undertake this operation.”376  
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Often, Lafayette also stressed the disparaging opinions other officers had reportedly 
expressed, even referencing the opinions of individuals who were not directly involved with the 
campaign, such as those of Benedict Arnold and Benjamin Lincoln. According to the Marquis, 
upon arriving in Albany, General Thomas Conway had apparently greeted the French officer 
with discouraging news. “His first word,” claimed Lafayette, “has been to tell me that the 
expedition was quite impossible.”377 And if these gloomy assessments were not discouraging 
enough, Lafayette also promptly informed Congress that his third-in-command, General Stark, 
had yet to even recruit and organize his troops.  
Constantly lamenting what he considered a military situation so disappointing and so 
contrary to what he had been expecting, Lafayette’s letters read more like a litany of complaints 
than reports on the state of military affairs. His primary aim after arriving in Albany was to 
ensure Congress’ abandonment of the campaign. When writing to Washington on February 19, 
he referred to his letter to Laurens, which he had penned that same day. Expressing his hopes 
that the expedition would be given up, he wrote: “I have sent to Congress a full account of the 
matter,” and hoped that it would “oppen (a little) theyr eyes.”378 Acknowledging that he did not 
know what they would decide, and committing to “waït [in Albany] for theyr answer,” it is 
nonetheless clear, Lafayette had already written it off.379 His expectations would prove true; after 
receiving and considering the discouraging assessments of Lafayette, Congress voted to abandon 
the endeavor on March 13, 1778. 
Lafayette’s correspondence is revealing not only because it sheds light on the 
circumstances that brought to an end the army’s second Canadian campaign, but also because it 
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provides a sense of how well-known the venture either was or was expected to be. In most of his 
letters, Lafayette was looking for validation, and not just from Congress, the Board of War, the 
army’s commander in chief, or his fellow officers. He was also striving to appease some of his 
own concerns about his reputation and military competence. As early as February 19, Lafayette 
began to wonder what his choices relative to the expedition would mean for his image both in 
North America and abroad. In the same letter to Laurens in which he first voiced his growing 
reservations, Lafayette also lamented: “The world has theyr eyes fixed upon me, and me, myself, 
I’l be obliged to end an operation which may be looked on as undertaken, in the same ridiculous 
way as I do’nt know which man by the name of a general has carried on one in the [eastward]. 
Men will have right to laugh at me, and I’l be almost ashamed to appear before some.”380 
Likewise, to Washington, Lafayette reflected, “Your excellency may judge that I am very 
distressed by that disapointement. My being appointed to the command of the expedition is 
known through the continent, it will be soon known in Europe.” He continued by writing: “The 
people will be in great expectations, and what schall I answer?” In the end, he bluntly admitted, 
“I am affraïd it will reflect on my reputation and I schall be laughed at.”381  
Lafayette’s fears, which revealed an embittered sense of injustice, lingered until early-to-
mid March, when he finally received orders from Congress and the Board of War, advising him 
to act according to his judgment. Until that time, much of the French general’s correspondence 
contained letter after letter expressing remorse at how his actions would be construed by others. 
On February 20, he resentfully questioned: “Why has been so much noise made about this 
expedition?”382 Days later, he would go on to describe his situation as “distressing, foolish, and 
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indeed nameless.” He insisted that in being sent “with a great noise at the head of an army for 
doing great things,” the “whole continent, France, Europe herself” and even “the british army are 
in expectations.” The only questions that seemingly remained unanswered were “how far they 
will be deceived” and “how far we schall be radicalized,” not whether either of these would 
indeed take place.383  
In fact, he so anticipated such negative responses that on more than one occasion 
Lafayette asked individuals to share what was being said about him and his command. To Henry 
Laurens he implored, “I hope you will be so good as to let me know every thing which has been 
told about me even by the public,”384 going as far as to request that Laurens forward him all 
newspapers that contained any reference to him or the campaign. So concerned was Lafayette 
that he assured Laurens he wished to know in “very very particular” detail “every thing which 
has been said publikly or privately of the canadian expedition and the commander in chief.” And 
so convinced was he of the existence of critical opinion, that he ended his appeal by writing: 
“Do’nt be affraïd to forward any disagreable compliment.385 
Lafayette’s correspondence, therefore, revealed much about his own personal turmoil, but 
it also spoke to other matters concerning the campaign. The assumptions, worries, and even 
grudges that peppered his letters were to a large extent predicated on the belief that the campaign 
was widely known, not just in North America, but in Europe as well. Given his involvement, 
there was no question of the notoriety the abandonment of the campaign would bring him. 
Rather, it was the extent and direction of this notoriety that consumed his thoughts. The un-posed 
question that these sentiments seem to answer is whether the campaign ever became common 
                                                
383 Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, 23 February 1778, Ibid., 321. 
384 Marquis de Lafayette to Henry Laurens, 23 February 1778, Ibid., 318. 
385 Ibid., 319. 
  
167 
knowledge despite the level of secrecy with which it was approached. As far as Lafayette was 
concerned, that seems to have been the case. 
 The trouble, though, was that Lafayette’s assessments were not wholly borne out by 
physical evidence. To be sure, letters and newspaper articles occasionally contained references to 
the campaign, but in no way did they constitute a surplus. Indeed, the first time a newspaper 
article even mentioned the second Canadian campaign seems to have been on February 19, 
when—in the pages of the Massachusetts Spy—an extremely brief description of it was 
published. The whole of it read: “We hear the Northern army, consisting of 4000 men, under 
General Fayette, a French gentlemen of distinction, are on their march for Canada.”386 Yet, 
although short, the announcement was immediately followed by a related report. The ensuing 
account related that “Congress have been informed by Major General Gates that those 
Canadians, who returned from Saratoga, and had been included in the Convention, had been 
compelled by Sir Guy Charltan to bear arms.”387 To be sure, the reports concerned different 
military offensives, but their placement suggested connections to be drawn. The suggestion that 
habitant involvement in the British army was the result of force would do much to justify and 
garner support for a second military expedition into the colony. A week later, another report 
circulated. In the Pennsylvania Ledger. Part of it read: “A person who came with a flag, says, 
that an expedition of 5000 men is gone against Canada, under the Marquis de Fayette.”388 Like 
that published in the Massachusetts Spy, this description was concise, to the point, and phrased in 
a way that suggests it was novel information.  
More telling than these earlier mentions of the campaign, however, were the reports that 
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relayed the news that the campaign had been abandoned. Acounts like those published in the 
Pennsylvania Ledger in the last days of March began with “You have no doubt heard of the 
intended expedition of the Marquis Le Fayat against Canada” or “The so much talked of northern 
expedition against Canada” before explaining that Lafayette “after having reached Albany, was 
obliged to trudge back again with his handful of men.” Another notice simply described it as 
having been “knocked up.”389 Such accounts do not just provide examples of how some 
newspaper editors chose to inform their audience about the fate of an unrealized campaign; they 
also demonstrate that—as Lafayette believed—the campaign was likely a popular topic of 
conversation.  
 
The British Administration in Canada: Changes, Continuities, and Paralysis 
Despite the energy surrounding the now-abandoned campaign into Canada, as well as the 
subsequent calls for pursuing an altered version of the offensive, the summer of 1778 progressed 
without an invasion taking place. But all was not calm in the British colony. In the last days of 
June, its administration weathered substantial changes. For reasons to do with Carleton’s military 
conduct at the end of the Canadian Campaign, in the fall of 1777, the British ministry chose to 
replace Guy Carleton with Frederick Haldimand. Finally arriving in Quebec on June 26, 1778, 
Haldimand took over Carleton’s gubernatorial obligations as well as many of his worries. Like 
Carleton, he was especially concerned with the colonial population’s loyalties and the 
susceptibility of Canada to a Continental Army-led attack, which, like his predecessor, he viewed 
as interrelated. 
Writing to Lord George Germain about a month after his arrival, Haldimand laid out 
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what he dubbed “an imperfect Sketch” of the current state of affairs in Canada.390 Aware that he 
had not been in the colony long, he nevertheless outlined his general thoughts on military and 
civil matters, believing they could prove useful to Germain and “His Majesty’s other 
Confidential servants” if they found themselves in need of taking immediate action on matters 
related to the province.391 The resulting eleven-page report provides invaluable insight into 
Haldimand’s mindset at the time he assumed office. It, therefore, reflects the priorities of the 
governor during a period of monumental shifts that followed the Continental Army’s victory at 
Saratoga and the commencement of the French alliance. Not surprisingly, given the shifting 
circumstances of the war, Haldimand assured Germain that his “great Object at present” was “the 
Security of the Province.” Yet he considered that an exceedingly difficult task. Straight away, 
Haldimand described Canada as “quite open to the Insults and Ravages of the Colonies in actual 
Rebellion,” portraying it as both scantily defended by British troops and readily accessible to 
rebel scouting parties.392 “Roads,” he explained, had “already been marked by the Rebels to the 
inhabited Parts of the Province,” with them already claiming “a tolerable Waggon Road within 
twenty, or five and twenty Leagues, Distance from the Habitations.”393 Even more troubling, 
however, Haldimand appeared convinced that “Rebels [had] explored every Part of the Country, 
and [knew] it well.”394  
Like Carleton, Cramahé, and many of the colony’s administrative officials before him, 
Haldimand seemed consumed by the revolutionary struggles of the period and what they meant 
for the British government in Canada. Not only did he present the colony as constantly exposed 
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to the “Insults and Ravages” of the United States, whose emissaries had made literal inroads into 
the province, he also described those emissaries as so completely familiar with the colony that 
they had explored every inch of it. Given Haldimand’s own inexperience, the sharply contrasting 
image he painted of a seasoned and all-knowing “rebel” agent could only serve to weaken the 
governor’s already fragile sense of security. It would also fuel his dedication to strengthening the 
colony’s defenses. Indeed, in his report to Germain, Haldimand specified that one of his first 
actions would be to fortify “as strongly as possible” all of “the Avenues into the Province.”395 
Yet other improvements, such as establishing a formidable citadel in Quebec, would have to 
wait. A project that would certainly require more time, “the erecting of a Citadel,” Haldimand 
explained, “might only serve to intimidate the People,” while in no way answering “immediate 
Exigencies.”396 The distinctions he drew between various defensive measures, together with the 
manner in which he prioritized them, revealed some of the concerns that weighed on the 
governor—ones that would continue to do so throughout his time in the Canada. It seemed the 
governor felt exposed to both external and internal threats to his administration.  
Despite assuming office months after Congress decided to renounce its second Canadian 
Campaign, Haldimand made it clear that he feared the advent of a military invasion from the 
start. In the “Sketch” he sent Germain, he accounted for various hypotheticals including the 
Continental Army attacking the colony with “all the Force, they [could] collect” at some 
unspecified point in the future as well as them launching an expedition that very winter. With 
France’s entry in the war, he had even more reasons to fear a coordinated attack in which French 
diplomacy and naval strength could play a role. Indeed, Haldimand already seemed convinced 
that French—and Spanish—agents were currently busy trying to win the sympathies of the 
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Native peoples in and around Canada. As he put it, “The Rebels,” were “leaving no Stone 
unturned to gain them” and were being “assisted by the French and Spaniards.”397 Evidently a 
concern from the onset of his tenure as governor, Haldimand would continue to fear military 
attacks throughout the war.  
His report also revealed that Haldimand doubted the loyalties of many of the populations 
in or around the colony, whether they were direct subjects like the French-speaking habitants or 
possible allied forces like the Caughnawagas, Abenakis, or other Native peoples in the region. 
As the Canadian historian J. Mackay Hitsman argued: “For the next five years [following his 
arrival] Haldimand was faced by the bogey of attack by both land and sea and by fear of revolt 
by the French-speaking inhabitants of his province.”398 After all, although Haldimand had 
multiple reasons for not immediately commissioning a citadel, he also took the time to 
acknowledge in his report to Germain that doing so could very well “intimidate the People.” And 
although failing to oversee the building of a citadel should not be taken as the governor’s 
decision to simply cater to an easily disaffected habitant population, it does suggest his 
inclination to at least take into account their potential reactions before sanctioning certain 
projects. Like Carleton, Haldimand worried he only enjoyed a fragile hold over this large sector 
of the colonial population. In words reminiscent of those of his predecessor, Haldimand 
explained, “The Clergy, the Noblesse, and some Part of the Bourgeoisie in the Towns, excepted, 
the Canadians are not to be depended upon.” And that was especially the case, the governor 
qualified, “if a French War breaks out, and they see the King’s Forces, obliged to withdraw from 
the Southern Parts of the Continent.”399  
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Yet no sector of the colonial population was more suspicious in the eyes of the governor 
than the English-speaking Old Subjects. To Germain, he declared: “By all Accounts, we still 
have amongst Us many Favourers of Rebellion, who are indefatigable in their Endeavours to 
poison the Minds of the Canadians, and to swerve them from their Duty and Allegiance, some 
Natives of the Colonies, and too many old Subjects, are said to incline that Way.”400 Therefore, 
although Haldimand remained in doubt about habitants’ loyalty, constantly portraying them as 
individuals whose allegiances were so easily swayed, he nevertheless placed the onus of their 
sedition on others. Whether believed to have been influenced by local or nonlocal emissaries, 
friends, or “favourers” of the United States (none of whom were ever viewed as coming from 
habitant communities), habitants were rarely given full credit for their own sedition. It was, 
therefore, with a heightened sense of vulnerability to the ideological and military assaults of his 
administration’s enemies both in and outside of Canada that Haldimand assumed office in the 
summer of 1778. 
 
Military Schemes for Every Season 
Haldimand was not alone in anticipating a second Continental Army-led invasion. In 
August 1778, just months after Congress abandoned its expedition, a colonel named Joseph Hays 
wrote Horatio Gates with a detailed proposal for a campaign that coming winter.401 Hays tackled 
everything from procuring provisions and navigating roads with snowshoes to forming alliances 
with both Native peoples and much of Canada’s colonial population. He defended his choices 
throughout, but at no point did he ever take the time to justify the notion of undertaking a 
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Canadian expedition in the first place. Like Hazen—and to a lesser degree Gates—Hays seemed 
to view the appeal and advantages of such a military offensive as self-explanatory. And like 
Lafayette suggested months earlier, the only question that remained to be answered for Hays was 
that of timing. 
In the first half of his letter, Hays focused on describing what such a campaign could look 
like and how it would progress; in the second half, he moved on to list seven advantages that 
were unique to a winter campaign. Yet, perhaps the greatest significance of Hays’ letter lay not 
in the consciously formulated arguments that he presented, but in the assumptions he evidently 
took for granted when advancing those very arguments.  
Hays began his appeal by acknowledging that there was “but little probability of an 
expedition into Canada this summer,” before proceeding to argue that these circumstances 
actually provided an opportunity to lead a more advantageous campaign in the latter months of 
the year.402 In starting this way, Hays apparently took for granted the possibility of an upcoming 
campaign, just not one that would take place that same summer. That was not altogether 
surprising, given that Hays wrote in August of that year. Indeed, those assumptions can be found 
throughout his proposal. Neither in his opening line, nor in any other that made up his seven-
page proposal did Hays ever justify the desirability of another Canadian campaign. Apparently, 
for Hays, both the probability of its taking place, and the benefits that would follow somehow, 
were self-evident. What needed to be defended were simply the particulars of the one he was 
advancing.  
Hays’s telling assumptions continued. Later in the letter, he reasoned:  
As a large number of spare Arms and a Quantity of Amunition will certainly be 
wanted for the Use of the friendly Canadians we shall be able to Inlist, as well as 
a large train or Artillery of which, perhaps some part may be thought necessary to 
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be Heavy; these and all our other Stores can be Transported in the Winter with 
much more ease and expedition than in the Summer.403 
  
Here again, his assumptions were revealing. Hays’ argument concerned how best to provide 
arms and ammunition to the “friendly Canadians” he expected would gladly enlist, and not in 
whether Canadians remained friendly to the Continental Army’s cause or whether their 
enlistment was even conceivable. In fact, he took as a given that any commander overseeing 
such an expedition would unquestionably want to take spare arms in order to best exploit these 
favorable circumstances. And winter, Hays argued, would provide the best conditions under 
which to transport such items. Although at first his logic appeared counterintuitive, Hays paired 
that argument with one in which he claimed that because in the early weeks of winter—
specifically December—“the Frost is generally so intense that the Road being properly broke 
with Snow Shoes after every fall of Snow that happens, the Swamp will bear loaded Sleighs or 
even Cannon.”404 Moreover, winter also held the extra advantage of being a time during which 
“the Lower Class,” or habitants (the majority of the colony’s population), “have little or no 
employment,” and would therefore be more willing and able to serve as soldiers in the 
expedition.405 All such convictions came together to convince Hays that the coming winter was 
“the best time” possible to “rouse the passions of the people already inflamed against the Enemy 
and to Use the most persuasive arguments for Uniting them with us in a firm Alliance.”406 
Unlike the Canadian habitants, whose friendly disposition to their cause he freely 
accepted, Hays considered merchants in Quebec to make up “the ill affected part” of the 
population. His assessment of their disposition might have been shaped by the fact that many of 
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the merchants who had been friendly suppliers or even active supporters of the Continental 
forces in the previous campaign had vacated the colony along with the retreating soldiers in the 
summer of 1776. On top of this, the army’s severe lack of funds during the campaign had also 
meant that countless merchants had suffered considerable sums in lost revenue.  
Yet, despite his misgivings about the merchants, Hays also argued that, with them as 
well, a winter campaign would prove favorable. Because Quebec’s merchants would find it 
“very difficult” to remove their goods during that time of the year, their provisions would be 
made available to the advancing troops by default.407 Moreover, by possessing these goods, Hays 
believed that the Continental troops would find that the interests of the merchants would become 
more aligned with theirs, and would therefore help neutralize the threat that the merchants’ 
sympathies could prove to be during other seasons.  
Finally, skirmishes with Native peoples also featured in Hays’s logic. He believed that 
Indian raids on the western frontiers would be unlikely during the coming winter. By this time, 
Hays believed that neighboring Native peoples would have lost faith in British promises of 
victory and conquest, and they would consequently be much more likely to “Implore Pardon of 
us,” and to do so “in the most humble Terms.”408 That would simultaneously have the added 
advantage of limiting the distracting effects that raids would pose to the expedition itself. To be 
sure, Hay’s views mirrored commonly-held, but mistaken, notions about Native peoples and 
their participation in the Revolutionary War, which failed to account for the degree of diplomacy 
and alternative agendas that informed their alliances, active participation, or concerted neutrality. 
Despite such prejudices, Hays’s proposal was evidently a multifaceted defense for the viability 
and even favorability of a winter campaign. His attention to various issues expressed an 
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awareness of the many factors that could play a role in the proposed expedition ahead. Although 
he acknowledged foreseeable advantages in regards to the British forces then stationed in the 
colony, his attention was directed just as much to the effects the coming winter would have on 
the inclinations of colonial inhabitants and native peoples in the surrounding areas—an attention 
to detail that spoke to the seriousness of Hays’s proposal as well as the lived possibilities under 
which he operated.      
Hays’s proposal was also uncommonly important because it came from a low-ranking 
army officer. Both Hays’s comfort in proposing such a venture to a general serving on the Board 
of War and his ability to speak to the geographic, climatic, and demographic factors involved in 
a campaign demonstrated that talk of potential military offensives into Canada—as well as their 
particulars involved—had become topics of conversation at least within certain echelons of the 
Continental Army. Moreover, it is worth noting that Colonel Hays had written his proposal from 
Fishkill, one of the army’s largest military encampments, as well as the headquarters of its 
Northern Department at the time. This being the case, it is likely that while the letter could only 
fully convey Hays’s own convictions, the views he expressed might also have reflected a more 
widespread sentiment held by others stationed at Fishkill. 
Gates, himself, also continued to participate in schemes aimed at incorporating Canada 
into the union. During the summer of 1778, George Washington appointed him—together with 
Hazen and a general named Jacob Bayley—to a committee tasked with discovering “the best 
ways, and means, for the Invasion, & possession of Canada.”409 The board of officers met in 
White Plains on September 10, 1778, and reported their findings that same day. Gates, Hazen, 
and Bayley outlined approaches for both a winter and summer campaign, apparently interested in 
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accounting for all contingencies. They also made clear their strong support for a Canadian 
expedition. “The union of Canada,” they explained, “on which depends a permanent peace with 
the Indians—The Advantages resulting from their Trade—The security of our Frontiers—and the 
evasion of the extended limits of Canada by the late Quebec Bill, will, we hope, in due time, 
have its full weight in the great scale of politicks.”410 
Like Hazen, Jacob Bayley—one of the members of the Board that Washington had 
appointed—would also become a committed advocate of a second Canadian campaign. Until the 
early 1780s, he would write to Washington on the subject, constantly arguing for the practicality 
and advantages of an invasion. For the better part of that period, Bayley also concerned himself 
with sending scouting parties into Canada, communicating with Native peoples in the region, and 
intercepting British deserters, reporting every piece of intelligence he gained to Washington.   
In August 1780, Bayley would also support landowners in the New Hampshire grants in 
their petition for an invasion of Canada. That August, an individual named Bezaliel Woodward 
wrote to Washington. Woodward represented a convention of individuals from—as he put it— 
“both sides of the Connecticut river and northward of Charleston” who were calling for a 
renewed military attack on the colony. Woodward explained that “the union of Canada with the 
united States,” was in their opinion, “of the greatest importance.”411 In addition to listing a 
number of advantages that would result from the annexation of Canada, Woodward also brought 
attention to the pervasive insecurity that existed in the Connecticut River valley. He argued that 
while Canada remained in British hands, the region’s inhabitants would be obliged to “hold the 
sword in one hand and tools for husbandry in the other.” Canada, it seemed, was central to their 
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daily lives, and by extension, to their experience of the Revolutionary War.412 
In an effort to further promote a Canadian expedition, Bezaliel Woodward also 
underscored the ease with which one could be carried out. In his letter to Washington, he 
explained: “The communication from the settlements on this river to St Charles on Chamblee 
river is easy,” a road already being open “more than half the way.” The rest of the road, he 
argued, could be cleared “at very little expence.”413 Woodward was not embellishing; over the 
last several years, a road into Canada had been in the works. Beginning in the Coos region of the 
Connecticut River valley, the construction of the road quickly became a priority for military 
officials in the area, including Timothy Bedel, Jacob Bayley, and Moses Hazen. In fact, Bayley 
and Hazen became such advocates of the route that colloquial references to the road still bear 
their name. The “Bayley-Hazen Road”—or sometimes just “Hazen’s Road”—would claim the 
attentions of individuals in the region to such an extent that the British administration in Canada 
eventually got wind of it.  
The possibility of a second campaign into Canada also remained alive in Congress 
throughout 1778, even after the decision to end Lafayette’s expedition. In October of that year, a 
plan for the reduction of Canada was drafted yet again.414 Once approved, a copy of the plan was 
sent to Benjamin Franklin, who was then in France, serving as a minister to the French Court, 
and foreign commissioner of Congress. Along with a draft of the plan, Congress provided 
Franklin additional instructions: “The above plan… you shall lay substantially before the French 
minister. You shall consult the Marquis de la Fayette on any difficulties which may arise; and 
refer the ministry to him, as he hath made it his particular study to gain information on those 
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important points.”415 Franklin’s instructions carried a number of implications. For one, the 
French court was expected to be especially interested in a campaign involving Quebec—its 
former colony. For another, Lafayette was still associated with potential expeditions into the 
colony. His participation earlier that year, in the approved—but subsequently abandoned—
second campaign, was evidently not forgotten. On the contrary, Congress viewed Lafayette, who 
had apparently maintained an ongoing “study” of the possibilities and avenues for these kinds of 
ventures, as an asset.  
Once again, secrecy would be a key component. Congress had laid out specific strategies 
for how the plan would remain concealed from British forces. As the plan of attack stipulated, 
French soldiers poised for military action in Canada were to act as though they were headed for 
the West Indies. And in lieu of carrying coats, which would be necessary during the winter but 
could also give away their real destination, they were to take blankets “of a large size.”416 These 
would then be turned into coats, Congress explained, “when the weather grows cool.”417 
Additionally, in anticipation of Canadian participation in the proposed campaign, French troops 
would also be expected to transport and provide spare arms. Such items “might be put up in 
boxes, and marked as for the militia of one of the French islands” in yet another attempt to 
disguise their intended purpose.418    
Congress’s use of the West Indies in its plan was not coincidental. The direct 
involvement of France—and later Spain—in the American Revolutionary War had redirected 
much of Britain’s attention in the Americas to the Caribbean. Therefore, although Congress’s 
choice to use the region as a diversion was a conscious one, it likely stemmed from an 
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unconscious recognition of the Caribbean’s crucial role in the ongoing war. The importance of 
the West Indies to their plan also goes to show the many geographical spheres under which 
congressional delegates operated, as well as their willingness to use these connections to their 
own benefit. The boundaries so often assumed to have effectively separated continental North 
America and the Caribbean either did not exist or were not as impermeable at the time.419 
Moreover, although preparations and routes were outlined, Congress’s new plan was 
much more flexible than previous ones. “The time of [the troops’] departure,” the plan stipulated, 
“must depend upon circumstances; and their object be kept as secret as the nature of the thing 
will permit.”420 In addition to the flexibility with which the start of campaign was approached, 
Congress’ plan was riddled with contingency plans at almost every step. Throughout the course 
of the campaign, its commanders would be tasked with securing pivotal posts, waterways, and 
routes that would allowed for a safe retreat, if, indeed, one was needed. Like many of the 
proposals that had emerged since the army’s 1775-76 campaign, proponents of renewed 
expeditions into Canada took care to account for military setbacks and reversals—both of which 
became easier to envision after the failure of the first Canadian campaign and premature end of 
the second.  
However, a key difference in this particular plan was the attention paid to foreign allies. 
Unlike proposals like that of Colonel Hays, Congress’s plan did not take for granted the 
importance of another Canadian campaign. There were justifications—both explicitly and 
implicitly expressed. “The reduction of Halifax and Quebec,” read part of the plan, “are objects 
of the highest importance to the allies, they must be attempted.” Clearly meant as an explicit 
rationale for a campaign, this statement nevertheless contained a number of justifications left 
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unstated. The plan stipulated that a campaign was important to allies, such as France, but 
nowhere did it explain why this meant that campaigns against these colonies “must,” therefore, 
“be attempted.”  
It is not that there was no connection there—what was beneficial to allied powers would 
surely factor into the Continental Army’s strategies. Indeed, at this stage in the war, the military 
viability of the United States was partly the product of its foreign alliances.421 Even in the very 
draft of the plan in question, the delegates admitted: “In order then to secure, as far as human 
wisdom can provide, the reduction of those places, aid must be obtained from France.”422 As a 
result, Congress and the army would be at pains to pander to the wishes of France and later 
Spain. What was taken for granted, on the other hand, was the importance of Halifax and Quebec 
to the United States themselves.  
If foreign allies were expected to support attempts to occupy Halifax and Quebec, they 
were not expected to claim the colonies for themselves. France would have much to gain 
commercially, as it would gain renewed access to the Newfoundland fisheries and the fur trade. 
It would also benefit from knowing that the reduction of the colonies would “strengthen her 
allies; and guarantee more strongly their freedom and independence.”423 Yet there was no 
confusion about which power would lay claim to both of these colonies, if the plan proved 
successful. As the draft made clear, success would mean “The accession of two states to the 
union”424—a fate with no accompanying explanation. Canada—as well as Halifax, it seemed, fell 
within the natural purview of the United States, at least as far as Congress was concerned.  
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“The Bogey of Attack:” Continued Fears of Invasion in Canada 
Word of France’s potential involvement in a military invasion of Canada literally got out. 
In anticipation of a future assault, the Comte d’Estaing, who commanded the French fleet, 
penned an address to Canada’s inhabitants, soliciting their future support. Both emissaries and 
supporters of the United States helped circulate printed copies of d’Estaing’s address among the 
colony’s French-speaking communities. Consequently, it did not take long for Haldimand and 
his commanding officers stationed at various posts throughout the colony to get wind of the 
proposed expedition. Their dependence on hearsay, however, meant that details of the campaign 
did not always agree. By late January 1779, Brigadier General William Powell, who believed 
that fulfilling his responsibilities as commander at St. Johns meant constantly employing 
scouting parties, had began reporting accounts of an upcoming invasion.425 He wrote to 
Haldimand on January 23, detailing a rumor then circulating in Montreal “that some Indians are 
arriv’d at St. Francis from Albany, who give an account, that twenty thousand Rebels are 
assembling there, who are intended to invade this Province under the command of the Marquis 
de Fayette.”426 Yet, exactly a month later, on February 23, Powell reassured Haldimand that with 
Lake Champlain being “so broke up,” it would be “impossible for the Rebels to make any 
attempt upon the Province” that season.427 By early March, he was instead reporting loyalists’ 
accounts of a summer invasion.  
Although providing Haldimand with what amounted to varied and often contradictory 
reports, Powell was not alone in regularly warning the governor about upcoming invasions. Until 
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the Revolutionary War ended, Haldimand received so many reports promising future campaigns 
that it seemed with every passing season, plans for a new invasion into Canada took root. In her 
study of the political and constitutional history of early British Canada, Hilda Neatby noted that 
trend, claiming: “From his arrival in 1778 until the summer of 1782 [Haldimand] heard countless 
rumours and received many official notifications of invasions planned by the Richelieu route, or 
by a French fleet from the Gulf of St Lawrence. From November to May the gulf was secure, but 
only during the brief period of the spring thaw could he relax his vigilance on the Richelieu and 
the St Francis.”428 As Neatby acknowledged, regardless of the discrepancies between incoming 
reports, the severity of a possible attack was never lost on the governor.  
Mindful of the varied rumors that flowed in the wake of D’Estaing’s address to the 
Canada’s French-speaking colonists, Haldimand approached the political administration of the 
colony cautiously. Hoping to avoid alienating any sector of the population at all cost, the 
governor discouraged policy changes that could appear either too sudden or too extreme. He 
opened the 1779 session of the colony’s Legislative Council with a speech in which he cautioned 
its members from pursuing policies with even the slightest whiff of self-interestedness. Later that 
winter, in a letter to Richard Cumberland, Haldimand summarized his approach to civil matters 
in similar language. He explained,  
In the present uncertain Situation of all things here, while our restless Neighbours 
are Constantly threatning Us with a Visit, and we have in the Heart of the 
Province, too Many favourers of their Schemes, ready to give them every 
Assistance in their Power, it did not appear to me right, to form new Regulations, 
or that a Discusion of those already Made Should be entered upon, as possibly it 
might Set rumours afloat.429  
 
The governor’s cautious approach to the civil administration of Canada continued to define the 
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tone of the Legislative Council sessions throughout the next several years. In language strikingly 
similar to that of 1779, Haldimand opened the council’s 1780 session with an address describing 
the then “present times” as still “not the most favorable for Establishing fixed and permanent 
regulations.” As he did before, and as he would continue to do so, Haldimand advised limiting 
all serious consideration to matters of primary importance—“of the first necessary of Life”—in 
coping with the ongoing “American Troubles.”430  
But the governor was saddled with accounts that relayed more than just proposed military 
invasions. From the time he assumed office until the end of the Revolutionary War, Haldimand 
received countless reports detailing the suspected, reported, and confirmed incursions of 
Revolutionary scouting parties and emissaries in the colony. Although these smaller-scale 
incursions posed less of an immediate threat to his administration than a full-scale military 
campaign, the intelligence such agents could transmit in-and-out of the colony could be nearly as 
damaging in the long run. Believing—as Haldimand and many of his administrative and military 
officials did—that the majority of the colony’s population was both impressionable and on the 
brink of rebellion, the governor took steps to limit the movements of both scouting parties and 
other emissaries. As he had assured Lord George Germain, Haldimand had concerned himself 
with securing the “avenues” into the colony soon after his arrival in Canada. But, as was not 
surprising to a governor who had lamented more than once the extensiveness of the province 
under his command, scouting parties, emissaries, and even deserters of the British forces could 
and did find ways to cross Canada’s borders on a more-or-less continuous basis.  
The threat emissaries, scouting parties, and deserting British soldiers posed was 
multifaceted. As mentioned above, their ability to transmit information in-and-out of the colony 
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was perhaps the most obvious of the administration’s concerns. Yet, as Haldimand himself 
seemed to realize as soon as he took office, the facility with which many envoys or friends of the 
United States seemed to move through the colony suggested an impressive degree of familiarity 
with Canada’s countryside and colonial populations. Indeed, their familiarity with the colony 
was such that most of the time, they seemed to be one step ahead of Haldimand’s administrative 
and military officers. On July 2, 1779, Powell assured Haldimand that he would attempt “all 
possible means to intercept the Rebel Scouts, which frequent the Province, but as they often 
change their rout it will be difficult to take them; our Rangers not being expert at tracking in the 
woods.”431 Perhaps one of the more subtle, but nonetheless more pressing, issues the existence of 
revolutionary agents or deserters raised was the fact that their movements were often made 
possible by the assistance afforded by the colony’s inhabitants.  
As the British administration was well aware, habitants, together with a number of Old 
Subjects in Canada, housed, fed, supplied, and even guided revolutionary emissaries, scouting 
parties, prisoners, and others friendly to the United States. When individuals like Powell reported 
accounts of scouting parties, for example, they frequently speculated on which communities had 
assisted their efforts, sometimes even naming specific individuals. Indeed, in the very letter 
Powell expressed his frustration with “Rebel Scouts” and their constantly altered routes, he also 
reported that he had received information that “the Inhabitants of St. Charles” were known to 
have carried on a “correspondence” with most of the scouts who had recently visited the 
province.432 So although “rebel” incursions were viewed as representing external threats, they 
were always understood as connected to internal affairs. 
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Given Haldimand’s qualms about activity both in and outside of Canada, the governor 
had long deployed his own scouts and emissaries throughout the Canadian countryside and 
neighboring colonies. His strategy since taking office had been one that was primarily defensive, 
seeking to retain control over Canada and its inhabitants rather than mount additional military 
forays into the neighboring United States.433 Yet, as the war progressed and loyalist refugees had 
begun fleeing from locales within the United States into British Canada, Haldimand found 
himself in the awkward and highly disconcerting position of having to both facilitate the 
movement of self-declared loyal British subjects across the province’s boundaries while, at the 
same time, preventing that of revolutionary agents and spies, The trouble was, both loyalists and 
spies would naturally insist on their loyalty to the British Empire. Somewhat ironically, then, the 
increasing arrival of loyalists in the province served to heighten Haldimand’s sense of 
insecurity.434  
In July 1781, as a way to more closely monitor movement along the province’s borders, 
Haldimand commissioned the creation of a post on the northern end of Lake Champlain, which 
would be named the Loyal Block House.435 To both oversee the creation of the blockhouse as 
well as assume control of it once it was completed, Haldimand appointed a loyalist from the New 
Hampshire Grants region named Justus Sherwood. Sherwood had served as a British scout since 
1777, and, in the summer of 1781, the governor had also granted him a supervisory role in his 
administration’s secret service.436 In the last months of 1781, when the Loyal Block House was 
complete, Sherwood occupied himself with sending parties scouts into the neighboring regions 
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on a fairly consistent basis. His correspondence with Haldimand and the governor’s secretary, 
Captain Robert Mathews in the months following the start of his tenure at the block house reveal 
the continuing threat of a Continental Army-led invasion. Running counter to the notion that 
Lord Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown was viewed as the unofficial end of the Revolutionary 
War in North America, Haldimand’s fears of an invasion actually grew after 1781. In a letter 
Mathews wrote to Sherwood in February 1782, the governor’s secretary advised Sherwood to 
send scouts into the Connecticut River Valley, which he presented as the most likely route into 
Canada that the Continental forces would follow.437  
Almost immediately after receiving Mathews’s letter, Sherwood issued a general order to 
all of his agents, especially those already located in the Connecticut River Valley. He tasked 
them with discovering General Washington’s “particular objective,” requesting that they 
communicate it to Sherwood as quickly as possible. Evidently anticipating the possibility that 
Washington’s sights were set on Canada, Sherwood explained that if the Continental Army’s 
objective was to attack the British colony, the agents should “at any expense or risk immediately 
dispatch different messengers, unknown to each other, to [the Loyal Block House].”438 The 
anxieties of British administrators in Canada, such as Haldimand, Mathews, and Sherwood, were 
somewhat validated by the reports of agents describing the movement of artillery and men, 
seemingly preparing for a Canadian invasion.439 And such reports were not wholly unjustified. 
As late as May 1, 1782, Washington contemplated an attack on the colony, drawing up “an 
ambitious plan for the conquest of Canada which he envisioned for that September,” consisting 
of a “Franco-American force of 8,000 men” that would strike Quebec from both the Richelieu 
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river route and the St. Lawrence River. As Ian Cleghorn Pemberton argued in his study of Justus 
Sherwood, “Washington’s plan never materialized, but its very existence justified the British fear 
of invasion.”440 
 
Conclusion 
Although a second Canadian campaign never came to pass, for many individuals in and 
outside of Canada, the years between 1776 and 1783 provided countless opportunities to hope 
for, plan, propose, and fret over the possibility of another military invasion of the colony. To 
limit the study of Canada to the mid-1770s, not exceeding the end of the Canadian Campaign in 
the summer of 1776, is to take for granted Canada’s eventual fate as a British colony in 1783. 
This approach, which relies solely on hindsight, denies agency to the many individuals whose 
actions and expectations were shaped by that very possibility. It denies agency, for example, to 
those who labored to clear a road from the Coos region in the upper Connecticut River Valley to 
the St. John’s, just south of Montreal. It dismisses the hopeful expectations of individuals like 
Moses Haze, Jacob Bayley, Timothy Bedel, and Bezaliel Woodward as well as the 
overwhelming anxieities of Guy Carleton, Frederick Haldimand, Hector Cramahé, and Justus 
Sherwood, all of whom considered the completion of the “Hazen’s road” a viable possibility.   
Attaining a more faithful understanding of Canada’s place within the American 
Revolution and the geopolitical imaginings of the time requires a more careful understanding of 
the schemes for a second Canadian campaign that, while ultimately unfulfilled, shaped the 
actions and experiences of countless individuals of the time. That, in turn, prompts us to consider 
both Hazen and “Hazen’s road” as productive points of entry into an alternative history of 
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Canada and the revolution. As this chapter has demonstrated, their value rests not in their ability 
to chronicle what ultimately transpired in the latter years of the Revolutionary War, but rather in 
their power to shed light on some of the lived possibilities of the time. As Hazen was aware, 
Canada’s fate was not spoken for, and the notion that it could one day join the United States was 
viable enough to inspire concrete action among members of Congress, the Continental Army, the 
Board of War, Canada’s colonial government, and various local assemblies and settlements. For 
him, the significance of the war was tied not only to the routes he did take, but also to the ones 
he did not, including, of course, “Hazen’s Road.” As he assured Timothy Bedel in the late 1770s, 
he maintained the possibility of a second Canadian campaign constantly in view.  
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Epilogue 
 
“The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of 
Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us experience 
for the attack of Halifax the next, and the final expulsion of England 
from the American continent.” Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 
August 4, 1812441 
 
On November 30, 1813, Thomas Jefferson wrote to his friend, the French nobleman the 
Marquis de Lafayette. After extending formal greetings and inquiring into more personal matters, 
the former United States president quickly segued into his more pressing concern: the nation’s 
current war with Britain. Begun in June of the previous year, the War of 1812 eventually gained 
the reputation of being the second American Revolution.442 “You have heard,” Jefferson wrote to 
Lafayette, “how inauspiciously our war began.” But rather than having a disheartening effect, 
Jefferson claimed, military setbacks had “only sunk deeper into our hearts the necessity of 
reexertion,” sparking a steadfast determination that seemingly paid off well. Measuring the 
success of the United States’ efforts in Canadian conquests, he boasted “every thing above the 
Eastern end of L[ake] Ontario is already in our possession, and I might venture to say to the 
walls of Quebec.”443 A day earlier, Jefferson had expressed similar views to Pierre Samuel du 
Pont de Nemours, a French refugee, who had moved to the United States during his nation’s own 
revolution.444 With an eye towards the southern stretches of republic, he asserted: “I consider 
ourselves as now possessed of every thing from Florida to the walls of Quebec.”445 Canada, the 
seemingly illusory target of the late eighteenth century, finally appeared to be within the grasp of 
                                                
441 Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 4 August 1812, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, ed. J. 
Jefferson Looney (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004-2017) (hereafter TJPR), 5: 293-294. 
442 See Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). 
443 Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis de Lafayette, 30 November 1813, TJPR, 7: 13-16. 
444 For more on Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (as well as four other French political “refugees” who traveled to 
the United States during the French Revolution), see François Furstenberg, When the United States Spoke French: 
Five Refugees Who Shaped a Nation (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).  
445 Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, 29 November 1813, TJPR, 7: 6-9. 
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the United States. 
Jefferson was arguably one of the most optimistic advocates of continued action in 
Canada—and perhaps a little too quick to expect the best—but he was not alone in considering 
Canada a conceivable war prize. In the spring of 1812, before the war began, General Henry 
Dearborn sent President James Madison a detailed plan of attack against British forces in 
Canada. Having participated in the unsuccessful Canadian Campaign of 1775-1776 and having 
recently served as the United States’ Secretary of War, Dearborn offered himself as the possible 
commander in a future invasion. In his “hasty Sketch,” he described the conquest of Canada as 
not just feasible, but also of “infinite importance” should war be declared. He argued that his 
plan would lead to a quick peace that favored the United States. He even asserted that “every 
intelligent man” would naturally agree with him, viewing the steps listed as “the only legitimate 
policy.”446 
Of course, not everyone who weighed in on the subject of Canada’s annexation was 
either as optimistic or laudatory. On March 15, 1813, for example, the famed physician, 
Benjamin Rush, penned a message rife with anxiety and rebukes. Fearful that the nascent 
republic was in danger of losing its way, Rush warned against the conquest of Canada. “The 
Attack upon Canada,” he argued, “appears to involve in it too much of the conquering Spirit of 
the old world, and is contrary to the professions and interests of Republicans.” Offering a 
hypothetical, Rush continued: “Admit that we have conquered it,—shall We hold it as a 
province? or give it a representation in our national legislature? If the latter,—by what means 
shall we eliminate British principles and habits from the representatives that will be sent by that 
British state to our Congress? Have we not evils eno’ to contend with already from those 
                                                
446 Henry Dearborn to James Madison, 6 April 1812, The Papers of James Madison, Presidential Series, ed. J.C.A. 
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principles and habits?”447 
Despite their differences of opinions, Americans evidently viewed the question of 
Canada’s potential place in their republic as a topic worth serious consideration. Even before the 
outbreak of war, a former United States senator, the Pennsylvanian George Logan, spoke of it as 
“the contemplated invasion of Canada,” which “every rational citizen regards with horror 
(emphasis mine).” 448 Although Logan’s fears came from his apprehension of sparking a war 
with Britain and not from the consequences of the nation’s potential annexation of Canada, they 
revealed the degree to which informed Americans were expected to know of—and to form 
opinions about—the possibility of adding the region to their union. Indeed, when, after only 
three months of warfare, the United States had not invaded British Canada, the American and 
Kentucky resident, Robert Johnson, wrote to Madison lamenting the lack of action.449 Johnson 
explained that much of that state’s population “expected when warr [sic] was declared that 
10,000 men would have been ordered to upper Canada to take that province and enex it to the 
United States, and at the same time the number or more ordered to lower Canada to prevent 
reinforcements from one place to the other.” “In this reasonable Expectation,” he explained, 
“they have been with regret much disappointed.”450 Others, like Rush, were likely not 
disappointed. Yet, regardless of Americans’ personal views, Canada clearly cast a long shadow 
over their understandings of the current war.  
 
 
 
                                                
447 Benjamin Rush to Thomas Jefferson, 15 March 1813, TJPR, 6: 13-16. 
448 George Logan to James Madison, 31 March 1812, JMP, 4: 277-278.  
449 Kentucky became the union’s fifteenth state in 1792.  
450 Robert Johnson to James Madison, 3 September 1812, JMP, 5: 260-262.  
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Canada and the Canadas 
 
To be sure, as a geographic region, Canada held a different meaning in the early 1800s 
than during the Revolutionary era. In 1791, largely because of loyalists’ migration into the 
province of Quebec and their tendency to settle in its western interior, Parliament split the 
extensive colony in two, naming the resulting sections Upper and Lower Canada (often referred 
to as “the Canadas” in Canadian historiography).451 Although “Quebec” continued to refer to the 
capital city of what was now Lower Canada, “Canada” became a blanket term for British 
holdings in northern North America, including Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
Given the altered geopolitics of British America, annexing Quebec was one thing; taking 
possession of Canada as a whole was a different endeavor entirely. As Jefferson phrased it in a 
letter he wrote to William Duane at the start of the War of 1812, the nation’s aim was “the final 
expulsion of England from the American continent.” And with Britain’s continental holdings 
reduced to Canada—having ceded both East and West Florida back to Spain during the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Paris in 1783—the possibility of expelling the longstanding empire 
was conceivable in ways it had not been before. 
                                                
451 With the onslaught of displaced American loyalists who had left their homes during the American Revolution and 
its immediate aftermath for the refuge of British Canada, Canada itself changed in social and political ways. Like 
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sanctioned the formation of representative legislative assemblies in both. On the Constitutional Act of 1791, see 
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Situated right in the midst of the Age of Revolutions, the 1810s seemed aptly suited for 
disrupting imperial bonds that stretched across the Atlantic world.452 In a context of imperial 
reshuffling, Americans likely attributed a certain volatility to geographic boundaries that is 
difficult to comprehend in the twenty-first century, where the figure of the nation-state looms 
large. Perhaps more than in the previous decades, Americans could envision alternative 
geographies. In the summer of 1812, the British merchant Charles Hall wrote to Jefferson, 
confiding: “I have always considered the River St Lawrence the natural Northern boundary of 
the United States, and hope no time will be lost in attacking Canada so as the Army may be there 
before any reinforcement could arrive from England or Ireland.” 
Hall’s thoughts on the nation’s “natural Northern boundary” were likely neither 
coincidental or unique. Despite the growing appeal of western settlement into the American 
interior, Britain’s Canadian colonies seemed to weigh heavily on the nation’s collective 
geographic imaging. In fact, 1812 was not the first time the prospect of adding sections of 
Canada to the new American republic had come up as a notable topic of conversation. In 1793, 
Edmond Charles Genêt, a French ambassador to the United States during the French Revolution, 
had sought to accomplish just that. In an address to French-speaking Canadians, he encouraged 
the colonial population to look upon France and United States as allies while also attempting to 
inspire colonial resistance against the British Empire. As he later put it, it was time to extend 
“the American constellation to the beautiful star of Canada.”453 Years later, almost immediately 
                                                
452 In addition to the American Revolution, the Age of Revolutions also included the French Revolution, the Haitian 
Revolution and the Latin American struggles for independence. Until recently, the Haitian Revolution has often 
been overlooked within studies of the period. See especially Trouillot, Silencing the Past. See also Laurent DuBois 
Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). On 
the United States’ responses to Latin American independence movements, see Caitlin Fitz, Our Sister Republics: 
The United States in an Age of American Revolutions (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016). 
453 “Mémoire pour Servir d’instruction au Citoyen Genet,” in Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., Correspondence of the 
French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 204-205. 
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after the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Paine wrote the then-current president with similar views. 
On the subject of Canada, he explained:  
 
That the idea of extending the territory of the United States was always 
contemplated, whenever the opportunity offered itself, is, I think, evident from the 
opinion that has existed from the Commencement of the Revolution that Canada 
would, at some time or other, become a part of the United States; and there is an 
Article either in the treaty with France (I have not the treaty by me) or in some 
Correspondence with that Government, that in case of a Conquest of Canada by 
the assistance [of] France, Canada should become a part of the United States.454 
 
Although Paine depicted the United States as a nation constantly eager to grow geographically, 
he also clearly viewed its interest in Canada as a unique case.  
But the shifting geopolitics of the age were far from the only reason why the prospect of 
annexing Canada to the United States had changed between the Revolutionary War and the War 
of 1812. By the time war broke out in June 1812, Americans were only three decades removed 
from the peace treaty that confirmed their nation’s independence. The very struggle on which 
their collective sense of national identity rested was within living memory. Naturally then, the 
individuals and obstacles that stood against the revolutionary action and rhetoric of the 1760s-
1780s were also easily recalled. Certainly, Britain and its role in the struggle for American 
independence loomed large, but so too did loyalists. Whether in the form of refugees who had 
fled their homes during the Revolutionary War or individuals who had faced the unhappy 
challenges of reintegrating themselves into their local communities, the figure of a loyalist was 
difficult for most Americans to square with their understanding of the revolution and its 
justification. In many ways, the enmity between Americans and their Canadian loyalist neighbors 
was easier to preserve than that between themselves and their former imperial agents. Not only 
                                                
454 Thomas Paine to Thomas Jefferson, 23 September 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Barbara B. Oberg 
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was that animosity more practical for commercial and political reasons, it was also fueled by a 
greater sense of personal betrayal. Unlike the more abstract relationships between North 
America’s former British colonists and their king and ministry officials, those among colonists 
were more messy and direct—more intimate. As the historian Maya Jasanoff recently reminded 
readers, the revolution was not just a contest for independence, it was also a civil war.455 
Within the altered circumstances of the 1810s, incorporating Canada in the United States 
was, therefore, a different geopolitical project. Change was everywhere. As a geographic 
referent, Canada now held a different meaning. The boundaries of Britain’s Canadian holdings 
were redrawn in the years following the American Revolution (and then redrawn again). The 
demographic profile of the region’s colonial population was forever altered. Even the United 
States as a republic had itself changed. By 1812, the young nation had already added five 
additional states to its original thirteen. Indeed, Paine was justified when, in his 1803 letter to 
Jefferson, he claimed “the idea of extending the territory of the United States was always 
contemplated, whenever the opportunity offered itself.”456 Not surprisingly then, annexing 
Canada to the young—but already expanding—empire promised more than just additional 
territory.  
As Jefferson described it in 1812, in his letter to William Duane, claiming control over 
Canada ensured “the final expulsion of England from the American continent.”457 Like the 
American Revolution, the War of 1812 was an anti-imperial war. Yet this time, the war in 
question was situated within an Atlantic world that not only encouraged such endeavors, but had 
                                                
455 Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, 21-53. 
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457 Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 4 August 1812, TJPR, 5: 293-294. 
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also raised the stakes of doing so. Britain, of course, was expected to feel the effects of its 
expulsion, but loyalists in Canada were as well. Once incorporated into the United States, 
Canadian loyalists would cease to be an ideological threat to the new republic and its self-
appointed mission. The contest against “old world empires” in North America required more 
than just victors and losers, it required witnesses, especially those living in Canada.  
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